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INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY FOR CORPORATE  
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
JOSEPH K. LEAHY* 
ABSTRACT 
 A corporation contributes to a Super PAC that supports a candidate for public office. A 
shareholder sues, alleging that management breached its duty of loyalty by making the con-
tribution to promote its own political views rather than to serve the corporation’s best inter-
ests—i.e., by acting in bad faith. What standard will a Delaware court apply when review-
ing management’s decision to cause the corporation to make the contribution? 
 Myriad scholars have opined that the court will apply the standard of review for ordi-
nary business decisions: the management-friendly business judgment rule. Unfortunately 
for our shareholder plaintiff, this rule presumes that management acts rationally, without a 
conflict of interest, and in good faith. Further, management can easily concoct a justification 
for supporting any major-party political candidate. Thus, absent a “smoking gun” that 
points to bad faith, it will be extremely difficult for a shareholder to prove that management 
has acted disloyally. 
 This Article departs from the scholarly consensus that courts should apply the business 
judgment rule to review corporate political contributions. Instead, courts should apply the 
intermediate level of scrutiny—the Unocal test—that is applied whenever management 
adopts defensive measures in the face of a hostile takeover. Delaware courts apply Unocal to 
defensive measures due to the “omnipresent specter” that management will promote its own 
interests over the corporation’s best interests. Under Unocal, management must earn the 
protection of the business judgment rule by establishing the reasonableness and proportion-
ality of its defensive actions. 
 Courts evaluating management’s decision to make a Super PAC contribution should 
apply Unocal for two related reasons. First, like corporate charitable donations, corporate 
political contributions give rise to serious agency cost concerns. These same concerns led 
prior commentators to propose applying intermediate scrutiny to charitable contributions; 
post-Citizens United, this proposal should be updated to include corporate political contri-
butions. Second, upon closer review, corporate Super PAC contributions give rise to greater 
agency cost concerns than corporate charitable gifts, due to the increased potential of man-
agement pretext in the former context. Indeed, although corporate Super PAC contributions 
do not pose an inherent conflict between management and the corporation, the possibility of 
pretext is so great that there is an “omnipresent specter” that management will serve its own 
purposes whenever it causes the corporation to make a political contribution. 
 Therefore, by analogy to Unocal, a court evaluating a corporate political contribution 
should ask (1) whether management had reasonable grounds to believe that the contribution 
would directly or indirectly advance specific corporate interests, rather than some general 
political viewpoint; and (2) whether the contribution was reasonable, both as a method of 
addressing the specific corporate interest and in its amount. Only if management can show 
that the political contribution satisfies both prongs should it be protected by the business 
judgment rule. 
 
 I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................  1121 
 II. DERIVATIVE SUITS, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AND  
THE UNOCAL TEST ............................................................................................  1133 
                                                                                                                  
 * Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law—Houston. Thanks to participants 
at the 2013 Southeastern Law Scholars Conference and the 2014 National Business Law 
Scholars Conference, and to my colleagues at South Texas, for their helpful suggestions. 
Thanks also to Joseph Collins, Kristina Rosado, and Matt Rowe for their helpful research 
assistance.  
1120  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1119 
 
 A. The Two Traditional Standards of Review for Shareholder Derivative 
Actions........................................................................................................  1133 
1.   The Business Judgment Rule—For Ordinary Business Decisions ......  1133 
2.   “Entire” Fairness—For Conflicted Transactions .................................  1134 
 B. The Unocal Decision ..................................................................................  1135 
1.   Factual Background of the Unocal Case ..............................................  1135 
2.   The Factual Backdrop: Takeover Battles on the Rise ..........................  1139 
3.   The Legal Backdrop: Cheff and Bennett .............................................  1140 
 C. Unocal’s “Intermediate” Scrutiny: “Enhanced” Business Judgment 
Review ........................................................................................................  1142 
1.   The Unocal Decision: A New Standard of Review ...............................  1142 
2.   Updating Unocal: Unitrin’s Modifications ..........................................  1144 
(a)   Factual Background to Unitrin ...................................................  1144 
(b)   Unitrin’s Modifications to Unocal ................................................  1145 
3.   The Unocal Test vs. Entire Fairness and the Business Judgment 
Rule ......................................................................................................  1146 
 C. Why Intermediate Scrutiny? The Famed “Omnipresent Specter” ..............  1147 
1.   Unocal’s Unclear Exhortation to an “Inherent” Conflict ......................  1147 
2.   The Crux of the Conflict: Shareholders’ Premium vs.  
Directors’ Seats ....................................................................................  1148 
3.   Why Not Entire Fairness? ....................................................................  1152 
4.   The Important (but Oft-Ignored) Role of Potential Pretext ..................  1152 
(a)   Why Pretext is Important .............................................................  1152 
(b)   Delaware Courts: Unocal “Smokes Out” Pretext ..........................  1155 
(c)   Unocal Forces Management to Make Its Case ..............................  1156 
 III. THE ARGUMENT BY ANALOGY: CORPORATE POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS RAISE 
THE SAME AGENCY COST CONCERNS AS CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY ..............  1157 
 A. When Corporations Simply Give Money Away ..........................................  1158 
1.   Corporate Gifts to Charity ...................................................................  1158 
2.   Corporate Political Contributions As Close Cousins ...........................  1161 
 B. The Problem with Just Giving Money Away: Enabling Agency Costs ......  1162 
1.   Corporate Charitable Donations as Quasi-Self-Dealing .....................  1162 
(a)   Understanding the Problem: A Hypothetical Example ................  1163 
 (1)   An Ordinary Business Decision .............................................  1163 
 (2)   A Decision to Make a Charitable Donation ...........................  1165 
 (3)   A Different Take: Corporate Philanthropy As Corporate  
      Opportunity .............................................................................  1169 
 C. The Law of Corporate Charitable Donations and Critiques Thereof ........  1171 
1.   Corporations’ Statutory Authority to Make Charitable Donations......  1171 
2.   How Courts Review Corporate Gifts to Charity ...................................  1172 
3.   Calls for Judicial Scrutiny and Understanding the Precise Nature of 
the Problem ..........................................................................................  1175 
 D. One Proposal For Reform: Apply Intermediate Scrutiny ...........................  1177 
1.   Three Types of Corporate Contributions ..............................................  1177 
2.   Two Frameworks Rejected ...................................................................  1179 
3.   The Proposed Framework: Three Tiers of Review................................  1179 
4.   Corporate Philanthropy and Defensive Measures Compared ..............  1180 
 E. Expanding Balotti and Hanks’s Framework to Include Corporate 
Political Contributions...............................................................................  1182 
 IV. BEYOND THE ANALOGY: CORPORATE POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS ARE MORE 
PROBLEMATIC THAN CORPORATE CHARITABLE DONATIONS .............................  1184 
2017]  INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY 1121 
 
 A. Corporate Political Spending Raises Greater Agency Cost Concerns 
Than Corporate Philanthropy ...................................................................  1184 
1.   Political Contributions Support Candidates, Not Policies ..................  1187 
(a)   With Politicians, Corporations Must Take the Good With the  
 Bad ...............................................................................................  1187 
 (1)   Politicians Have Views on Many Issues .................................  1187 
2.   The Problem of “Dark Money” ..............................................................  1189 
3.   Some Real-World Examples .................................................................  1191 
(a)   Target’s Contribution to MN Forward .........................................  1191 
(b)   The Additional Complication of Dark Money ..............................  1193 
(c)   Politicians Cannot Be Held to Their Promises .............................  1194 
4.   Charity Is Supposed to Be Altruistic; Politics Can Be Selfish .............  1196 
5.   Political Contributions Are Unlikely to Foster Goodwill .....................  1198 
 B. Corporate Political Contributions and Defensive Measures Compared ....  1200 
1.   Corporate Political Contributions Raise an Inherently Strong Risk of 
a Management Conflict of Interest ......................................................  1200 
(a)   No Inherent Conflict…. ................................................................  1201 
(b)  . . . But Far Greater Potential for Pretext ......................................  1204 
2.   A Response to Arguments that Political Contributions Do Not Raise 
Unusual Agency Cost Concerns ...........................................................  1205 
(a)   Takeover Markets Are Inadequate Regulators of Political  
 Spending ......................................................................................  1205 
(b)   Boards Are Unlikely to Rein In CEO Political Spending ............  1207 
 V. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY FOR CORPORATE POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS ..........  1209 
 A. The Proposed Test: In Brief .......................................................................  1210 
 B. The Proposed Test: Detailed Application ...................................................  1210 
1.   Prong One in Greater Detail ................................................................  1210 
2.   Prong Two in Greater Detail ................................................................  1213 
 C. The Proposed Test in Action ......................................................................  1216 
1.   Target Corp.’s Donation to MN Forward .............................................  1216 
2.   News Corp.’s Contribution to the Republican  
Governor’s Association .........................................................................  1219 
 VI. CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................  1223 
 
[When applying the Unocal test,] [t]he court must . . . look at the 
possibility that personal interests short of pure self-dealing have 
influenced the board. . . . Through this examination, the court 
seeks to assure itself that the board acted reasonably . . . for the 
purpose of advancing a proper objective, and to thereby smoke out 
mere pretextual justifications for improperly motivated decisions.1 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 A public corporation contributes to a Super PAC that supports a 
candidate for public office.2 A shareholder learns of the contribution3 
                                                                                                                  
 1. In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 598 (Del. Ch. 2010) (Strine, V.C.). 
 2. Super PACs are political action committees that can spend unlimited money to 
expressly advocate the election or defeat of candidates for federal political office, but cannot 
contribute to or coordinate their spending with candidates or campaigns. See Joseph K. 
Leahy, Are Corporate Super PAC Contributions Waste or Self-Dealing? A Closer Look, 79 
MO. L. REV. 283, 295-96 (2014) [hereinafter Leahy, A Closer Look] (describing Super PACs). 
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and sues the board of directors (and/or executive officers),4 alleging 
that they breached their duty of loyalty by causing the corporation to 
make the contribution. The shareholder plaintiff argues that man-
agement made the contribution in bad faith, to serve the personal or 
political interests of certain members of senior management, rather 
than the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. Fur-
ther, the shareholder alleges that management’s stated rationale for 
the contribution (if any)5 is pretext. What standard will a court apply 
when reviewing management’s decision to make the contribution? 
                                                                                                                  
The Super PAC arose due to recent Supreme Court and federal appellate decisions inter-
preting the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. See id. (attributing the 
rise of the Super PAC to the combined effect of Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 
(2010), which struck down part of the Federal Election Campaign Act, and SpeechNow.org 
v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010), which essentially blessed the Super PAC form of 
organization). Therefore, Super PACs presumably can become involved in state elections, 
as well. See Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 567 U.S. 516, 516-17 (2012) (per curiam) 
(holding that Citizens United applies to state law). 
 3. This is unlikely because neither federal securities law nor state corporation law 
currently requires that corporations disclose their political expenditures. See Joseph K. 
Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, 86 COLO. L. REV. 477, 482 n.6 (2015) 
[hereinafter Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith]. State campaign finance 
laws that require corporations to disclose all political expenditures also are uncommon. See 
Taren Kingser & Patrick Schmidt, Business in the Bulls–Eye? Target Corp. and the Limits of 
Campaign Finance Disclosure, 11 ELECTION L.J. 21, 24-25 (2012). Although federal campaign 
finance law requires that Super PACs disclose certain contributors, and although corpora-
tions that donate more than a certain amount to Super PACs must disclose their contribu-
tions, corporations can easily—and regularly do—circumvent these requirements by donating 
to Super PACs via intermediaries that do not disclose their contributors. See Leahy, Corpo-
rate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, supra, at 482 n.6; Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 
2, at 295 n.73. For example, many major Super PACs are paired with a “social welfare” organ-
ization that exists solely for the purpose of funneling contributions to the Super PAC. See 
James Kwak, Corporate Law Constraints on Political Spending, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 251, 
255-56 (2013); Kim Barker & Marian Wang, Super-PACs and Dark Money: ProPublica’s 
Guide to the New World of Campaign Finance, PROPUBLICA (July 11, 2011, 11:38 AM), 
https://www.propublica.org/blog/item/super-pacs-propublicas-guide-to-the-new-world-of-
campaign-finance [https://perma.cc/2UQM-AYVE]. 
 Recently, however, some large corporations have started voluntarily disclosing their 
political spending. See Jacquelyn E. Ryberg, Note, The Train Has Left the Station, Folks: 
The Inevitability of Widespread Adoption of Voluntary Political Spending and Lobbying 
Disclosure, 10 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 1, 35 (2015) (discussing the CPA-Zicklin Index, a joint 
report of the Center for Political Accountability and the Zicklin Center, which details vol-
untary corporate disclosure of political spending, andconcluding, based on reviewing the 
CPA-Zicklin Indexes for 2011 to 2014, that “voluntary disclosure of corporate political 
spending information is . . . occurring . . . [and] progressively increasing year after year”). 
It remains to be seen whether this will result in corporations regularly disclosing individu-
al contributions. 
 4. Hereinafter, this Article will use the term “director” (or “management”) to refer to 
(1) “outside” directors (who are not employed by the corporation), (2) “inside” directors (who 
are), and (3) senior executive officers who are not directors. This imprecise shorthand has 
its theoretical limitations, however. See Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad 
Faith, supra note 3, at 483 n.7. 
 5. It is unusual for management to explain why the corporation made a particular 
political contribution. Recent examples of management doing so occurred only because the 
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 Myriad scholars have opined that the decision to make the politi-
cal contribution is like any other ordinary business decision made by 
management.6 Hence, it is widely assumed that a court reviewing a 
corporate political contribution would apply the standard of review 
for ordinary business decisions: the “notoriously management-
friendly”7 business judgment rule.8 
 This rule essentially prohibits courts from reviewing the 
substance of a management decision, so long as it was rational  
and not wrongful; 9  the only issue for courts is whether the 
board engaged in serious wrongdoing, such as bad faith, 10  
self-dealing,11 or a waste of corporate assets.12 However, absent unu-
                                                                                                                  
controversies surrounding the contribution. See Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 326-
27 (describing how Target Corp.’s CEO explained the company’s rationale for its 2010 con-
tribution to Super PAC MN Forward after the company received negative publicity about 
the contribution). 
 6. See Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 299-302. 
 7. Adam Winkler, Other People’s Money: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign 
Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871, 908 (2004); see also Laurence Tribe, Laurence Tribe on 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, HARV. L. TODAY (Jan. 25, 2010), 
http://today.law.harvard.edu/laurence-tribe-on-citizens-united-v-federal-election-commission/ 
[https://perma.cc/7UR5-UYVG]. 
 8. See Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 299-302 (providing examples); see, e.g., 
Jay B. Kesten, Shareholder Political Primacy, 10 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 161, 184 (2016) (deem-
ing it likely that courts will review corporate political spending under the business judg-
ment standard, but noting the possibility of a heightened standard). This Author has 
(somewhat reluctantly) made the same assumption in prior works. See Leahy, A Closer 
Look, supra note 2, at 370; Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, supra 
note 3, at 488 & n.35, 505-10. 
 9. See infra Part II.A; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Prima-
cy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J CORP. L. 769, 787 (2006) (“The court begins with a 
presumption against review. It then reviews the facts to determine whether the decision-
making process was tainted by self-dealing and the like. The questions asked are objective 
and straightforward: Did the board commit fraud? Did the board commit an illegal act? Did 
the board self-deal? Whether or not the board exercised reasonable care is irrelevant, as 
well it should be.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 10. The business judgment rule presumption of non-review is overcome by manage-
ment’s bad faith. See Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, supra note 3, 
at 495-97. Yet, although many corporate political contributions may constitute bad faith, 
see id. at 510-14, 517-23 (describing when they do), a plaintiff will likely have difficulty 
proving this, see id. at 514-23 (explaining why), unless a court would accept the novel ar-
gument that all political contributions made by public corporations constitute bad faith, see 
id. at 524-56 (advancing novel theory that essentially all political contributions by public 
corporations should be deemed bad faith). Despite this, bad faith usually will be a better 
argument for a shareholder derivative plaintiff to advance than waste or (absent unusual 
facts) self-dealing. See id. at 505-10. 
 11. Self-dealing occurs when a director obtains a material financial benefit from a 
transaction that is not shared equally with all of the other shareholders. See Leahy, A 
Closer Look, supra note 2, at 344-46. The business judgment rule presumption of non-
review is overcome by self-dealing; as a result, once a shareholder plaintiff proves that 
management engaged in self-dealing, the transaction is subject to the onerous “entire fair-
ness” standard. See id. at 346-48. 
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sual facts, corporate political contribution will rarely constitute man-
agement self-dealing13 or waste.14 Thus, the best theory upon which 
to challenge management’s decision to make a corporate Super PAC 
contribution is bad faith15—i.e., that management decided upon the 
contribution primarily for a purpose other than serving the corpora-
tion’s best interests.16 
 Yet, the business judgment rule presumes that management acts 
in good faith (and rationally, without any conflict of interest).17 Thus, 
when a court applies this rule, a shareholder plaintiff cannot simply 
assert that management acted to serve its own political or personal 
goals; unless the shareholder can prove this claim, the court must 
conclude that management acted properly. That is to say, if a share-
holder establishes that it is equally plausible that management acted 
in bad faith, primarily to serve its own goals, or in good faith, intend-
ing to serve the corporation’s best interests, the shareholder-
plaintiff’s claim of bad faith will fail.18 Therefore, absent “smoking 
gun” evidence of bad faith—a board that obviously lacks independ-
ence (or perhaps an “Imperial CEO and [a] supine board”)—it will be 
extremely difficult for a shareholder plaintiff to prove that manage-
                                                                                                                  
 12. The business judgment rule does not protect management when it engages in 
waste—which is akin to burning the corporation’s money. See Leahy, A Closer Look, supra 
note 2, at 303-09. Waste occurs only rarely, if at all; in theory, it occurs when the corpora-
tion engages in a transaction that either (1) is essentially irrational, see id. at 304-08 (ex-
plaining the objective theory of waste), or (2) clearly serves no plausible business purpose, 
see id. at 308 (explaining the subjective theory of waste).  
 13. Although some political contributions might plausibly lead to a potential material 
financial benefit for management that is not shared equally with all shareholders, such 
benefits would be uncertain and therefore might not be material; accordingly, political 
contributions that truly constitute self-dealing probably are not common. See Leahy, A 
Closer Look, supra note 2, at 349-61 (so arguing); see also id. at 361-63 (describing exam-
ples of corporate political contributions, both real and hypothetical, that may constitute 
self-dealing).  
 14. Since waste is exceedingly difficult to prove, corporate political contributions will 
rarely if ever constitute waste. See id. at 338-40 (so arguing); see also id. at 340-41 (describ-
ing an extreme—and entirely hypothetical—example of a corporate political contribution 
that would constitute waste). 
 15. See Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, supra note 3, at 505-10. 
 16. See Joseph K. Leahy, A Decade After Disney: A Primer on Good and Bad Faith, 83 
U. CIN. L. REV. 859, 867 (2015) [hereinafter Leahy, A Decade After Disney] (citing In re 
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney IV), 906 A.2d 27, 63, 64 (Del. 2006)). 
 17. See Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 297 (citing, inter alia, Aronson v. Lewis, 
473 A.2d 805, 811-12 (Del. 1984)); Eric A. Chiappinelli, The Life and Adventures of Unocal: 
Part I: Moore the Marrier, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 85, 88 n.13 (1998). 
 18. See Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, supra note 3, at 515-
16; Leahy, A Decade After Disney, supra note 16, at 888. 
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ment intended for a corporate political contribution to promote its 
own political views rather than serve the corporation.19 
Unfortunately for shareholder plaintiffs, management can easily con-
coct a plausible justification for supporting any major-party political 
candidate.20 Due to its ability to obfuscate the purpose for a corporate 
political contribution, management therefore has a strong incentive 
to cause the corporation to serve its own personal, political goals, re-
gardless of any benefit to the corporation. After all, if management 
can use the corporate treasury to fund its favored political candidates, 
and get away with it, why use its own money?21 As a result, there is 
every reason to believe that corporate managers act with (at best) 
mixed motives or (at worst) principally self-serving motives when 
causing the corporation to make a political contribution.22 
 Thirty years ago, Dean Robert Clark described situations where 
management is likely to act both for personal reasons and to benefit 
the corporation as involving “mixed motives.”23 A common “mixed mo-
tives” situation, where there is a strong possibility that management 
will make a decision that conflicts with the interest of shareholder 
wealth maximization, arises when management decides whether to 
                                                                                                                  
 19. See Leahy, A Decade After Disney, supra note 16, at 888-98 (concluding, after a 
review of the bad faith caselaw, that plaintiffs can overcome the business judgment rule’s 
presumption of good faith by (1) showing that management “utterly” ignored its fiduciary 
duties, (2) pointing to “smoking gun” evidence of management’s bad faith, (3) establishing 
that management lacked independence when making the decision in question, or perhaps, 
(4) providing a “supine board” bent to the will of an “imperial CEO”); see also id. at 889-90 
(concluding that utter disregard has become a difficult avenue for bad faith challenges 
because it seems to require a showing that the board did “absolutely nothing whatsoever” 
(emphasis removed)). 
 20. See infra Part IV.B.1; see, e.g., Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, 
supra note 3, at 514-23 (exploring both real and hypothetical examples); accord Kesten, 
supra note 8, at 184 (“Absent obvious self-interest . . . virtually any [political] expenditure 
could be justified as putatively in the corporations’ long-run best interests.”). 
 21. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 22. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 23. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 146, 148-49 (1986) (explaining that 
a “mixed motives” situation differs from traditional self-dealing because the former situa-
tion involves a director who has “some interest in a side effect” of the corporation’s transac-
tion with a third party whereas the latter situation involves a director with a direct finan-
cial interest in the third party or the transaction itself (emphasis removed)); MARK A. SAR-
GENT & DENNIS R. HONABACH, D&O LIABILITY HANDBOOK § 1:5 (2016) (“The third category 
of duty of loyalty cases is . . . mixed motives. . . . The paradigmatic situation . . . is the hos-
tile takeover.”); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corpo-
rate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 299 (1999) (explaining that “Clark has labeled ‘corporate 
action with mixed motives’ ” as those actions where “directors make strategic business 
decisions that provide nonmonetary benefits to themselves at shareholders’ expense” (em-
phasis removed)); Alan R. Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model: A Director's 
Duty of Independence, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1351, 1412 (1989) (describing “corporate responses in 
takeover fights” as “the most prominent . . . mixed-motive context”). 
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take defensive measures to avert a hostile takeover.24 In that context, 
courts recognize that there is an “omnipresent specter that a board 
may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the 
corporation.”25 A board facing a hostile takeover faces an inherent 
conflict of interest because if the takeover succeeds they will probably 
lose their jobs.26 Further, it typically is easy for management to pur-
port to oppose a hostile takeover based on the pretext that doing so 
will benefit shareholders’ long-term interests (or the interests of oth-
er corporate constituencies like employees, communities, or  
customers).27 
 As a result of this inherent conflict in a mixed motives situation, 
Delaware courts apply a (supposedly) heightened level of scrutiny—
“enhanced business judgment review,” also known as the Unocal 
test—whenever management adopts defensive measures in the face 
of a hostile takeover.28 Under Unocal, management is not immediate-
ly protected by the business judgment rule.29 Instead, management 
must earn the protection of the business judgment rule.30 In order to 
do so, management must first establish the reasonableness and pro-
portionality of its defensive actions.31 That is to say, management 
must demonstrate (1) that it had reasonable grounds to believe that 
there existed a credible threat to corporate policy and effectiveness; 
and (2) that the defensive measures were reasonable in relation to 
the threat posed—not draconian, but within a range of reasonable-
ness.32 Only if management makes both showings will it obtain the 
                                                                                                                  
 24. See E. Norman Veasey & Michael P. Dooley, The Role of Corporate Litigation in 
the Twenty-First Century, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 131, 146 (2000) (“The Unocal test . . . recog-
nizes the possibility of mixed motives . . . .”).  
 25. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). 
 26. See infra Part II.B. 
 27. See infra Part II.B. 
 28. See infra Part II.C (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing Unocal, 493 
A.2d at 954). 
 29. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. Many scholars have argued—persuasively—that the 
standard set forth in Unocal, and modified by its progeny, has been so watered down that 
it is now effectively no more onerous than the business judgment rule itself. See, e.g., Mary 
Siegel, The Illusion of Enhanced Review of Board Actions, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 599, 608 
(2013) [hereinafter Siegel, Illusion of Enhanced Review]. However, the Unocal test could be 
modified slightly to give it “teeth.” See, e.g., Mary Siegel, The Problems and Promise of 
“Enhanced Business Judgment,” 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 47, 84-88 (2014) [hereinafter Siegel, 
Problems and Promise] (proposing modifications). The version of intermediate review ad-
vanced by this Article would attempt to address the concerns of those who think Unocal is 
too weak by being somewhat more rigorous than the Unocal test as currently applied. See 
infra notes 461, 465 and accompanying text. 
 30. See infra Part II.B (discussing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954). 
 31. See infra Part II.C (discussing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954). 
 32. See infra Part II.C (discussing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954). 
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protection of the business judgment rule.33 In short, Unocal requires 
that the board provide a reasonable explanation for its defensive 
measures—forcing them to make their case to the shareholders—in 
order to earn deference. 
 This Article departs from the scholarly consensus that courts 
should apply the business judgment rule to corporate political contri-
butions.34 Instead, Delaware courts should review corporate political 
contributions with a standard of review that is more appropriate for 
mixed motives situations—intermediate scrutiny.35 This Article pro-
vides the first sustained defense36 of applying intermediate scrutiny 
to corporate political contributions.37 That defense consists of two re-
                                                                                                                  
 33. See infra Part II.C (discussing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954). 
 34. For the reasons described in greater detail elsewhere, see Leahy, Corporate Politi-
cal Contributions as Bad Faith, supra note 3, at 481 n.5, this Article uses the term “politi-
cal contribution” to encompass four related but distinct types of corporate spending, all of 
which probably are ultimately intended by corporate management to support candidates 
for elective office. Those four types of spending are: (1) “in the context of an election for 
federal, state or local office . . . any independent expenditure or any contribution to an in-
dependent expenditure-only organization, such as a Super PAC, whether the contribution 
is made directly to the Super PAC or indirectly through an intermediary such as a 501(c)(4) 
social welfare organization”; (2) “in the context of an election for state or local office in a 
state that does not prohibit direct contributions to candidates and parties . . . direct contri-
butions to candidates, their committees, or parties”; (3) “direct expenditures in support of 
or in opposition to, or contributions to organizations that support or oppose, any state or 
local ballot initiative that relates to social or economic issues rather than narrow industry-
specific issues”; and (4) any contributions to section 501(c)(6) trade associations. 
 Corporate political spending that falls outside of this definition—lobbying elected 
officials, for example—may raise the same agency cost concerns as corporate political con-
tributions. That is a question for another article, however. 
 35. See infra Part V.A. Thanks to my colleague, Gary Rosin, for suggesting this idea 
several years ago. 
 36. Professor James Kwak recently made a similar proposal to the one advanced here. 
See Kwak, supra note 3, at 282 (“[C]ourts have the opportunity to create a new standard 
for evaluating challenges to corporate political contributions—another area in which the 
‘omnipresent specter’ of conflict warrants particular scrutiny. . . . The test for political do-
nations should be similar to that used in change-of-control situations. Courts should re-
quire defendant insiders to prove that they had ‘reasonable grounds for believing;’ that the 
contribution in question would provide a net benefit to the corporation, ‘a burden satisfied 
by a showing of good faith and reasonable investigation.’ . . . [B]y requiring reasonable 
grounds for that belief based on a reasonable investigation, the standard does not allow 
insiders to direct corporate funds to their preferred organizations on the basis of hopeful 
guesses or conclusory assertions regarding corporate benefits.”). In his article, Professor 
Kwak offered a compelling rebuttal of some potential policy arguments against his pro-
posal. See id. at 284-92. However, Professor Kwak did not provide a detailed argument in 
favor of his proposal. This Article seeks to provide that justification.  
 37. Others have suggested that courts apply Unocal to corporate political contribu-
tions, but only in passing. See Kesten, supra note 8, at 185 (“[C]orporate political activity 
[arguably] is, like managerial entrenchment, an inherently conflicted activity. . . . [M]anagers 
could be acting to further the firm’s interests, but there are also significant personal inter-
ests at stake. Corporate law’s standard response to inherently conflicted activity is to set 
aside the business judgment rule and impose a heightened standard of judicial review.”) 
(citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)); Tribe, supra note 7 
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lated arguments: (1) a direct analogy to charitable donations;38 and 
(2) an argument that corporate political contributions are analogous 
to, but more problematic than, corporate charity.39 
 First, the argument by analogy: Many scholars have recognized 
that a close cousin to the corporate political contribution—corporate 
philanthropy—differs starkly from most ordinary, non-self-dealing 
business decisions.40 Ordinary business transactions typically affect 
management in the same limited way that such decisions affect 
shareholders’ interests: by either directly or indirectly improving or 
harming the corporation’s bottom line (depending on whether the 
transaction succeeds or fails) in predictable ways.41 Thus, ordinary 
business decisions are (at least theoretically) subject to shareholder 
oversight, and management cannot easily make such decisions solely, 
or even mainly, due to their material psychological or emotional ben-
efits to management.42 
 By contrast, when management causes a corporation to make a 
charitable donation there is a substantial risk (even in the absence of 
classic self-dealing—i.e., a material, financial conflict of interest) 
that management will be guided by its own personal views rather 
than the best interests of the corporation (i.e., maximizing share-
holder value).43 In other words, charitable donations pose a “mixed 
motives” 44  situation in which there is a greater risk of imposing 
“agency costs”45 on the corporation than exists when management 
makes an ordinary business decision. 
                                                                                                                  
(suggesting that the business judgment rule “could be replaced with a rule less deferential 
to management and more focused on the existence of a convincing justification for using 
general treasury funds as such rather than relying entirely on PAC funds contributed by 
people with politics in mind”). Cf. Jonathan Romiti, Note, Playing Politics With Sharehold-
er Value: The Case for Applying Fiduciary Law to Corporate Political Donations Post-
Citizens United, 53 B.C.L. REV. 737, 739 & n.9 (2012) (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d 946) (“Alt-
hough modern corporate law rules are extremely deferential to the discretion of corporate 
management, most courts still require that board decisions be made with the best interests 
of shareholders in mind. When non-shareholder constituencies cloud a board’s judgment, 
courts have been responsive to shareholders wielding fiduciary law . . . to protect . . . the 
corporation.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 38. See infra Part III. 
 39. See infra Part IV. 
 40. See infra Part III.A.  
 41. See infra Part III.A. 
 42. Nor do they pose a material, financial conflict of interest; otherwise, they would be 
self-dealing, subject to stringent judicial review for fairness. See supra note 11. 
 43. See infra Part III.B. 
 44. Blair & Stout, supra note 23, at 299 (describing “donations to [directors’] favorite 
charities” as “mixed motives” situations) (quoting CLARK, supra note 23, at 142 (emphasis 
added)). 
 45. Agency costs are, essentially, the costs associated with having agents. Agents’ 
incentives usually are not aligned precisely with owners’ incentives because agents gener-
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 For this reason, nearly two decades ago, two esteemed members of 
the Delaware bar, R. Franklin Balotti and James J. Hanks, Jr., ar-
gued that management’s decision to cause the corporation to make 
certain corporate charitable donations should (for some such dona-
tions) be subject to a more rigorous test than the business judgment 
rule.46 Instead of that rule, Balotti and Hanks urged courts should 
apply a version of the Unocal test.47 Unfortunately, no court or schol-
ar has taken up this proposal. 
 Yet, there is much to be said for this proposal—and much that 
others have already written, albeit not directly in support of this pro-
posal. This Article (1) summarizes the views of other scholars, who 
tend to liken charitable donations to “soft” or quasi-self-dealing that 
raises “mixed motives” or “agency cost” concerns;48 and (2) offers a 
new argument that corporate philanthropy raises the same issues, 
albeit inversely, as management stealing a corporate opportunity.49 
 Corporate political contributions raise the same concerns that led 
Balotti and Hanks to urge that corporate charitable donations be 
subject to intermediate review.50 Like charitable donations, political 
contributions typically do not have a direct impact on a corporation’s 
profitability. As a result, just as with charitable donations, it is diffi-
cult for the market to evaluate political contributions.51 Further, like 
charitable donations, no corporation would prohibit management 
from contributing to the same political campaign as the corporation, 
and vice versa. Thus, like charitable donations, corporate political 
contributions should be subject to Unocal-esque strict scrutiny.52 
 Second, going beyond a simple analogy: Despite their facial simi-
larities (i.e., they both involve giving away money for no agreed-upon 
return), political contributions actually differ in several subtle ways 
                                                                                                                  
ally do not share all the risks and rewards of a business. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOM-
IC ANALYSIS OF LAW 368 (3d ed. 1986) (“[A]gency costs [are] the costs to the principal of 
obtaining faithful and effective performance by his agents . . . .”). See generally Michael C. 
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). In the context of a corporation, offic-
ers are agents and shareholders are (at least nominally) owners. As a result, corporate 
managers, who control the corporation’s purse strings, may have an incentive to “use cor-
porate funds to further their personal goals rather than the best interest of the corpora-
tion” (i.e., its shareholders). Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 324 n.237. 
 46. See R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Giving at the Office: A Reappraisal 
of Charitable Contributions by Corporations, 54 BUS. LAW. 965, 992-96 (1999). 
 47. See infra Part III.B.3 (describing Balotti and Hanks’s proposal). 
 48. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 49. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 50. See infra Part III.A.  
 51. See infra Part III.A. 
 52. See infra Part III.E. 
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from charitable donations.53 The result of these differences is that it 
is far easier for directors to resort to pretext to justify political con-
tributions that serve their own political views than it is for them to 
justify charitable donations that serve their own personal, psycholog-
ical interests. 54  Therefore, corporate political contributions pose a 
greater risk of management promoting their own personal or political 
agenda (i.e., raise a stronger “mixed motives” or agency cost problem) 
than even charitable donations.55 Indeed, corporate political contribu-
tions arguably pose a conflict of interest similar to defensive 
measures56—the “paradigmatic” case for intermediate scrutiny57—
with an even greater potential for managerial pretext.58 
 Accordingly, even if courts and scholars continue to ignore Balotti 
and Hanks’s exhortation to subject charitable donations to a less 
management-friendly, intermediate level of scrutiny, like the Unocal 
test,59 the Delaware courts should nonetheless employ intermediate 
scrutiny when reviewing corporate political contributions.60 By anal-
ogy to Unocal, a court evaluating a corporate political contribution 
should ask whether (1) management had reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that the contribution would directly or indirectly advance specif-
ic corporate interests, rather than some general political viewpoint; 
and (2) whether the contribution was reasonable, both as a method of 
addressing the specific corporate interest and in its amount.61 Only if 
management could show that the political contribution satisfied both 
prongs would it be subject to business judgment review. 
 If courts were to employ such an intermediate standard to review 
the decision to make a corporate political contribution, management 
might make fewer political contributions that support managers’ own 
political views under the guise of serving the corporation’s best inter-
ests. Further, management would have less discretion to donate to 
Super PACs that support specific candidates for public office.62 How-
ever, management would retain wide discretion to donate to (1) ballot 
                                                                                                                  
 53. See infra Part IV.A.  
 54. See infra Part IV.A. 
 55. See infra Part IV.B. 
 56. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 57. SARGENT & HONABACH, supra note 23. 
 58. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 59. The Unocal test is (purportedly) an intermediate standard because it is supposedly 
more onerous on management than the business judgment rule and yet less exacting than 
entire fairness review. Compare infra Parts II.A.1 & A.2 (describing business judgment rule 
and entire fairness review), with infra Part II.C (describing the Unocal test). 
 60. See infra Part IV.B.  
 61. See infra Part V.A.1. 
 62. See infra Part V.B.2. 
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initiatives that directly relate to the corporation’s business; or (2) Su-
per PACs that focus on areas of particular interest to the corporation 
and also support political candidates.63 
 A review of two notorious corporate political contributions con-
firms that, at least in theory, applying intermediate scrutiny would 
limit management’s discretion to make such contributions that likely 
benefit management’s psyche rather than the corporation’s bottom 
line. First, the 2010 contribution by retailer Target Corporation (Tar-
get Corp.) to a Super PAC that supported the Republican candidate 
for governor of Minnesota, which hurt Target Corp.’s image greatly 
due to the candidate’s opposition to marriage equality, would have 
been allowed under this standard. Target Corp.’s management of-
fered a plausible explanation for the contribution and could have 
shown that it was intended to advance a specific corporate interest 
for a retail store, namely, job creation.64 
 But second, the 2012 contribution from media conglomerate News 
Corporation (News Corp.) to the Republican Governor’s Association, 
ostensibly to support the candidacy of a friend of the CEO, probably 
would not have passed muster under the standard proposed by this 
Article. Unfortunately for News Corp., the best plausible business 
rationale that it could offer for the contribution was basically un-
provable fluff: that the candidate in question was “pro-business.”65 
* * * * * 
 The remainder of this Article is organized into four parts and a 
brief conclusion. Part II provides important background: first, it 
briefly introduces shareholder derivative lawsuits and the business 
judgment rule that courts apply in such lawsuits to review ordinary 
business decisions;66 second, it delves into Unocal. After briefly sum-
marizing the factual and legal background to the case,67 Part II de-
scribes the so-called “intermediate” or “enhanced business judgment 
rule” announced in Unocal (and modified in subsequent decisions).68 
Next, Part II explores the rationale for reviewing directors’ decisions 
to undertake defensive measures under a more rigorous standard 
than the business judgment rule.69 In so doing, Part II explores a crit-
ical, but underappreciated, policy reason that Unocal and its progeny 
apply intermediate scrutiny rather than the business judgment rule: 
                                                                                                                  
 63. See infra Part V.B.2. 
 64. See infra Part V.C.1. 
 65. See infra Part V.C.2. 
 66. See infra Part II.A. 
 67. See infra Part II.B. 
 68. See infra Part II.C.  
 69. See infra Part II.D. 
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the serious potential for management pretext posed by defensive 
measures.70 
 Part III moves on to the analogous situation of corporate charita-
ble donations: first, it touches the similarities between corporate po-
litical contributions and charitable donations;71 second, it then de-
scribes some key differences between ordinary business decisions and 
corporate charitable gifts that raise greater concerns about mixed 
motives and increased agency costs.72 
 Next, Part III describes how courts review management decisions 
to make such charitable donations,73 summarizes some of the argu-
ments for greater judicial scrutiny, 74  and explicates Balotti and 
Hanks’s framework for applying intermediate scrutiny to such con-
tributions.75 Part III then concludes by underlining the clear implica-
tion of the similarities between political contributions and charitable 
donations: If courts adopt Balotti and Hanks’s proposal for interme-
diate scrutiny of corporate gifts to charity, then the same rule ought 
to apply to corporate political spending.76 
 Part IV moves beyond charitable donations. Part IV explores criti-
cal differences between charitable donations and political contribu-
tions that counsel for applying intermediate scrutiny to the latter, 
even if it is not applied to the former.77 Further, Part IV compares 
corporate political contributions to defensive measures, and con-
cludes that political contributions have the same potential for man-
agement conflicts with shareholder interests as,78 but greater poten-
tial for managerial pretext than, defensive measures.79 
 Finally, Part V proffers and analyzes a customized version of the 
Unocal test for political contributions. Part V describes the test;80 de-
scribes how the test would be applied, and its probable effects on cor-
porate political contributions, generally;81 and applies the test to two 
                                                                                                                  
 70. See infra Part II.D.4. 
 71. See infra Part III.A. 
 72. See infra Part III.B. 
 73. See infra Part III.C.1. 
 74. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 75. See infra Part III.D. 
 76. See infra Part III.E. 
 77. See infra Part IV.A. 
 78. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 79. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 80. See infra Part V.A. 
 81. See infra Part V.B. 
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famous corporate political contributions—one by Target Corp.82 and 
one by News Corp.83 
II.   DERIVATIVE SUITS, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE, AND  
THE UNOCAL TEST 
A.   The Two Traditional Standards of Review for  
Shareholder Derivative Actions 
1.   The Business Judgment Rule—For Ordinary Business  
     Decisions 
 In a derivative lawsuit, a shareholder sues on behalf of the corpo-
ration to address an injury to or vindicate a right that belongs to the 
corporation.84 A shareholder lawsuit challenging a corporate political 
contribution as a breach of management’s duty of loyalty, on the the-
ory that the contribution used corporate funds for an improper pur-
pose, would be derivative in nature.85 
 In such a lawsuit, if the court concludes that the shareholder 
plaintiff has standing to sue on the corporation’s behalf, the plaintiff 
must still rebut the business judgment rule.86 This rule presumes (or, 
perhaps it would be more accurate to say, assumes87) that, in making 
a business decision, management “acted on an informed basis, in 
good faith, and in honest belief that the action taken was in the best 
interests” of the corporation.88 Unless this assumption is rebutted, a 
“court will not substitute its judgment for that of the board if the 
[board’s] decision can be ‘attributed to any rational business pur-
pose.’ ”89 That is to say, “unless the plaintiff overcomes the business 
judgment presumption, management’s decision is simply not subject 
to challenge.”90 
                                                                                                                  
 82. See infra Part V.C.1. 
 83. See infra Part V.C.2. 
 84. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES  AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSI-
NESS ORGANIZATION 367 (4th ed. 2012). 
 85. See Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 299. But see id. at 299 n.96 (noting that 
a shareholder could possibly bring an individual claim based on a corporate political con-
tribution, depending on the nature of the shareholders’ allegations).  
 86. See id. at 297. 
 87. See id. at 297 nn.87-88 (discussing various views of the business judgment rule as 
a substantive rule of law, an abstention doctrine, or a hybrid of the two).  
 88. Id. at 297-98 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).   
 89. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (quoting Sin-
clair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 380 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)); cf. Siegel, Problems and Promise, 
supra note 29, at 50 (stating that, under some formulations of the business judgment rule, 
management’s conduct is reviewable for irrationality or waste). 
 90. Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, supra note 3, at 492. 
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 The effect of the business judgment rule is to “refocus a court’s 
inquiry into management’s conduct”—to shift the inquiry from a 
question of “whether the applicable standard of care was breached” to 
a “question of ‘whether the directors were truly disinterested and in-
dependent and whether their actions were not so extreme, unconsid-
ered, or inexplicable’ ” as to be essentially irrational.91 As a result, 
the business judgment rule “effectively prohibit[s]” judges from 
“evaluating the merits” of most “rational, good faith business deci-
sions” made by the corporation’s management.92 The bottom line: “a 
large swath of director conduct” is rendered “unreviewable.”93 There-
fore, when the business judgment rule is applied, “imposition of lia-
bility is rare.”94 
 2.   “Entire” Fairness—For Conflicted Transactions 
 The business judgment rule stands in stark contrast to the test 
that Delaware courts apply to conflicted transactions. Transactions 
in which a director or officer has a material conflict of interest are 
reviewed for “entire” or “intrinsic”—i.e., objective—fairness.95 Under 
this standard of review, the conflicted defendants must prove to the 
court’s satisfaction that both the board’s process in reaching the deci-
sion and the substance of the decision itself were fair to the  
corporation.96 
 Thus, while business judgment review is largely about deference, 
intrinsic fairness review requires “careful judicial scrutiny of the 
                                                                                                                  
 91. Id. (quoting ALLEN ET AL., supra note 84, at 231 (citing AMERICAN BAR ASSN., 
CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK (2d ed. 1994))); id. (“In short, the business judgment 
rule demands that courts ignore ‘the quality of the board’s decision (i.e., was the decision 
negligent?)’ and instead focus on ‘the integrity of the board’s decision-making process (i.e., 
was the decision made in good faith, uninterested, independent, minimally informed, and 
not made in a grossly negligent manner?”) (some emphasis removed) (citing, inter alia, 
ALLEN ET AL., supra note 84, at 231)); see also Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 297. 
 92. Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 298-99; see also Siegel, Problems and Prom-
ise, supra note 29, at 51. 
 93. Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, supra note 3, at 493 (quot-
ing Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to the Business Judgment Rule: Reflec-
tions on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty, 66 MD. L. REV. 398, 401 (2007)); 
Siegel, Problems and Promise, supra note 29, at 50 (explaining that even formulations of 
the business judgment rule that include irrationality or waste still render board decisions 
“virtually unreviewable”). 
 94. Siegel, Problems and Promise, supra note 29, at 49. 
 95. Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 298-99; see also Siegel, Problems and Prom-
ise, supra note 29, at 50 (explaining that, under the business judgment rule, “[t]he board’s 
decision . . . is not reviewable for its wisdom or reasonableness.”). 
 96. See Siegel, Problems and Promise, supra note 29, at 53. For further detail about 
what it means for a court to review the “substance” and “process” of management’s deci-
sion, see A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 347-48. 
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transaction in question.”97 As a result, “the entire fairness standard 
is often described as ‘onerous,’ ‘exacting’ or ‘rigorous’ ”98 and a court’s 
decision to apply it is often “outcome determinative”—management 
almost always loses.99 
B.   The Unocal Decision 
 This subpart: (1) provides the factual background of,100 and histor-
ical and legal backdrop to,101 the famed Unocal case; (2) explains the 
new standard of review that the Delaware Supreme Court announced 
in its Unocal decision (as modified in subsequent cases);102 and (3) 
describes the court’s widely reported rationale for imposing that 
standard of review—the “omnipresent specter” of director self-
interest that arises whenever directors employ defensive measures to 
thwart a hostile takeover.103 (Readers familiar with the Unocal deci-
sion may wish to skip these first three subparts.) 
 In addition, this Part highlights a critical, but oft-ignored, ra-
tionale for the Unocal standard of review: the ease with which direc-
tors can lie about (1) their reasons for implementing defensive 
measures; and (2) the benefits of such measures to the corporation.104 
 1.   Factual Background of the Unocal Case 
 Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum105 arose out of a tender offer for the 
stock of Unocal Corporation (Unocal), a public corporation, by Mesa 
Petroleum Co. (Mesa), which was controlled by renowned corporate 
raider and “greenmailer,” T. Boone Pickens.106 Prior to its tender of-
fer, Mesa acquired approximately thirteen percent of Unocal’s com-
mon stock.107 On April 8, 1985, Mesa commenced a cash tender offer 
to acquire almost thirty-eight percent of Unocal’s outstanding 
                                                                                                                  
 97. Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 348. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id.; see also Siegel, Problems and Promise, supra note 29, at 53 (“[F]ew defendants 
successfully satisfy th[e] exacting scrutiny [of entire fairness review].”). 
 100. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 101. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 102. See infra Part II.B.3. (describing the test announced in Unocal and how it was 
clarified/modified in Unitrin Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995)). 
 103. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 104. See infra Part III.B.4. 
 105. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985). 
 106. See id. at 949 n.1, 956 n.13. “Greenmail” is “the purchase by a corporation of a 
potential acquirer’s stock, at a premium over the market price,” to avert a potential hostile 
takeover. Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 792 n.98.  
 107. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949.  
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stock.108 The tender offer was a “two-tier” offer, an acquisition method 
which involves a tender offer along with the “promise” of a merger 
between the two companies if the tender offer is successful.109 The 
offer also was “front-loaded”:110  Unocal stockholders who tendered 
their stock to Mesa by the deadline would receive $54 per share in 
exchange for their stock; shareholders who held onto their stock 
would receive certain securities that Mesa claimed were worth $54 
per share.111 However, in reality the securities offered in the “back-
end” were essentially worthless, as they were “junk bonds.”112 
 Front-ended, two-tier tender offers are inherently “coercive” on 
shareholders, causing them to rush to tender their stock into the of-
fer regardless of whether or not the stockholders believe the offered 
price is fair.113 A shareholder who fails to tender into such an offer 
will be stuck with the lesser (possibly worthless) back-end value if 
enough of the other shareholders tender; further, since shareholders 
cannot predict or control what other shareholders will do, the safest 
course of action for each shareholder is to take the front-end value (at 
                                                                                                                  
 108. Id. A tender offer is a public offer to purchase a set percentage of shares—often a 
controlling or substantial stake—at a premium to the market price, if such shares are  
tendered to the offeror by a set date. See Tender Offer, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tenderoffer.asp?lgl=no-infinite (last visited Dec. 13, 
2016); see also Douglas M. Branson, An Essay for Professor Alan Bromberg: Removing the 
Taint From Past Illegal Offers and Sales, 68 S.M.U. L. REV. 657, 672 (2015) (“A shorthand 
definition many securities lawyers use is that a tender offer is an offer to buy that seeks 
control or a measure of control over the takeover target.”).  
 109. A “two-tiered” offer involves two steps. First, the offeror typically proposes to ob-
tain at least 50 percent of the target’s voting stock. (Obtaining a majority of the voting 
shares means that, in the absenence of any defensive measures that may be in place, the 
offeror will be able to take over the target’s board of directors at the next annual meeting, 
if not sooner.) Second, the offeror proposes that the new board of directors will propose a 
“freeze-out” merger between the offeror and the target company, in which any remaining 
minority shareholders of the target receive cash or securities of a company other than the 
offeror in exchange for their stock, and no longer are shareholders of the target. (This mer-
ger would be subject to approval of the shareholders, but such approval would be guaran-
teed due to the offeror’s majority of voting shares.) See Dale A. Oesterle, Target Managers 
as Negotiating Agents for Target Shareholders in Tender Offers: A Reply to the Passivity 
Thesis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 53, 56-64 (1985). 
 110. In a “front-loaded” offer, the remaining minority shareholders of the target corpo-
ration who are “frozen out” in the “back end” merger receive securities or bonds that are 
valued below the first step cash tender offer. See David J. Schubert, Note, Unocal Corp. v. 
Mesa Petroleum Co.: A New Era of Fiduciary Duty, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 687, 703 (1986). 
 111. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949. 
 112. See id. at 950. 
 113. Id. at 956 (“It is now well recognized that such offers are a classic coercive meas-
ure designed to stampede shareholders into tendering at the first tier, even if the price is 
inadequate, out of fear of what they will receive at the back end of the transaction.”); see 
also id. at 946 n.12 (citing, inter alia, Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Board-
room, 35 BUS. LAW. 101, 113-14 (1979)). 
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a premium over the market price), even if the shareholder thinks the 
stock is worth more.114 
 Five days after Mesa’s offer, the Unocal board met to consider its 
options.115 The board was comprised of eight “independent” (i.e., out-
side, purportedly unaffiliated) directors and six inside directors.116 At 
the meeting, the board’s investment bankers opined that the compa-
ny’s stock was worth more than $60 per share, and therefore, Mesa’s 
offer price was insufficient.117 In light of this valuation, the independ-
ent directors, representing a majority of the board, met separately to 
consider the offer and any possible defensive measures that could be 
undertaken. 118 These directors unanimously agreed to advise the 
board to reject Mesa’s tender offer as inadequate and implement the 
defensive strategy—a “self-tender,” in which Mesa offered to repur-
chase its own stock119—to give stockholders a fair alternative op-
tion.120 The entire board then reconvened and voted unanimously to 
reject Mesa’s proposal.121 
                                                                                                                  
 114. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956; accord Schubert, supra note 110, at 701-02; Bain-
bridge, supra note 9, at 797 (“Two-tier offers like Mesa’s are generally regarded as struc-
turally coercive. If shareholders believe the offeror is likely to obtain a controlling interest 
in the front-end transaction, they face the risk they will be squeezed out in the back-end for 
less money or a less desirable form of consideration. Thus, they are coerced into tendering 
into the front-end to avoid that risk, even if they believe the front-end transaction itself is 
undesirable.” (footnote omitted)); Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Negotiation Model of Tender 
Offer Defenses and the Delaware Supreme Court, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 117, 126-28 (1986) 
(explaining that “front-end loaded tender offers are inherently coercive” because they “ex-
emplif[y] the classic prisoner’s dilemma”: “[T]he initial offer’s value is substantially greater 
than that which nontendering shareholders can expect to receive if the offer succeeds. Even 
a shareholder who is convinced that the initial premium is too low will tender for fear that 
other, similarly fearful shareholders will tender leaving her, if the takeover succeeds, with 
the inferior back-end position of a nontendering shareholder. . . . Thus, a tender offer could 
succeed even if over fifty percent of target shareholders believe the price too low.”). 
 115. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 950.  
 116. See id. “Inside” directors are employees of the corporation—typically officers, such 
as the CEO—or their close relatives; “outside” directors are not employed by the corpora-
tion. While some sources deem all outside directors as “independent,” a better classification 
divides all outside directors into two sub-categories. The first category, “affiliated direc-
tors,” includes “former company officers and persons with business relationships with the 
company, such as suppliers, customers, investment bankers, and lawyers”; the second cat-
egory, “independent directors,” are directors with no such affiliations. Bernard S. Black, 
The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 
895, 900 (1992) (emphasis omitted) (citing THE ISS PROXY VOTING MANUAL 96-100 (R. 
Monks, H. Sherman & N. Minow eds., Inst. Shareholder Servs. 2d ed. 1991)). 
 117. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 950. 
 118. See id. 
 119. See id. 
 120. See id. 
 121. See id. 
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 Two days later, the entire board met again to consider defensive 
measures.122 The board agreed to implement a self-tender of debt se-
curities valued at $72 per share, contingent upon the success of Me-
sa’s offer, for the remaining forty-nine percent of Mesa’s shares.123 
The board excluded Mesa from its contingent self-tender,124 meaning 
that Unocal would not accept any shares tendered by Mesa. Unocal’s 
contingent self-tender essentially rendered Mesa’s tender offer a dead 
letter.125 
 Mesa sued to challenge the discriminatory self-tender,126 and the 
Delaware Court of Chancery temporarily restrained Unocal’s board 
from implementing the tender offer unless it included Mesa.127 Un-
ocal took an interlocutory appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court.128 
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court vacated the lower court’s 
injunction. 129  In a landmark decision, applying a new threshold 
standard of review, the court held that the Unocal board’s self-tender 
was a proportionate defensive reaction to a legitimate threat to the 
corporation.130 
                                                                                                                  
 122. See id. at 950-51.  
 123. See id. at 951.  
 124. See id. 
 125. See Schubert, supra note 110, at 704. The genius of Unocal’s contingent self-
tender offer was that simply making this offer was sufficient to thwart Mesa’s tender offer; 
in all likelihood, Unocal would never need to make good on its own offer. See Bainbridge, 
supra note 9, at 797-98 (“What made the tactic especially clever . . . was that Unocal likely 
would never need to actually complete the self-tender offer. Its offer would only close if 
Mesa acquired more than 50% of Unocal’s voting stock. Because Unocal was offering a 
higher price than Mesa, however, Unocal’s shareholders were likely to tender to it rather 
than to Mesa. If no shareholders tendered to Mesa, Mesa would not acquire 50%, and Un-
ocal would be able to terminate its offer without taking down any of the tendered shares.”). 
Once Unocal’s shareholders realized that the Unocal board had saved its jobs without so 
much as having to buy back a single share, they demanded—and received—a modification 
of the self-tender. Unocal ultimately agreed to buy back some fifty million shares. See Un-
ocal, 493 A.2d at 951. 
 126. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 951. Discriminatory self-tenders like the one proposed by 
the Unocal board are now prohibited under federal law. See Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 
798 n.128 (“After the Unocal decision, the SEC . . . amend[ed] its Williams Act rules to 
prohibit tender offers other than those made to all shareholders.” (citing 17 C.F.R.  
§§ 240.13e-4(f)(8) & 240.14d-10(a)(1))). 
 127. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 952. 
 128. See id. at 952-53. 
 129. See id. at 949. 
 130. See id. at 956-57 (“Here, the threat posed was viewed by the Unocal board as a 
grossly inadequate two-tier coercive tender offer coupled with the threat of greenmail. . . . In 
adopting the selective exchange offer, the board stated that its objective was either to de-
feat the inadequate Mesa offer or, should the offer still succeed, provide the 49% of its 
stockholders, who would otherwise be forced to accept ‘junk bonds’, with $72 worth of sen-
ior debt. We find that both purposes are valid. . . . [T]he board’s decision to offer what it 
determined to be the fair value of the corporation to the 49% of its shareholders, who would 
otherwise be forced to accept highly subordinated ‘junk bonds’, is reasonable and consistent 
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 2.   The Factual Backdrop: Takeover Battles on the Rise 
 Unocal was decided against the backdrop of the hostile takeover 
craze of the early- and mid-1980s.131 Since hostile takeovers typically 
lead to the removal of incumbent management,132 the 1980s takeover 
mania led directors of target boards to devise strategies that would 
“frustrate unwelcome suitors”—and thereby, save their jobs.133 
 Corporate lawyers and scholars were sharply divided on what, if 
anything, courts should do to respond to the rise of the hostile takeo-
ver. Some writers—including, most notably, famed corporate lawyer 
Martin Lipton, inventor134 of the “poison pill”135—advocated that a 
board’s decision to implement defensive measures would be judged by 
the standard that applies to everyday business decisions: the busi-
ness judgment rule. 136 Other commentators—mainly academics—
urged that courts should simply prohibit the use of defensive 
measures.137 Still others advocated that defensive measures should be 
allowed, but reviewed (in light of management’s conflict of interest) 
                                                                                                                  
with the directors’ duty to ensure that the minority stockholders receive equal value for 
their shares.”).  
 131. Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (And What We Can Do About It), 26 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 493 (2001) (starting in the 1970s and “accelerating through the 
1980s,” there was an “unprecedented wave of hostile takeovers”); see also Bradley R. Ar-
onstam, The Interplay of Blasius and Unocal—A Compelling Problem Justifying the Call 
for Substantial Change, 81 OR. L. REV. 429, 434 (2002) (“The 1980s witnessed an explosion 
of acquisition practice, particularly with respect to hostile takeovers which dominated that 
decade.”); Paul L. Regan, What’s Left of Unocal?, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 947, 951 (2001) (“In 
the early 1980s, as hostile takeovers became more prevalent . . . .”). 
 132. See infra notes 208-11 and accompanying text. 
 133. Id. The hostile tender offer, in particular, first “emerged . . . as an important ac-
quirer tool” in the 1970s; soon thereafter, boards began developing defensive tactics to re-
spond to hostile tender offers. Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 771.  
 134. See Brian R. Cheffins, Delaware and the Transformation of Corporate Governance, 
40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 52 (2015); Patrick J. McKenna, Four Key Questions to Achieve Mean-
ingful Differentiation, 32 No. 5 OF COUNSEL 11, 12-13 (2013). See generally Martin Lipton, 
Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037 (2002). 
 135. A poison pill is an ingenious anti-takeover device. Here is how it works: “Upon the 
occurrence of certain ‘triggering’ events, such as a would-be acquiror’s purchase of a certain 
percentage of the target corporation’s shares, or the announcement of a tender offer, all 
existing shareholders, except for the would-be acquiror, get the right to purchase debt or 
stock of the target at a discount. This action dilutes the would-be acquiror’s stake in the 
company and increases the costs of acquisition.” Unitrin Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp. 651 A.2d 
1361, 1369 n.6 (Del. 1995) (quoting Robert J. Klein, The Case for Heightened Scrutiny in 
Defense of the Shareholders’ Franchise Right, 44 STAN. L. REV. 129, 129 n.6 (1991)).  
 136. Siegel, Problems and Promise, supra note 29, at 54 (citing, inter alia, Martin Lip-
ton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101, 131 (1979)).  
 137. See id. at 54 (citing, inter alia, Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The 
Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 
1161, 1200 (1981)).  
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under the more stringent standard that applies to self-dealing: “en-
tire” or “intrinsic” fairness.138 
 3.   The Legal Backdrop: Cheff and Bennett 
 Although hostile takeovers were a phenomenon of the 1970s and 
1980s, the Delaware Supreme Court did not decide Unocal on a clean 
slate. The court had twice before addressed the question of defensive 
measures—and the use of repurchases to thwart hostile takeovers—
in Cheff v. Mathes139 and Bennett v. Propp.140 
 In the first case, Bennett, Noma Lites, Inc. (Noma), acquired fifty-
one percent of the outstanding shares of American Screw Company 
with the intent of acquiring that company.141 When American Screw 
proposed to sell its assets to another company, Textron, Inc., Noma 
voted its stock against the sale, defeating it.142 Soon thereafter, Tex-
tron’s president wrote Noma’s chairman of his plans to make a ten-
der offer (subject to board approval) for control of Noma.143 As a re-
sult, the Noma chairman “panicked,” 144  and repurchased nearly 
twenty percent of the company’s shares without informing, or obtain-
ing authorization from, the board.145 Upon learning of the repurchas-
es, the board ratified them as fait accompli, and paid using borrowed 
funds. 146  The Delaware Court of Chancery held the entire Noma 
board liable for entrenchment,147 but the Delaware Supreme Court 
limited that liability to the Noma chairman, accepting the board’s 
claim that it had ratified based on exigent circumstances.148 
 In reaching its decision, the Bennett court reasoned that, in light 
of the “inherent danger in the purchase of shares with corporate 
funds to remove a threat to corporate policy when a threat to control 
is involved,” in which the “directors are of necessity confronted with a 
conflict of interest, and an objective decision is difficult. . . . [T]he 
burden should be on the directors to justify such a purchase as one 
                                                                                                                  
 138. See id. at 55. 
 139. 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964). 
 140. 187 A.2d 405 (Del. 1962). 
 141. See id. at 406. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. 
 144. Carlos L. Israels, Are Corporate Powers Still Held in Trust?, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 
1446, 1454 (1964). 
 145. See Bennett, 187 A.2d at 407. 
 146. See id. at 407, 410. 
 147. See Propp v. Sadacca, 175 A.2d 33 (Del. Ch. 1961), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub 
nom., Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405 (Del. 1962). 
 148. See Bennett, 187 A.2d at 410-11. 
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primarily in the corporate interest.”149 In so doing, the Bennett court 
effectively reversed the business judgment presumption, under which 
plaintiffs have the burden of showing that the directors acted with a 
conflict of interest, and held that, in the context of a defensive share 
repurchase, the directors must show that they had none. 
 In the second case, Cheff, a shareholder sued the directors of Hol-
land Furnace Corporation, alleging that they breached their duty of 
loyalty by repurchasing—at a large premium over the market price—
the shares of another shareholder who had threatened to acquire and 
liquidate the company.150 In light of the plaintiff’s contention that the 
board was motivated by the desire to entrench itself, rather than mo-
tivated by the best interest of the corporation, the Delaware Supreme 
Court, citing Bennett, affirmed that the directors bore the burden of 
proving “the presence or lack of good faith on the part of the board in 
authorizing the purchase of shares.”151 
 The Cheff court did not require much of a showing from the direc-
tors, however. The court held that, “if the actions of the board were 
motivated by a sincere belief that the buying out of the dissident 
stockholder was necessary to maintain . . . proper business practices,” 
the board would not be liable.152 Further, only “if the board has acted 
solely or primarily because of the desire to perpetuate themselves in 
office,” the court held, would the repurchase be “improper.”153 Thus, 
all the court required for the directors to sustain their burden “was 
good faith and reasonable investigation of a ‘reasonable threat to the 
continued existence of [the company] in its present form.’ ”154 The 
court found “no evidence in the record sufficient to justify a contrary 
conclusion.”155 
* * * * * 
 In sum, in Bennett and Cheff, the Delaware courts effectively 
shifted the burden of proof to the defendant directors when imple-
menting repurchases as defensive measures. However, this burden 
shift had little effect because the Delaware courts seemingly accepted 
                                                                                                                  
 149. Id. at 409. However, it appeared to early commentators that the holding in Ben-
nett was premised more on the chairman’s being incorrect in his belief that a threat to cor-
porate control existed than the fact that such a belief caused him to act in conflict with his 
fiduciary duties. See Israels, supra note 144, at 1455 (“Clearly in the [Bennett] court’s view 
the chairman’s sin was acting precipitately—without adequate evidence of clear and  
present danger.”). 
 150. Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 552-53 (Del. 1964). 
 151. Id. at 554. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Israels, supra note 144, at 1456 (quoting Cheff, 199 A.2d at 555-56). 
 155. Id. 
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any disagreement as a good faith “policy” reason to approve a takeo-
ver, instead of a nefarious intent to perpetuate control. Therefore, 
despite the Bennett/Cheff burden shift, directors who believed that 
their control was “threatened by an outside interest which arguably 
would advocate some change classifiable with any verisimilitude as 
‘policy,’ [could] decide a priori that such change would not be in the 
best interests of all the shareholders” and then, “with impunity pro-
ceed to make substantial expenditures of corporate funds to acquire 
at premium prices sufficient shares” to defeat the takeover.156 
C.   Unocal’s “Intermediate” Scrutiny: “Enhanced” Business  
Judgment Review 
 1.   The Unocal Decision: A New Standard of Review 
 In Unocal, in light of inefficacy of Cheff/Bennett, the Delaware Su-
preme Court appeared to face the choice posited by commentators of 
reverting to the business judgment rule or applying entire fairness. 
However, the Unocal court instead decided that neither standard ap-
plied—at least not at the outset.157 Rather, building upon Cheff and 
Bennett,158 the court created a new threshold test to apply in such 
situations.159 
 Under the new standard set forth in Unocal—generally known as 
“intermediate or enhanced business judgment” review, but more ac-
                                                                                                                  
 156. Id. 
 157. Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 799. Ultimately, however, since Unocal is a threshold 
test, one of the two traditional standards will apply; Unocal just helps the court decide 
which one. If the board satisfies its burden, the court must apply the business judgment 
rule; if the board fails to sustain its burden, the court must apply the entire fairness stand-
ard. See id.; see also Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1389-90 (Del. 1995). 
 158. Siegel, Problems and Promise, supra note 29, at 57. 
 159. See Jack B. Jacobs, Fifty Years of Corporate Law Evolution: A Delaware Judge’s 
Retrospective, Lecture to Professor Robert Clark and Chief Justice Leo Strine’s “Mergers, 
Acquisitions, and Split-Ups” Class at Harvard Law School (Dec. 2, 2014), in 5 HARV. BUS. 
L. REV. 141, at 163 (2015) (“Unocal . . . addressed the unique concern posed by board defen-
sive conduct that neither the business judgment nor the entire fairness standards could do 
successfully. . . . [By] creat[ing] a new analytical framework that objectified the inquiry for 
determining the validity of board-adopted defensive measures.”); see also Julian Velasco, 
How Many Fiduciary Duties Are There in Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1309 
(2010) (“Under Unocal, enhanced scrutiny cannot be described as a filter between the busi-
ness judgment rule and the entire fairness test. Rather, it is characterized as a ‘threshold’ 
inquiry, ‘before the protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred.’ ” (quoting 
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985))).  
 Creation of an intermediate standard of review was not without precedent; the Del-
aware Supreme Court had created one in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 
1981). For a detailed discussion of the Zapata decision and the two-part test that the Del-
aware Supreme Court announced in Zapata, see Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bot-
tom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW. 
U. L. REV. 913, 935-41(1982). 
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curately described as “conditional business judgment” review160—a 
court must engage in both a procedural and substantive review of the 
defensive action being challenged, and only if the decision passes 
muster will it earn the protection of the business judgment rule.161 
The Unocal review includes both a reasonableness test and a propor-
tionality test, and as in Cheff and Bennett, the board bears the bur-
den on each test.162 
 Under the first prong—a direct outgrowth of Cheff and Bennett—
the board must show that it had reasonable grounds for believing 
that a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness existed.163 In par-
ticular, the board must show that, after a reasonable investigation, it 
determined in good faith that the hostile takeover presented a threat 
to the company that warranted a defensive response.164 In the second 
prong—which was granted on top of Cheff and Bennett—Unocal held 
that the board must establish that its defensive measures were rea-
sonable in relation to the threat posed to the corporation.165 Thus, 
                                                                                                                  
 160. Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 796 (quoting Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Cor-
porate Governance, 47 BUS. LAW. 461, 515 (1992)). The Unocal test “is more properly seen 
as a conditional version of the business judgment rule, rather than an intermediate stand-
ard of review” because the test is simply a “mechanism for determining . . . which of the 
traditional doctrinal standards was appropriate for the particular case.” Id. at 800. 
 161. See Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. 
L. REV. 1385, 1415 (2008) (“[T]he Delaware Supreme Court has, since its 1985 Unocal opin-
ion, applied ‘enhanced’ scrutiny: the board in effect must earn the protections of the busi-
ness judgment rule.”); Jacobs, supra note 159, at 163 (Under Unocal, “a board-adopted 
defense could become entitled to business judgment review, but the target board must first 
earn the right to that deferential review by carrying its burden to show that the board 
reasonably perceived that the hostile offer constituted a threat to corporate business or 
policy, and next, that the defense the board adopted was a reasonable, and not dispropor-
tionate, response.”). 
 If the board fails either the first or second prong of Unocal, it must in theory satisfy 
the entire fairness test, although in practice the failure to satisfy Unocal virtually ensures 
the inability to establish entire fairness. Siegel, Problems and Promise, supra note 29, at 
59-60. 
 162. See Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 799 (“The initial burden of proof is on the  
directors . . . .” (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955)); accord Siegel, Problems and Promise, su-
pra note 29, at 58. 
 163. Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 799 (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955) (“In the face of 
this inherent conflict directors must show that they had reasonable grounds for believing 
that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed because of another person’s 
stock ownership. . . . [T]hey satisfy that burden ‘by showing good faith and reasonable in-
vestigation.’ ”); see also Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964). 
 164. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. The good faith aspect of this test “requires a showing 
that the directors acted in response to a perceived threat to the corporation and not for the 
purpose of entrenching themselves in office.” Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 799. To satisfy 
the reasonable investigation element, the board must show that it “was adequately in-
formed, with the relevant standard being one of gross negligence.” Id.  
 165. Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 799 (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955). 
1144  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1119 
 
when faced with a particularly grave threat, a board is permitted to 
employ more potent defensive tactics.166 
 2.   Updating Unocal: Unitrin’s Modifications 
The Unocal test was extensively modified in Unitrin Inc. v. American 
General Corp.167 
 (a)   Factual Background to Unitrin 
 Unitrin involved a proposal for a consensual merger by American 
General Corporation (American General) to purchase all 51.8 million 
outstanding shares of common of Unitrin, Inc. (Unitrin) for $50⅜ per 
share, “a 30% premium over the market price of Unitrin’s shares.”168 
Unitrin’s board met to discuss the offer. At the meeting, an inde-
pendent investment bank, Morgan Stanley, and the board’s legal 
counsel, made a presentation on the potential effects of the merger 
and also advised the board about possible defensive actions.169 The 
board unanimously decided that the merger proposal was not in the 
best interests of Unitrin shareholders and rejected the offer.170 How-
ever, apparently believing that American General did not intend to 
go public with its offer, the Unitrin board did not implement any de-
fensive measures at that time.171 
 After the rejection, American General issued a press release an-
nouncing its offer and that Unitrin had rejected the offer.172 The Uni-
trin board met again to discuss the public announcement and deter-
mined that it was a “hostile act designed to coerce the sale of Unitrin 
at an inadequate price.”173 As a response, the board unanimously vot-
ed to put in place a “poison pill” and to authorize a repurchase pro-
gram.174 The combined effect of the poison pill and the repurchase 
program was to prevent American General from acquiring Unitrin, 
while increasing the value of outstanding Unitrin shares.175 
                                                                                                                  
 166. Id. (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955).  
 167. 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
 168. Id. at 1368. In its offer, American General also “stated that it ‘would consider of-
fering a higher price’ if ‘Unitrin could demonstrate additional value.’ ” Id.  
 169. Id. at 1368-69. 
 170. Id. at 1369. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 1370. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. The repurchase program authorized Unitrin to repurchase, “in the open mar-
ket or in private transactions, up to 10 million of Unitrin’s 51.8 million outstanding com-
mon shares.” Id.  
 175. Id. at 1371. 
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 (b)   Unitrin’s Modifications to Unocal 
 In Unitrin, the Delaware Supreme Court provided more specificity 
about Unocal’s proportionality test.176 The Unitrin court concluded 
that, although the board must show that its actions were reasonably 
related to the threat that was posed, the court’s analysis in this re-
gard should be somewhat superficial rather than close and careful.177 
First, a court must determine whether the board’s actions in re-
sponse to the hostile takeover threat were “draconian”178—that is to 
say, “preclusive” or “coercive.”179 So long as the directors’ defensive 
action was neither preclusive nor coercive, the court shall not look 
closely at whether the response was precisely calibrated to meet the 
threat posed; rather, the proper inquiry is whether the defensive 
measures were within a “range of reasonableness.”180 If so, the court 
must apply the business judgment rule to evaluate the board’s deci-
sion to engage in defensive measures.181 
* * * * * 
 In sum, under Unocal (as modified by Unitrin), once a shareholder 
plaintiff establishes that the board engaged in defensive measures in 
order to head off a possible hostile takeover, the shareholder has “es-
tablishe[d] a presumption of breach of fiduciary duty.”182 This poten-
tial conflict of interest results in “an enhanced duty which calls for 
judicial examination at the threshold”183 before the business judg-
ment rule can be applied. The board can attempt to rebut the Unocal 
presumption—essentially, earning the protection of the business 
judgment rule—by: 
                                                                                                                  
 176. Id. at 1388. 
 177. Id.  
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id.; see also Gilson, supra note 131, at 500. In Unitrin, the Delaware Supreme 
Court ultimately held that the Court of Chancery erred “by substituting its judgment . . . for 
that of the Board” since the poison pill and repurchase program implemented by the Uni-
trin board “was not coercive” and further, when the repurchase program was potentially 
“not . . . preclusive.” Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1389-90. The court therefore remanded to the 
Court of Chancery to make this determination, and further, to “determine whether they 
were within the range of reasonable defensive measures available to the Board.” Id. at 
1390. The Unitrin court’s view of preclusive appears to be quite narrow, since a poison pill 
essentially precludes a tender offer but leaves open takeovers by other means (i.e., proxy 
battle). See Gilson, supra note 131, at 500-01. 
 182. Ethan G. Stone, Business Strategists and Election Commissioners: How the Mean-
ing of Loyalty Varies with the Board’s Distinct Fiduciary Roles, 31 J. CORP. L. 893, 904 
(2006). 
 183. Siegel, Illusion of Enhanced Review, supra note 29, at 609 (emphasis omitted). 
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[D]emonstrating that it (1) carefully and in good faith identified a 
valid threat to corporate policy or effectiveness (including share-
holder interests) and (2) responded in a manner that (a) was with-
in a range of reasonable responses to the threat identified, and (b) 
did not preclude the possibility of a successful proxy contest to un-
seat the board.184 
 This initial judicial review of the board’s process and decision 
“provid[es] both a subjective and an objective review of the defensive 
tactic.”185 If the board’s decision to employ a takeover defense satis-
fies both tests, the court will apply the business judgment rule to re-
view the directors’ decision to implement defensive measures.186 
3.   The Unocal Test vs. Entire Fairness and the Business  
     Judgment Rule 
 The Unocal test (as modified in Unitrin) is, at least on its face, a 
significant departure from—and somewhat of a middle ground be-
tween—the two key standards of review in the corporate law arena, 
business judgment review and “entire fairness.”187 First, the board’s 
burden under Unocal “is not nearly as heavy as in a traditional loyal-
ty case,” when entire fairness is applied. 188 Entire fairness is a 
“searching and pervasive inquiry”189 in which the court must deter-
mine whether the transaction is objectively fair to the corporation, 
both with regard to price and procedure.190 Indeed, in light of the ex-
acting and expansive nature of the intrinsic fairness test, some con-
                                                                                                                  
 184. Stone, supra note 182, at 904. 
 185. Siegel, Illusion of Enhanced Review, supra note 29, at 610. 
 186. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1388. 
 187. But see Stone, supra note 182, at 933 (“Unocal does not impose an ‘intermediate’ 
standard of review somewhere between entire fairness and business judgment. Rather, it 
imposes a test that parallels traditional entire fairness review. The difference is in the 
object, not the degree, of court scrutiny.”). 
 188. Stone, supra note 182, at 904; see also Neil Fabricant, Hostile Tender Offers: Can 
the States Shut Them Down?, 22 J. CORP. L. 27, 43 (1996) (explaining that Unocal “estab-
lished an ‘intermediate’ standard of judicial review of defensive tactics, a standard more 
rigorous than the business judgment rule, but less strict than the ‘intrinsic fairness’ test.”);  
Sean J. Griffith, The Costs and Benefits of Precommitment: An Appraisal of Omnicare v. 
NCS Healthcare, 29 J. CORP. L. 569, 570 n.2 (2004) (explaining that Unocal “did not move 
takeover jurisprudence to the more rigorous standard of entire fairness.”); Gregg H. Kan-
ter, Comment, Judicial Review of Antitakeover Devices Employed in the Noncoercive Tender 
Offer Context: Making Sense of the Unocal Test, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 225, 245 n.100 (1989) 
(“The Unocal standard has been referred to as an intermediate review because it is not as 
demanding as the intrinsic fairness test, although it is stricter than the business judgment 
rule.”).  
 189. Siegel, Illusion of Enhanced Review, supra note 29, at 613. 
 190. Id. 
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sider it to be “almost outcome determinative” in that the defendant 
will nearly always lose.191 
 However, the Unocal test is nonetheless “starkly different” from 
the burden that shareholder plaintiffs face under the business judg-
ment rule.192 Although the board’s burden under Unocal is not terri-
bly onerous—indeed, some commentators argue it is merely pro for-
ma 193 —the burden of establishing reasonableness is nonetheless 
squarely on the board, not the plaintiff; the plaintiff’s prima facie 
case for liability is merely a “showing that the board’s action was de-
fensive in nature.”194 This is (at least in theory) plainly different from 
the business judgment rule, where the plaintiff has the burden of 
proof—and a heavy one at that:195 the plaintiff must show that the 
board was conflicted, lacked independence, or made an utterly irra-
tional decision.196 Like the entire fairness rule, the business judgment 
rule is essentially outcome determinative: directors who have not en-
gaged in misconduct like fraud or self-dealing almost never lose. 
C.   Why Intermediate Scrutiny? The Famed “Omnipresent Specter” 
 1.   Unocal’s Unclear Exhortation to an “Inherent” Conflict 
 Why did the Unocal court hold as it did? Two now-famous words: 
“omnipresent specter.” As the Unocal court explained: 
Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting 
primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation 
and its shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which calls for ju-
dicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the 
business judgment rule may be conferred. 
                                                                                                                  
 191. Id. But see Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993) (explaining that a 
court’s decision to apply entire fairness frequently, but not always, results in holding de-
fendants liable). 
 192. Stone, supra note 182, at 904-05. 
 193. Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 772 & nn.12-17 (citing academics who described the 
Unocal standard as ranging from “fairly forgiving” to “toothless” to “a dead letter”); Siegel, 
Illusion of Enhanced Review, supra note 29, at 617-24 (providing statistics to show Un-
ocal’s ineffectiveness, and describing it as a “paper tiger.”); Siegel, Problems and Promise, 
supra note 29, at 61-68 (same, and providing statistics to show that courts applying Unocal 
rarely hold against the defendant board). 
 194. Stone, supra note 182, at 904-05. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See supra Part II.A. 
1148  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1119 
 
In the face of this inherent conflict directors must show that they 
had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate 
policy and effectiveness existed . . . .197 
 Yet, beyond this famous phrasing, the Unocal court did little ex-
plaining—leaving lawyers and litigants to guess at the exact nature 
of the supposed “inherent conflict” faced by target directors.198 Alt-
hough the Delaware Supreme Court quoted its prior decision in Ben-
nett,199 that decision also offered little guidance on the “the inherent 
danger”200 that boards face when implementing defensive measures.201 
Rather, the Bennett court simply asserted that “when a threat to con-
trol is involved,” directors “are of necessity confronted with a conflict 
of interest, and an objective decision is difficult.”202 Thus, Bennett, 
like Unocal, left the precise nature of that conflict unstated.203 
2.   The Crux of the Conflict: Shareholders’ Premium vs. Directors’  
      Seats 
 Despite this ambiguity, there is little doubt as to which “inherent 
conflict” the Unocal court was alluding. Scholars widely agree that 
the Unocal court “was referring to the incumbent directors’ interest 
in the power, prestige, and perquisites that accompany board mem-
bership”—i.e., their own personal interest in maintaining their posi-
tions as directors.204 As such, “commentators universally agree[] that 
                                                                                                                  
 197. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985) (emphasis 
added). 
 198. See J. Travis Laster, Exorcizing The Omnipresent Specter: The Impact of Substan-
tial Equity Ownership by Outside Directors on Unocal Analysis, 55 BUS. LAW. 109, 112 
(1999) (the Unocal court offered little “to explain the nature of the inherent conflict of in-
terest faced by target directors.”); see also id. at 114 (“The Unocal opinion provided little 
guidance on this issue, except to assert that the conflict of interest was ‘inherent’ and ‘long 
recognized’ under Delaware law.”). 
 199. Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962). 
 200. Id.  
 201. See Laster, supra note 198, at 114 (“The Bennett court did not explain why the di-
rectors faced an inherent conflict of interest . . . or why an objective decision was difficult.”). 
 202. Bennett, 187 A.2d at 409. 
 203. Bennett does cite a law review note which purported to explain this supposedly 
“inherent conflict.” See id. (citing Note, Recent Developments: Board of Directors May Not 
Ratify Chairman’s Purchase of Corporate Shares to Prevent Assumption of Control by An-
other Without Adequate Study of Threat to Corporation, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1096, 1100 
(1962) (“[I]t is questionable whether the directors’ decision to this effect can ever be a whol-
ly objective one. Certainly those in control have a personal interest in perpetuating their 
control.”). However, the note did not explain why the board’s personal interest in perpetu-
ating control was in conflict with the decision to implement defensive measures to avert a 
takeover. See Laster, supra note 198, at 114 (explaining that the “note cited by the Bennett 
court similarly asserted, without analysis, that ‘[c]ertainly those in control have a personal 
interest in perpetuating their control’ ” and therefore failed to “provide[] any explanation 
that goes beyond the Unocal court’s assertion that an inherent conflict of interest exists”). 
 204. See Laster, supra note 198, at 114.  
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the source and nature of the omnipresent specter [lies] in the direc-
tors’ concern with retaining their offices.”205 The Delaware Supreme 
Court confirmed this a dozen years after Unocal, in Kahn v. Rob-
                                                                                                                  
 205. Laster, supra note 198, at 115-16 (citing, inter alia, E. Norman Veasey, Duty of 
Loyalty: The Criticality of the Counselor’s Role, 45 BUS. LAW. 2065, 2075 (1990); R. Frank-
lin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Rejudging the Business Judgment Rule, 48 BUS. LAW. 
1337, 1351 (1993); Paul L. Regan, The Unimportance of Being Earnest: Paramount Re-
writes the Rules for Enhanced Scrutiny in Corporate Takeovers, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 125, 148 
(1994)); see also, e.g., SARGENT & HONABACH, supra note 23, at 3 (“Target corporation direc-
tors are inevitably compromised. If they resist the hostile bid, they may be accused of pro-
tecting their own jobs at the expense of shareholders who would be denied a takeover pre-
mium. . . . Whatever the target board does, it will be accused of having at least mixed mo-
tives, if not a blatantly disloyal desire to entrench themselves (or avoid conflict) at the 
shareholders’ expense.”); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate 
Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973, 991 (2002) (“The takeover context is one in which man-
agers’ and shareholders’ interests often diverge. Managers might lose their control and the 
private benefits associated with it.”); Gilson, supra note 131, at 495 (“[T]arget management 
faces an inherent conflict of interest in confronting a transaction that directly threatens 
both their positions and their egos.”); Oesterle, supra note 114, at 130, 135 n.71 (“[T]here 
exists a very real danger that target managers may use the occasion of a tender offer to 
further their own interests at shareholder expense. . . . One obvious reason why target 
managers may seek to block a tender offer is the fear of losing their jobs and salaries. . . . 
In fact, one study of ninety-five cash tender offers found that the greater the positive im-
pact of a tender offer on target managers’ personal wealth, the lesser the likelihood of tar-
get management resistance.” (citing Ralph A. Walkling & Michael S. Long, Agency Theory, 
Managerial Welfare, and Takeover Bid Resistance, 15 RAND J. ECON. 54 (1984))); Palmiter, 
supra note 23, at 1413 (“Any unsolicited . . . proposal to change corporate control . . . is 
likely to be premised on the inadequacy of the performance of the incumbent board and 
management. Management, which faces losing the significant emoluments of control, has a 
rational and ineluctable motive to use the governance machinery to perpetuate control. 
Only an irrational manager, or one facing significant countervailing incentives, would ac-
cede to the change without trying to avoid or soften the blow.” (footnote omitted)); Robert 
A. Ragazzo, Unifying the Law of Hostile Takeovers: Bridging the Unocal/Revlon Gap, 35 
ARIZ. L. REV. 989, 1032 (1993) (“Self-interested director behavior is more of a concern in the 
takeover context than in the day-to-day running of a business. . . . Directors, especially 
management directors, have a substantial interest in safeguarding their jobs. If directors 
are able to reject bids out of hand based on the interests of nonshareholder constituencies, 
the board has a substantial ability to advance its selfish interests on the pretense of pro-
tecting nonshareholder groups.”); Schubert, supra note 110, at 690 (defensive techniques 
“permit managers to entrench themselves and thus avoid accountability for their perfor-
mance, at the expense of shareholders who are denied the opportunity to maximize their 
investments” (citing Norlin Corp. v. Rooney Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1984))); 
Mary Siegel, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics: A Proposal for Reform, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 377, 
387 (1985) (“[Decisions from other jurisdictions prior to Unocal] sidestepped the inherent 
conflict of interest confronting target management engaged in defensive tactics . . . [and 
ignored] the likelihood that the directors’ desire to retain control, rather than the interests 
of the corporation, may be the primary motive for defensive tactics . . . .”); Gregory V. Var-
allo & Srinivas M. Raju, A Fresh Look at Deal Protection Devices: Out From the Shadow of 
the Omnipresent Specter, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 975, 979 (2001) (“The principle announced in 
Cheff and later expanded in Unocal and its progeny is an acknowledgment of human frailty 
and a reflection of judicial distrust of directorial decisions made in the context where a 
director could be influenced by a desire to maintain his or her position and the emoluments 
of directorial office, even absent direct, personal financial interest of a more easily quanti-
fied type.”). 
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erts,206 reasoning that Unocal reflects “the temptation for directors to 
seek to remain at the corporate helm in order to protect their own 
powers and perquisites.”207  
 This conflict of interest arises from two simple, uncontroversial 
facts: First, a hostile offer will, almost by definition, be higher than 
the market price for the stock, thereby allowing shareholders to sell 
their shares immediately at a premium to market or resulting in a 
larger price per share due to an auction between bidders.208 Second, 
directors also undoubtedly know that, in the context of a hostile 
takeover, the new controlling shareholder will almost always remove 
the existing board after the takeover.209 Hence, directors inherently 
face a conflict between doing their jobs—i.e., maximizing shareholder 
value—and keeping their jobs.210 Academic agreement about this con-
flict is so widespread that “[n]o one disputes an unsolicited takeover 
offer poses a serious conflict between the interests of target managers 
and target shareholders.”211 
                                                                                                                  
 206. 679 A.2d 460 (Del. 1996). 
 207. Id. at 495. These authorities leave no doubt that the basis for the omnipresent spec-
ter is the interest of incumbent directors, both insiders and outsiders, in retaining the “pow-
ers and perquisites” of board membership; see Laster, supra note 198, at 116 (“In Kahn . . . the 
Delaware Supreme Court explained the rationale for Unocal review specifically in terms of 
the motivation of incumbent directors to retain the benefits of board membership . . . .”). 
 208. See Siegel, supra note 205, at 382.  
 209. See Schubert, supra note 110, at 697 (“Acquisition of control by a hostile raider 
inevitably results in replacement of the old board.”). Indeed, the whole theory of takeover 
markets is that, “[i]f the value of the corporation’s stock drops substantially below the val-
ue of its assets, that invites a hostile takeover by some outside pirate who will fire man-
agement and acquire the company’s assets.” Calvin H. Johnson, The Disloyalty of Stock 
and Stock Option Compensation, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 133, 138 (2005) (citing Henry G. 
Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 113 (1965)).  
 210. See Siegel, supra note 205, at 382 (“On the one hand, a new management . . . a 
higher price per share made possible by an auction among bidders, or even the simple abil-
ity to sell their stock at a premium above the market price may be in the best interests of 
the target shareholders. On the other hand, target management’s desire to maintain con-
trol may spur its resistance to tender offers that are consistent with the financial interests 
of the corporation, but jeopardize the directors’ status and salaries. Indeed, such self-
interest may result in the use of defensive tactics that could operate to the financial detri-
ment of both the corporation and its shareholders.”); see also Wayne O. Hanewicz, Director 
Primacy, Omnicare, and the Function of Corporate Law, 71 TENN. L. REV. 511, 534 (2004) 
(“The conflict of interest discussed in Unocal involved hostile takeovers and the inherently 
conflicted position in which they place target managers and the board. On the one hand, a 
hostile takeover often results in the target managers losing their jobs, but on the other, it 
also often results in the target shareholders being paid a substantial premium for their 
shares. The conflict is apparent—the target managers have an incentive to fend off a take-
over that the target shareholders may want to accept.” (footnote omitted)). 
 211. Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 818 (“If the deal goes forward, shareholders stand to 
gain a substantial premium for their shares, while managers face a substantial risk of 
losing their jobs. Any defensive actions by management are thus tainted by the specter of 
self-interest.” (footnote omitted)). 
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 Yet, while many commentators have described this conflict as “in-
herent,” it is important to understand that—in the eyes of the Dela-
ware courts, which do not generally view a director’s interest in keep-
ing her own job as a material, financial interest212—not all directors 
are affected equally by this supposedly “inherent” conflict. Clearly 
the conflict is “inescapable” for the company’s top managers, such as 
the CEO, who stand to lose their multi-million dollar salaries and 
perks.213 However, the conflict “is merely a potential problem” for any 
of the company’s directors who are at least nominally independent.214 
For independent directors, the conflicts posed by unsolicited tender 
offers are, in theory, no different from other situations involving a 
potential change in control of the corporation, including freeze-out 
mergers and management buyouts.215 This is particularly true since 
the boards of large firms generally consist of a majority of outside 
directors. 
 Therefore, the Unocal test’s justification cannot be correctly de-
scribed as an inherent conflict between the directors’ duties and their 
personal interests. Rather, Unocal’s underlying reasoning is better 
described as simply an “inherently . . . strong risk” of such a con-
flict.216 
                                                                                                                  
 212. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Govern-
ance of Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 373 n.376 (2004) (“Courts in Delaware 
have indicated that payment of directors fees will not result in a loss of independence.” 
(citing, inter alia, Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 188 (Del. 1988) (“The only averment per-
mitting such an inference is the allegation that all GM’s directors are paid for their ser-
vices as directors. However, such allegations, without more, do not establish any financial 
interest.”)); In re The Ltd., Inc. S’holders Litig., 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 28, at *18 (Del. Ch. 
2002) (“Allegations as to one’s position as a director and the receipt of director’s fees, with-
out more, however, are not enough for purposes of pleading demand futility.”))). 
 213. Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 819. 
 214. Id.; see supra notes 4 and 116 regarding different types of directors. 
 215. Id. To support this point, Bainbridge observes that “the somewhat analogous case 
of management-sponsored leveraged buyouts” also “inherently involve[s] a strong risk of 
management self-dealing” because “management is acting as the sellers’ agents and, in 
that capacity, is obliged to get the best price it can for the shareholders,” while it is “also 
acting as a purchaser and, in that capacity, has a strong self-interest to pay the lowest 
possible price.” Id. Further, a MBO also faces an independent director with the potential 
choice of going along and being fired or resisting and saving her director fees. See id. at 
819-20.  Yet, according to Bainbridge, while “judicial review of management buyouts tends 
to be rather intensive,” courts have nonetheless “allowed such transactions” after careful 
review. Id. at 820.  
 216. Id. at 819. Thus, “the conflict of interest present when the board responds to an 
unsolicited tender offer differs only in degree, not kind, from any other corporate conflict. 
Although skepticism about board motives is appropriate, their conflict of interest does not 
necessarily equate to blameworthiness.” Id. at 820 (footnote omitted).  
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 3.   Why Not Entire Fairness? 
 That said, if there is such a risk of conflict, why did the Unocal 
court hold that defensive measures warranted a new, intermediate 
form of scrutiny rather than the standard that traditionally applies 
when the board engages in a self-dealing transaction? The answer 
must be that the court recognized that defensive measures, while 
posing the risk of conflict, are nonetheless just a potential conflict. 
When a director places herself on the opposite side of a transaction 
with the corporation, that director’s interests are in fact in conflict 
with that of the corporation, so a court will presume that the duty of 
loyalty has been breached absent the director’s proof that the trans-
action was objectively fair to the corporation (or that it was approved 
by certain disinterested persons).217 
 By contrast, when management engages in defensive measures, 
there is only the possibility that management must choose between 
remaining in their jobs and what is in the best interest of the corpo-
ration; whether or not that is true depends on what is, in fact, best 
for the corporation. Thus, by not employing entire fairness review, 
the Unocal decision suggests that defensive measures reflect an ex-
traordinarily high-risk of a conflict of interest, but not an actual con-
flict of interest.218 
 4.   The Important (but Oft-Ignored) Role of Potential Pretext 
 (a)   Why Pretext is Important 
 The existence of an “inherent” conflict (which, as described above, 
is better described as an “inherently strong risk of a” conflict) be-
tween the board’s best outcome and the shareholders’ best outcome is 
well traveled ground. However, another aspect to the “omnipresent 
                                                                                                                  
 217. Cf. Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (1964) (stating that the defendant directors 
did not “have the same ‘self-dealing interest’ as is present . . . when a director sells proper-
ty to the corporation” and therefore, not applying entire fairness). 
 218. See Siegel, Problems and Promise, supra note 29, at 69 (explaining that the use of 
defensive tactics “occupies the middle ground between an obvious conflict—as . . . when 
directors transact business with their corporation—and a suspicion that a conflict could 
exist by virtue of the directors concern about losing their jobs should a hostile offer suc-
ceed”); see also id. (citing City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 796 
(Del. Ch. 1988) (describing the use of defensive measures as “neither self-dealing nor whol-
ly disinterested”); Judd F. Sneirson, Merger Agreements, Termination Fees, and the Con-
tract-Corporate Tension, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 573, 589 (“Where a board is faced with 
a bid to take over the company, and acts to defend the company against it, circumstances 
present a conflict of interest, although not the sort of conflict of interest implicated in tradi-
tional duty of loyalty settings. Although directors may not have a direct . . . pecuniary 
stake in the decisions they make, they naturally have an interest in remaining in control of 
the company . . . and enjoying the perquisites of office.”)).  
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specter”—the potential for management pretext—has received far 
less scholarly attention. 
 To understand why pretext is a factor, it is helpful to remember 
that, at some level, when directors act, they always risk a conflict of 
interest, regardless of what they are doing on behalf of the corpora-
tion. A board is faced with the possibility of a conflict of interest every 
time it spends the corporation’s money. In every instance, manage-
ment faces some non-negligible temptation to spend that money on 
its own personal interests rather than the corporation’s best inter-
ests. This is simply the nature of the beast (at least in large corpora-
tions): The board always plays with “other people’s money,”219 so it is 
impossible to entirely eliminate agency costs. 
 Yet, most of the time, when the board plays with other people’s 
money, the business judgment rule is deemed sufficient to protect 
shareholder interests from corporate disloyalty; we presume the 
board is acting in the corporation’s best interest unless a plaintiff can 
establish a problem with the decisionmaking process that suggests a 
conflict of interest or utter irrationality. 
 So why do we trust boards for normal, day-to-day decisions—i.e., 
decisions to buy or sell goods or services to or from unrelated third 
parties? In large part220 because, for most regular day-to-day business 
transactions, the directors’ absence of traditional (material, pecuni-
ary) disloyalty is obvious on the face of the transaction. Absent a high 
likelihood that the third party is simply a straw buyer or seller for 
management, there is simply no reasonable fear of disloyalty. Alt-
hough management could easily act in bad faith, there is no pressing 
reason to fear that they will do so. That is to say, for most ordinary 
transactions, there is simply no reason to fear that management’s 
ostensible rationale for the transaction is a ruse to hide its disloyal-
ty.221 There is simply no reason to believe that the board is acting to 
                                                                                                                  
 219. See generally LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANK-
ERS USE IT (1914) (decrying the agency costs associated with by bankers’ use of account 
holders’ money). To be fully accurate, in the corporate context, management is really using 
the money of “another person”—the corporation itself—since (unlike account holders) 
shareholders have no legal right to the corporation’s funds. 
 220. Another reason is that the parties are repeat players. Corporation law provides 
shareholders a greater decisionmaking role in “final period” transactions, where the share-
holders will not be around to discipline the directors after the transaction is consummated. 
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(c) (2012) (shareholders vote on proposed mergers). 
Indeed, many policy rationales have been offered for the business judgment rule. See 
Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided 
Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 287, 305-17 (1994) (describing various rationales).  
 221. See In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 598-600 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
(Strine, V.C) (“In a business judgment rule case, the rule applies because the board is dis-
interested and thus has no apparent motive to do anything other than act in the best inter-
ests of the corporation and its stockholders.”).  
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further its own goals at the shareholders’ expense—and every reason 
to believe that board and shareholder interests are aligned. 
 Defensive measures are different. If the board is faced with a hos-
tile tender offer—at a premium over the market price for the compa-
ny’s stock—then, by definition, the offeror is asserting that the corpo-
ration is worth more (either in whole or in parts) than the market 
price. Yet, regardless of whether the corporation is a massive, widely-
known public company or an obscure, private, family corporation, 
management has inside information—and therefore, the upper hand 
in determining the corporation’s actual valuation. Critically, man-
agement knows its short- and long-term plans for the corporation—
which, even if described to some extent in the corporation’s public 
filings, to a large degree exists simply in their minds (and perhaps in 
the corporation’s internal planning documents). 
 Hence, if a corporation’s shares are trading for $25 and the tender 
offer is for $50, the board could easily take advantage of information 
asymmetry by refusing to pull its poison pull with a brief statement 
about how it believes the corporation’s long-term value is greater 
than the offered. (And, more likely than not, the board could pur-
chase an investment banker’s “fairness opinion” to that effect.222) Or 
the board could assert that it was the wrong time to sell, in that it 
would interrupt the next phase of the corporation’s strategic devel-
opment.223 Or the board could claim that it was developing a new 
product line that will boost the stock’s value. In each instance, no 
outsider is in a position to prove otherwise, particularly if manage-
ment’s explanation is logical.224 Thus, as one commentator astutely 
put it: 
                                                                                                                  
 222. See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain 
Search for Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521, 556 (2002) (describing as “dubious” that 
“courts . . . give substantial weight to an investment banker’s bought-and-paid-for fairness 
opinion”); Steven M. Davidoff, Fairness Opinions, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1557, 1562 (2006) 
(“Fairness opinions . . . are prone to subjectivity and are frequently prepared utilizing 
methodologies that simply do not jibe with best practices. These defects are exacerbated  
by . . . investment banks who are conflicted . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 223. Cf. Siegel, supra note 205, at 386-87 (“A number of business reasons can be prof-
fered to explain why a target may consider a takeover undesirable and decide to resist. For 
example, the target board may consider the offering price inadequate or the selling time 
inappropriate; management may seek to protect the corporation’s direction or continued 
existence; or, it may determine that significant legal impediments bar consummation of the 
takeover.” (footnote omitted)). 
 224. See ROGER J. MAGNUSON, 1 SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION § 10:16 (2016); James 
Farinaro, Note, Target Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: An Initial Reasonableness Burden, 61 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 722, 726-27 (1986) (“The problem with using [the business judgment 
rule] in the takeover context is that the plaintiff must present evidence of the directors’ 
subjective intent, an extremely difficult burden to overcome. In fact, most courts and com-
mentators agree that plaintiffs in most takeover cases cannot negate the presumption of 
 
2017]  INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY 1155 
 
Directors . . . selfishly waging battle for themselves can almost al-
ways erect a facade of sophisticated rationales to justify pitched 
battles to maintain their own perquisites. They can hire account-
ants, lawyers, and other experts to give a sensible (and distracting) 
gloss to cover darker motives in doggedly resisting a takeover 
bid.225 
 In sum, since the information necessary to determine whether the 
tender offer or the board’s strategic plan represents the best value is 
largely, if not entirely, held by the board, the situation is ripe for bad 
faith.226 The board (and its paid consultants, the investment bankers) 
could easily lie about its long-term plans and its expected long-term 
valuation in order to protect their jobs and leave the plaintiffs with 
no way of overcoming the business judgment presumption.227 
 (b)   Delaware Courts: Unocal “Smokes Out” Pretext 
 Although most scholars who have addressed Unocal’s fabled “om-
nipresent specter” language have focused on the “inherent” conflict 
posed by defensive measures, one particularly important scholar of 
Unocal—Chief Justice Leo Strine of the Delaware Supreme Court—
has repeatedly recognized the importance that potential pretext pre-
sumably played in the Unocal court’s decision. When sitting on the 
Court of Chancery, then-Judge Strine twice described Unocal as in-
                                                                                                                  
the business judgment rule. . . . [Thus], directors might act with a desire to perpetuate 
themselves in office under a pretext of benefiting their company and stockholders.”). 
 225. ROGER J. MAGNUSON, 1 SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION § 10:16 (2016). 
 226. Accord Recent Case, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1253, 1255 (1965) (explaining that Cheff’s 
decision to place “the burden of proof of good faith on the directors” could be justified in 
part on the ground that “much of the evidence going to the directors’ good faith and lack of 
interest is most readily accessible to them”); Note, Buying Out Insurgent Shareholders with 
Corporate Funds, 70 YALE L.J. 308, 317 (1960) (urging that, when “determining motive, the 
assignment of the burden of proof on this issue is crucial . . . [because] the facts which indi-
cate the motivation . . . are probably accessible only to the directors, [and] to compel the 
plaintiff to prove the intent of the purchase would impose an almost insurmountable bur-
den, and would, in effect, insulate the directors’ action from challenge”); Note, Corpora-
tions: Good Faith Defense of Corporate Policy Held Sufficient to Justify Repurchase of Stock 
with Corporate Funds, 1965 DUKE L.J. 412, 417 (1965) (noting that in cases like Cheff, 
“Delaware courts have altered the common law rule by assigning the burden of proving 
good faith to the defendant directors. The possibility of accounting to the corporation for 
the misuse of management power tends to discourage repurchase where a demonstrable 
threat to the corporation does not exist” (footnotes omitted)). 
 227. See Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life 
and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865, 916 (1990) (“As the court recognized in Unocal, 
[management’s stated] rationales for [engaging in defensive measures] might simply be a 
pretext . . . to defeat a bid.”); accord Christine Hurt, The Hostile Poison Pill, 50 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 137, 149 (2016) (“[T]he Unocal test ‘smokes out self-interest and pretext’ in ‘situa-
tions where boards of directors make decisions that have clear implications for their con-
tinued control.’ ” (quoting Kallick v. Sandridge Energy, Inc., 68 A.3d 242, 258-59 (Del. Ch. 
2013) (Strine, V.C.))). 
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tended to root out management pretext. 228  First, in In re Dollar 
Thrifty Shareholder Litigation, 229  then-Vice Chancellor Strine ex-
plained that the purpose of the Unocal test is to assure “that the 
board . . . [took] a logical and reasoned approach for the purpose of 
advancing a proper objective, and to thereby smoke out mere pre-
textual justifications for improperly motivated decisions.”230 Second, 
in Kallick v. Sandridge Energy, Inc.,231 then-Chancellor Strine ex-
plained that Unocal “smokes out self-interest and pretext” and there-
by “surfaces the issues at stake, including the possibility of bad 
faith.”232 
 (c)   Unocal Forces Management to Make Its Case 
 The effect of Unocal, then, is two-fold: First, the directors must 
proffer a plausible, logical justification for their actions—which they 
are not required to do under the business judgment rule. Second, ra-
ther than be protected so long as their “cover story” is rational (i.e., if 
the transaction does not constitute waste), as they would be under 
the business judgment rule, the directors must show that their ac-
tions were reasonable in that their defensive measures furthered 
their stated goal.233 
 In this way, as Chief Justice Strine (then Chancellor) explained in 
Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Delaware), Inc., the Unocal test is similar to 
some standards of review under Constitutional law,234 
[W]hich smoke out the actual objective supposedly motivating 
challenged governmental action and require a fit (of looser or 
tighter nature) between that objective and the means used. This 
approach to analyzing behavior . . . is useful in exposing pre-
                                                                                                                  
 228. Perhaps Justice Strine is attuned to this issue because of his former position as 
Chancellor of the Court of Chancery, where he had to sift through the evidence and make 
factual determinations. 
 229. 14 A.3d 573 (Del. Ch. 2010) (Strine, V.C). 
 230. Id. at 598; see also id. (“One of the benefits of [the Unocal] approach is that it 
mandates that the court look closely at the motivations of the board.”). 
 231. 68 A.3d 242 (Del. Ch. 2013) (Strine, V.C).  
 232. Id. at 258-59. 
 233. See Siegel, Problems and Promise, supra note 29, at 95 (“Increasing review to en-
hanced business judgment for topics that are currently reviewed under the business judg-
ment rule would require boards to justify the reasonableness of their actions . . . .”). Ra-
tionality is, at least in theory, a much lower standard than reasonableness—particularly. 
See In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 598 n.181 (Del. Ch. 2010) (Strine, V.C.) 
(“One of the benefits of this approach is that it mandates that the court look closely at the 
motivations of the board. In adopting a reasonableness, rather than rationality,  
standard . . . Unocal implicitly acknowledge[s] that there is a predicate question that must 
be answered that is not typically at issue in a case governed by the business judgment 
rule.”). 
 234. Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
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textual justifications. Because there is a burden on the party in 
power to identify its legitimate objectives and to explain its actions 
as necessary to advance those objections, flimsy pretense stands a 
greater chance of being revealed.235 
 This is very different, at least in theory, from the business judg-
ment rule—which puts the plaintiff shareholder to the test and al-
lows the defendant board to offer nothing but a smile. 
III.   THE ARGUMENT BY ANALOGY: CORPORATE POLITICAL  
CONTRIBUTIONS RAISE THE SAME AGENCY COST CONCERNS AS  
CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY 
 When investigating the appropriate standard by which state cor-
poration law should review corporate political contributions, corpo-
rate charitable contributions are a logical starting point. On the face 
of it, the two acts seem similar: In each instance, the corporation is 
giving away money rather than exchanging money for a contractual 
right to some specified return. That is to say, neither charitable do-
nations nor political transactions would seem, at first glance, to be 
business transactions. 
 This Part begins by briefly detailing some of the similarities be-
tween corporate political contributions and corporate charitable do-
nations.236 Next, this Part explores how a corporate decision to donate 
to charity (or, presumably, a corporate decision to contribute to a Su-
per PAC) differs from a typical business decision—and why these dif-
ferences should (and do) concern shareholders.237 After that, this Part 
                                                                                                                  
 235. Id. at 807 (footnotes omitted); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Del-
aware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality 
Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 272-73 (1989) (“Under an effective proportionality test, moreo-
ver, the difficulty of constructing a plausible but inaccurate account of future value would 
be increased by the reluctance of secondary participants [i.e., investment bankers] in a 
target’s decisionmaking to acquiesce in such an effort.”); see also id. at 273 (“[F]orcing 
management to articulate the concrete link between its plan and shareholder interests can, 
by its own force, shift management’s institutional incentives enough to provide an effective 
screen against ill-conceived or self-interested defensive tactics.”); cf. Stephen M. Bain-
bridge, The Geography of Revlon-Land, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3277, 3302-04 (2013) (“ ‘When 
a special committee’s process is perceived as reflecting a good faith, informed attempt to 
approximate aggressive, arms-length bargaining, it will be accorded substantial importance 
by the court. When, on the other hand, it appears as artifice, ruse or charade . . . then one can 
expect that its decision will be accorded no respect.’ There is considerable evidence that the 
same emphasis on conflicted interests and motives underlies much of the Unocal . . . analy-
sis.” (footnote omitted)); Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 792-93 (explaining that Delaware’s 
former approach—the Cheff “primary purpose test”—was a “minimal” burden on directors 
because it was “always possible” for management to “find some issue of policy as to which 
they differed” from the potential acquirer, and that such a sincere belief that defensive 
tactics were necessary was all that was required for directors to avoid liability). 
 236. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 237. See infra Part III.A.2. 
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describes (1) the deferential approach that Delaware courts use (in 
the context of a shareholder derivative lawsuit) to review a board’s 
decision to cause the corporation to make a charitable donation;238 (2) 
scholars’ criticism of that approach;239 and (3) a long-neglected argu-
ment that courts should apply a tougher approach, akin to the Un-
ocal test, when reviewing charitable donations.240 Finally, this Part 
concludes by urging that, if the Delaware courts were to use an in-
termediate standard of review to evaluate a management decision to 
cause the corporation to make a charitable donation, they should ap-
ply the same standard to review a management decision to cause the 
corporation to make a corporate political contribution.241 
A.   When Corporations Simply Give Money Away 
 1.   Corporate Gifts to Charity 
 Corporate donations to charity are a strange idea. If one accepts 
that management’s prime directive for running the corporation is to 
maximize shareholder value, 242  then simply giving money away 
seems squarely at odds with that purpose. 
 Of course, one might argue that donations to charity do not, in 
fact, involve simply giving money away.243 And perhaps, it is laugha-
                                                                                                                  
 238. See infra Part III.B. 
 239. See infra Part III.C.1. 
 240. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 241. See infra Part III.D. 
 242. This is the dominant paradigm in corporate law, at least according to those who 
make the decisions. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-
Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 155 (2012) (“[T]he corporate 
law requires directors, as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith strategy 
to maximize profits for the stockholders.”); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 
1919). Yet, not everyone agrees with this view of the corporation’s prime directive. See, e.g., 
J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit 
Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 15 (2012). See generally LYNN STOUT, THE 
SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, COR-
PORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012). 
 243. This view seems common among scholars. See, e.g., Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox 
of Corporate Giving: Tax Expenditures, the Nature of the Corporation, and the Social Con-
struction of Charity, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 11-12, 49-79 (1994) (looking to corporate market-
ing literature to assess why corporations give money to charity, and concluding that such 
literature “reveals a pervasive belief”—or, at least, a stated belief—among corporate offic-
ers “that corporate giving is good for business”––i.e., the “halo effect”; but also acknowledg-
ing that “there may be alternative (and unspoken) explanations for corporate transfers to 
charity, such as the ability of corporations to exercise social and political power”); see also 
Victor Brudney & Allen Ferrell, Corporate Charitable Giving, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1191, 1192 
(2002) (“Many corporate charitable donations to . . . charities are indistinguishable from 
ordinary business expenditures made to realize imminent, visible corporate operating 
gains.”); Hildy J. Simmons, Luncheon Address, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1013, 1014 (1997) 
(describing corporate charitable giving as corporations acting in their “[e]nlightened self-
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bly naïve to believe that corporations run by presumably-successful 
businesspeople simply give money away without expecting something 
in return. It is difficult to picture a hard-driving CEO—who probably 
climbed to the top of the corporate ladder by maintaining a laser-like 
focus on the bottom line—being easily swayed by a sad-sap pitch that 
the corporation should divert the shareholders’ profits to benefit 
mankind. 
 Yet, even if one accepts that charitable donations are often in-
tended to improve a corporation’s bottom line somehow, they none-
theless differ from other types of business decisions because any ben-
efit to the corporation must, by law, be not just indirect, but wholly 
unexpected. That is to say, a corporate charity cannot involve a clas-
sic bargained for exchange—i.e., quid pro quo—in which the corpora-
tion explicitly receives goods or services, either directly or indirectly, 
as a result for the donation. To the extent that the corporation does 
receive a “substantial” financial benefit in return for the donation, 
the transaction is by definition not a charitable donation, and is not 
tax deductible as such.244 Moreover, a corporation cannot deduct a 
“donation” to charity to the extent that it receives “goods or services” 
                                                                                                                  
interest”); Hayden W. Smith, If Not Corporate Philanthropy, Then What?, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 757, 763 (1997) (“With very few exceptions, if any at all, corporate giving is not moti-
vated by altruism.”); Phillip I. Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Social Crisis, 50 
B.U. L. REV. 157, 207 (1970) (“Corporate activity in the social sphere is not, in fact, altruis-
tic. . . . [Rather, i]t reflects a tactical judgment as to the most advantageous manner for the 
corporation to conduct its business in the light of the climate of opinion in which it must 
function.”).  
 244. See Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, “Gifts, Gafts, and Gefts”––The Income 
Tax Definition and Treatment of Private and Charitable “Gifts” and a Principled Policy 
Justification for the Exclusion of Gifts from Income, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 441, 515 
(2003) (“What, then, is the standard for determining whether a transfer to a charity is a 
gift? The standard rests on whether the transferor received a substantial benefit in return 
for, or as a consequence of, making the transfer. . . . Only benefits that have a financial 
dimension will be taken into account. The pleasure that a gift provides a donor, the spir-
itual experience that a donor may enjoy, and the enhanced personal status that a donor 
achieves in the community . . . are not taken into account.”); see, e.g., United States v. Am. 
Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986); Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104. Indeed, 
“[p]ayments made by a corporation to a nonprofit organization may be treated as an ordi-
nary and necessary business expense when the company has an expectation of financial 
return from the gift.” Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Philanthropy, Executives’ Pet Charities 
and the Agency Problem, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1147, 1156 n.36 (1997). 
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in return for a donation.245 Thus, for example, corporate “sponsor-
ships” that are obviously advertising cannot be deducted.246 
 Hence, any benefit to the corporation stemming from the charity 
must be extremely indirect and tangential, such as a potential in-
crease in goodwill—i.e., the “halo effect”247—that members of the 
community might have in finding out that the corporation donated to 
charity (or to this specific charity). Thus, “[t]he corporate benefit, if 
                                                                                                                  
 245. William A. Drennan, Taxing Commercial Sponsorships of College Athletics: A Bal-
anced Proposal, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1353, 1382 (2012) (“[I]f a donor contributes cash or prop-
erty and the charity provides goods or services in return, the donor can deduct only the 
portion of the payment in excess of the fair market value of the goods or services the chari-
ty provides.”) (citing United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 117-18 (1986); 
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(2)(B) (1984); Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 105). 
 246. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBL’N 598, TAX ON UNRELATED BUSINESS  
INCOME OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 8 (2017), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p598.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JFW9-RAZB]; accord National Council for Nonprofits, Is Corporate Spon-
sorship Income Taxable or a Charitable Contribution?, NAT’L COUNCIL FOR NONPROFITS, 
https://www.councilofnonprofits.org/tools-resources/corporate-sponsorship-income-taxable-
or-charitable-contribution [https://perma.cc/CS57-FYBT].  
 Accordingly, the suggestion that corporations may simply use charitable deductions 
as tax-deductible advertising, see, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Questioning Philanthropy from a Cor-
porate Governance Perspective, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1091, 1094 & n.18 (1997); Joseph 
Galaskiewicz, Corporate Contributions to Charity: Nothing More than a Marketing Strate-
gy, in PHILANTHROPIC GIVING: STUDIES IN VARIETIES AND GOALS, 246, 247 (Richard Magat 
ed., 1989), is not completely accurate. While the corporation can deduct a gift if the charity 
simply lists its contact information in the charity’s publication or on its website, if the char-
ity highlights the corporate sponsor (e.g., by indicating a “tier” of sponsorship, or an exclu-
sive sponsorship, or any endorsement by the charity of the corporation’s product, or any 
highlighted mention of the corporation’s sponsorship compared to other donors), the gift 
will probably be considered a “substantial benefit” by the IRS and, therefore, be taxable. 
See National Council for Nonprofits, supra note 246. 
 Perhaps for this reason, corporate philanthropy has languished in recent years. See 
Dan Pallotta, The Ice Bucket Challenge Won’t Solve Charity’s Biggest Problem, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Sept. 4, 2014 (“Charitable giving has remained stuck at 2% of GDP in the U.S. ever 
since we started measuring it in the 1970s.”); Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, The 
Competitive Advantage of Corporate Philanthropy, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2002 (“Corporate 
philanthropy is in decline. . . . The reasons are not hard to understand. Executives increas-
ingly see themselves in a no-win situation, caught between critics demanding ever higher 
levels of ‘corporate social responsibility’ and investors applying relentless pressure to max-
imize short-term profits. . . . [E]xecutives find it hard, if not impossible, to justify charitable 
expenditures in terms of bottom-line benefit.”); Ken Stern, Why Don’t Corporations Give to 
Charity?, SLATE.COM (Aug. 8, 2013, 5:51 AM), www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/ 
2013/08/corporations_don_t_give_to_charity_why_the_most_profitable_companies_are.html 
[https://perma.cc/9XL3-4QAS] (“Over the past 30 years, corporate contributions to charities 
in the U.S., as measured by percentage of pretax profits, have fallen precipitously, from a 
high of 2.1 percent at its peak in 1986 to just around 0.8 percent in 2012. . . . By compari-
son, the comparable measure of the generosity of individuals, as told by the percentage of 
disposable personal income, has remained solid over that time, changing from 2 percent in 
1982 to 1.9 percent today.”); cf. John A. Pearce II, The Rights of Shareholders in Authoriz-
ing Corporate Philanthropy, 60 VILL. L. REV. 251 (2015) (stating that “[c]orporate philan-
thropy is on the rise” by U.S. corporations, but citing the total amount donated by corpora-
tions rather than the percentage of GDP or corporate profits). 
 247. Knauer, supra note 243, at 57-61. 
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any, from management designation of corporate goodwill gifts is un-
certain in effect and immeasurable in amount, and . . . is apt to be 
modest.”248 
 Perhaps for this reason, while every state allows corporations to 
donate to charity,249 in “many jurisdictions it is perfectly legal for a 
corporation to literally give away property to charity without receiv-
ing anything in return.”250 Accordingly, while many corporate chari-
table gifts may be intended by management as strategic ways to pro-
vide an indirect, intangible, long-run benefit—such as improving 
public goodwill—it is nonetheless completely legal in many states for 
management to donate corporate money to charity without any such 
goal in mind. “Simply giving money away” is, therefore, by no means 
an inaccurate way to describe corporate charitable donations. 
 2.   Corporate Political Contributions As Close Cousins 
 Like charitable donations, political contributions also involve giv-
ing away the corporation’s money251 and “cannot be a specific bar-
gained-for exchange—i.e., a quid pro quo—because that would consti-
tute an illegal bribe.”252 Moreover, unlike most decisions that corpo-
rate management makes, which involve either a contract in which 
the corporation exchanges goods or services for money with the hopes 
of making a profit, or steps towards developing contracts, goods or 
services, political contributions “are not contracts” since “there is no 
‘consideration.’ ”253 
                                                                                                                  
 248. Brudney & Ferrell, supra note 243, at 1202 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 1192-
93 (describing some corporate donations as “ ‘goodwill’ gifts that seek to improve the public 
image of the corporation . . . in a way that arguably will produce future intangible benefits 
from a favorable public image of the firm”––i.e., to show that the corporation is a “good 
citizen.”); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 733, 768 (2005) (“[A]lthough corporate managers generally claim their donations in-
crease long run profits, as an empirical matter this frequently seems dubious, and thus in 
fact profit-sacrificing donations are being allowed.” (citing Brudney & Ferrell, supra note 
243 at 1192-93)).  
 249. William Alan Nelson II, Post-Citizens United: Using Shareholder Derivative 
Claims of Corporate Waste to Challenge Corporate Independent Political Expenditures, 13 
NEV. L.J. 134, 141 (2012) (citing Elhauge, supra note 248, at 768). 
 250. Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 312 (citing Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pando-
ra’s Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. 
REV. 579, 609 (1997)). 
 251. One might be tempted to say, for rhetorical effect, “simply giving away the share-
holders’ money.” However, shareholders have no legal right to the corporation’s funds, nor 
is there any right to share in its profits unless the board decides to declare a dividend.  
 252. Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 311 (citing, inter alia, the federal bribery 
statute). 
 253. Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, supra note 3, at 547 (quot-
ing Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 311)). 
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 However, by contrast to charitable donations, no state has a stat-
ute that explicitly authorizes corporate political contributions.254 Nor 
does any state explicitly permit such contributions to be made in ex-
change for no consideration whatsoever. 
B.   The Problem with Just Giving Money Away: Enabling  
Agency Costs 
 Scholars have frequently argued that corporate philanthropy pos-
es a heightened risk that executives will misappropriate the corpora-
tion’s funds to serve their own purposes more than with ordinary 
business decisions.255 To put it another way, corporate charitable giv-
ing presents a “mixed motives” situation256 that raises greater “agen-
cy cost”257 concerns than normal business decisions. But why? What is 
it about corporate gifts that make them more susceptible to agency 
costs? 
 1.   Corporate Charitable Donations as Quasi-Self-Dealing 
 Basically, since corporate philanthropic giving is indirect and dif-
ficult to measure, scholars urge that such donations are more likely 
to give rise to “soft” benefits—i.e., intangible, non-financial, personal 
benefits that accrue to directors—than most ordinary business deci-
sions.258 Meaning, CEOs can spend a corporation’s money “on projects 
that offer[] little, if any, benefit to the corporation while providing 
substantial benefits to the CEOs in the form of psychic satisfaction, 
increased status, and visibility in the community.”259 In short, chari-
                                                                                                                  
 254. One might therefore wonder if corporate political contributions are ultra vires. 
Perhaps they are, and in any event, Delaware could by statute—and should—deem them 
so. See Joseph K. Leahy, The Ultra Vires Solution to Citizens United (presentation of  
working draft paper), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2802147.  
 255. See Arthur Gautier & Anne-Claire Pache, Research on Corporate Philanthropy: A 
Review and Assessment, 126 J. BUS. ETHICS 343, 349-50 (2015) (reviewing articles from 
various disciplines which urged that charitable donations reflect agency cost concerns).  
 256. See Blair & Stout, supra note 23, at 299.  
 257. See supra note 45 (defining agency costs). 
 258. See William O. Brown et al., Corporate Philanthropic Practices, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 
855 (2006) (arguing that “giving programs may enable managers and directors to support 
their own pet charities at shareholder expense”); Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora’s Box: 
Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579, 
586 (1997) (“[C]orporate senior executives have had a blank check to make corporate chari-
table contributions independent of both business objectives and shareholder preferences. In 
no other area of corporate affairs do managers enjoy the same degree of discretion with 
such a concomitant lack of accountability.”). 
 259. Barnard, supra note 244, at 1149. According to experts who study corporate chari-
table giving, CEOs often pick the charities to which the corporation gives. See, e.g., Gretch-
en Gavett, So Long, Giant Check Ceremony: The New World of Charitable Giving, HARV. 
BUS. REV., Dec. 24, 2013, https://hbr.org/2013/12/so-long-giant-check-ceremony-the-new-
world-of-charitable-giving [https://perma.cc/6ERB-T266] (interviewing Michael Norton of 
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table giving is a form of non-financial benefit to management, akin to 
job perquisites—a form of quasi-self-dealing. 
 (a)   Understanding the Problem: A Hypothetical Example 
 To better understand this view, let us begin with an example. We 
shall use a close corporation, HOF Inc., which owns a boutique wom-
en’s clothing store named “House of Fashion,” and nothing else. HOF 
Inc. provides detailed, regular financial statements to its (few) 
shareholders. 
 (1)   An Ordinary Business Decision 
 HOF Inc.’s CEO makes an ordinary business decision. The busi-
ness decision might be that House of Fashion will carry a new line of 
clothing, or that House of Fashion will raise the commission that it 
pays to its sales representatives, or that House of Fashion will ex-
pand its hours of operation. In each instance, the decision involves 
one or more market transactions. These transactions increase House 
of Fashion’s costs (i.e., by purchasing the new line of clothing, paying 
the workers more for the same amount of work that they previously 
performed, or to pay the added expense of keeping the store open for 
more hours).260 Further, in each instance, assume that the CEO dis-
closes to the shareholders that the intent of the decision is to increase 
HOF Inc.’s profitability. Either the new clothing is expected to be 
sold at a profit by House of Fashion (and perhaps even bring new 
customers to the store), or House of Fashion’s employees are expected 
to work harder to sell more clothing (which will more than make up 
for the increased cost of the greater commission), or House of Fashion 
is expected to serve more customers by extending its opening hours 
(and the profit on these sales will more than cover the increased cost 
of keeping the store open longer each day). In each instance, the 
market transaction by HOF Inc. to expend more money is intended, 
according to the CEO, to result in other market transactions that will 
lead to greater profits for HOF Inc. 
 Here, the CEO’s ordinary business decision to incur specific ex-
penses, which in turn are supposed to lead to fairly specific future 
revenues, is a decision to engage in a specific set of quid pro quo 
                                                                                                                  
Harvard Business School). Studies of corporate giving also suggest that CEOs “are often 
deeply involved in decisions about which organizations will receive charitable contribu-
tions.” Barnard, supra note 244, at 1159 (citing examples).  
 260. Other types of business decisions might attempt to increase HOF Inc.’s profitabil-
ity by reducing House of Fashion’s costs. Either way, the analysis would be essentially the 
same—the business decision’s success or failure would be relatively easy to assess because 
it will lead to market transactions.  
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transactions in hopes that those transactions will lead to other, fairly 
specific quid pro quo transactions. As a result, HOF Inc.’s sharehold-
ers could probably determine whether the CEO’s decision succeeded 
in increasing HOF Inc.’s profitability. When the shareholders read 
their detailed financial reports in the weeks, months, and years fol-
lowing the CEO’s decision, there is a good chance they will see some 
evidence about whether the CEO’s decision increased HOF Inc.’s 
profits. Clearly, the shareholders will be able to see whether HOF 
Inc.’s bottom line profits increased. Moreover, since HOF Inc. is so 
small that all financial results are likely material, the financial 
statements may break out House of Fashion’s revenues in some de-
tail, such as by showing sales related to the new line of clothing, or 
sales per sales representative, or sales by time of day.261 
 Hence, the direct connection between the CEO’s business decision 
and the profit that is supposed to result from that decision means 
that shareholders should be able to evaluate the CEO’s decision. That 
is to say, the CEO’s claims that its business decision will benefit HOF 
Inc. are verifiable because they involve actual market transactions 
and other transactions that follow directly, or fairly directly, from 
those transactions. While this analysis may involve some unknowns 
and some counterfactuals, it should be possible, with some effort, to 
objectively evaluate the CEO’s claims. 
 Of course, the business decision in question also might involve 
some psychic, or non-pecuniary, rewards to HOF Inc.’s CEO. For ex-
ample, the new clothing line could bring prestige to the CEO (if, for 
example, it bears the name of a hard-to-get, well-known designer). 
Further, raising the sales clerks’ commission could comport with the 
CEO’s moral or religious belief in sharing the corporation’s fortunes 
with its workers. However, since each business decision involves one 
or more financial transactions, it is less likely that the benefits accru-
ing from the transactions will be wholly or mostly psychic, or wholly 
personal to the CEO. Even if the CEO receives some psychic, or non-
pecuniary, personal benefit from these changes in corporate policy, 
the decisions themselves will have to stand up to some objective scru-
tiny as well—that is to say, the scrutiny of the shareholders. 
                                                                                                                  
 261. Even if HOF Inc. does not break down House of Fashion’s sales results in detail, 
the shareholders could seek the specific information with a “books and records” request. 
The shareholders could demand a record of commissions paid to, and sales made by, each 
House of Fashion salesperson in order to determine whether the decision to increase com-
missions was successful. Or the shareholders could seek House of Fashion’s cash register 
receipts—which usually have time stamps—to see whether the decision to extend the 
store’s hours led to more sales. Finally, the sales receipts presumably could be used to as-
sess whether the new line of clothing was selling briskly—and whether House of Fashion 
was selling the clothing at full price or at a markdown.   
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 This market scrutiny is a critical assumption underlying corporate 
law, and the business judgment rule in particular. A key reason un-
derlying the business judgment rule is the view that “the markets in 
which a corporation operates constrain management discretion with-
in permissible limits” and therefore, “[t]he discipline of the market 
provides a substitute for extensive regulatory oversight.”262 Further, 
“[m]arket checks also reduce the agency costs of corporate decision-
making without the need for extensive shareholder involvement” be-
cause “the market operates as a monitor.”263 Markets are particularly 
well suited to monitor decisions tied to profit maximization. 
 (2)   A Decision to Make a Charitable Donation 
 Now assume that, instead of making an ordinary business deci-
sion such as those described above, the CEO causes HOF Inc. to do-
nate a large sum of money to a charity—say, to a nonprofit theater in 
the same town where the store is located and where the CEO lives. 
This donation is tax deductible for the corporation, even if the CEO 
attends the theater herself and/or the corporation has season tickets, 
because the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) does not view these non-
financial benefits as resulting in a “substantial benefit” to HOF Inc. 
or the CEO, particularly when the general public also benefits from 
the donation.264 Yet, the donation is not a market transaction, and it 
cannot, by definition, be intended to directly or indirectly lead to a 
specific quid pro quo for HOF Inc.265 
 If the donation is entirely altruistic and is truly intended simply 
as a gift to benefit society, then there is no way for markets to evalu-
ate whether it is a good idea or not. Markets are “a poor monitor for 
                                                                                                                  
 262. Fisch, supra note 246, at 1098; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF DIS-
CRETIONARY BEHAVIOR: MANAGERIAL OBJECTIVES IN A THEORY OF THE FIRM 29-32 (1964). 
 263. Fisch, supra note 246, at 1098. Thus, while it is possible for managers to make 
ordinary business decisions primarily for their own psychological benefit, the fact that such 
decisions impact the corporation only in circumscribed ways means that the decisions are 
relatively easy for the stock market to evaluate. For example, if an automobile manufac-
turer develops a line of fuel-efficient cars simply because management has an irrational 
emotional attachment to environmental causes—and if the cars do not sell as well as gas-
guzzling SUVs—the stock market can evaluate the decision to manufacture the green car 
and punish management accordingly.  
 264. See Kahn & Kahn, supra note 244, at 515-16 (“A benefit that accrues to the gen-
eral public is not ‘substantial’ . . . . [T]he benefits that the gift provides to a sizeable com-
munity, of which the donor is a member, are merely incidental to the donor and do not 
detract from the gift. So, a gift to a theater company that permits the company to produce 
dramas that the donor can enjoy, along with other members of the public, does not consti-
tute a receipt by the donor of a substantial benefit.” (footnote omitted)). 
 265. See supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
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management decisions that are not tied to profit maximization.”266 
But let us assume that the CEO contends that this particular chari-
table donation is not entirely altruistic. Rather, it is intended to ben-
efit the corporation in the long-term. In fact, the CEO discloses (in 
informal, closed-door conversations with the shareholders) that the 
contribution is intended to increase “buzz” about House of Fashion in 
the community, or to increase goodwill so that House of Fashion’s 
long-time customer base will purchase more items at the store. 
 Regardless of the specifics of the CEO’s argument about how the 
charitable donation will increase House of Fashion’s profitability, 
shareholders will have difficulty evaluating the CEO’s claim. The 
CEO’s claim about how the decision will affect HOF Inc.’s bottom line 
will, by definition, have to be entirely speculative. While some mar-
ket transactions—such as advertising—are always more speculative 
than other market transactions, charitable giving is required to be 
even more speculative because charitable donations that act like clas-
sic advertising are not characterized as such for tax purposes.267 
 Thus, in our hypothetical, the CEO will not be able to obtain spe-
cial treatment for House of Fashion, or an endorsement, such as if it 
were a classic advertisement. Therefore, while shareholders of HOF 
Inc. may be skeptical about the value of advertising, at least there 
are ways to evaluate the potential market value for advertising.268 
Further, since there are many quid pro quo transactions in which 
corporations buy advertising, the shareholders could, at least in theo-
ry, determine whether management paid a good price for any regular 
advertising. 
 None of that is likely to be true for charitable donations. A charity 
that markets its sponsorships exactly like advertising risks it being 
treated exactly like advertising by the IRS—and losing its tax deduc-
tion. Hence, even if some charities pitch management for major gifts 
in the same way that advertising executives do, those pitches pre-
sumably must occur behind closed doors and shareholders will not 
have access to that information. 
 Since the benefit to HOF Inc. from the gift to charity must, by def-
inition, be speculative, and since there will be no objective way for 
shareholders to determine whether the gift actually benefitted HOF 
                                                                                                                  
 266. Fisch, supra note 246, at 1098 (urging that, as a result, “[p]hilanthropy is prob-
lematic for corporate law if . . . philanthropic decisions are [not] profit maximizing”). 
 267. See supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
 268. For example, advertising executives who try to pitch certain types of advertising 
buys to the company will presumably present research that compares and contrasts the 
value of certain types of advertising—such as the number of cars that drive past a particu-
lar billboard, the number of viewers that watch a particular TV show, or the number of 
people of a particular demographic that read a certain type of magazine. 
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Inc. or not, the chance that the charitable donation actually was in-
tended to provide a psychic or personal, non-pecuniary gain to the 
CEO is therefore increased. Perhaps the gift will burnish the CEO’s 
own, personal standing in town among her social peers.269 
 This might be particularly true if, as sometimes occurs, the chari-
ty were to honor the CEO who initiated the donation by naming part 
of the theater building for her.270 Naming part of a building after the 
CEO is a non-pecuniary gain for the CEO, and therefore, it does not 
constitute overt self-dealing; nonetheless, it undoubtedly provides 
psychological benefits, such as increased status among that execu-
tive’s peers.271 Yet, strangely, the IRS does not view naming some-
thing for a company—or anyone else—as a “substantial benefit” in 
return for a charitable donation. Accordingly, a donation made explic-
itly in exchange for naming rights is nonetheless tax-deductible.272 
* * * * * 
 Obviously, the foregoing example is simplistic, as it involves a 
close corporation and relatively straightforward transactions. Many 
market transactions are more complicated and, therefore, more diffi-
cult for shareholders to evaluate. Further, if HOF Inc. were a large, 
public corporation, or if House of Fashion were a chain of stores (e.g., 
imagine if the store in question were Target Corp.), it would be more 
difficult for the corporation’s shareholders to evaluate any of man-
agement’s individual business decisions—even big ones—because 
large corporations do not report the financial effects of individual 
business decisions or even individual lines of business.273 These com-
plications would also compound the problem of assessing the profita-
bility of a decision by HOF Inc. management to cause the corporation 
to make a charitable donation. 
                                                                                                                  
 269. See Galaskiewicz, supra note 246, at 252.  
 270. See, e.g., Note, Finding Strategic Corporate Citizenship: A New Game Theoretic 
View, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1957, 1970-71 (2004) (“The $5 million that Tyco International 
pledged to Seton Hall University was to be used to build Kozlowski Hall, named for the 
then-CEO.”). Such a donation would still be tax deductible.  
 271. Fisch, supra note 246, at 1096 (“[C]orporate giving is frequently motivated by the 
personal preferences of corporate executives who use their power to choose the recipients of 
large corporate grants in order to support preferred causes or reap the social perquisites 
afforded to large donors.” (citing Barnard, supra note 244, at 1149)); see, e.g., Finding Stra-
tegic Corporate Citizenship, supra note 270. 
 272. See William A. Drennan, Where Generosity and Pride Abide: Charitable Naming 
Rights, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 45, 46 (2012) (“A philanthropist typically cannot claim a charita-
ble deduction to the extent the philanthropist receives a return benefit from the charity, 
but a special tax rule effectively values naming rights at zero.”). 
 273. However, stock market analysts or industry analysts may be able to determine 
how individual decisions affect a corporation’s profitability by asking questions about the 
profitability of a particular line of business.  
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 Yet, increasing the size of the corporation or the complexity of its 
business does not change the basic fact that ordinary business deci-
sions result in market transactions that are easier for shareholders 
to evaluate than the non-market transactions that arise from chari-
table donations.274 Any difficulties that arise from moving from the 
simplistic hypothetical described above to the realities of a large cor-
poration reflect the difficulty in gauging the profitability of any deci-
sion of a large corporation. Those difficulties do not change the con-
clusion that it is inherently easier for shareholders to evaluate the 
profitability of ordinary business decisions than it is for them to 
evaluate the profitability of charitable donations. 
a. Empirical Evidence Supports the Theory 
 The forgoing example being hypothetical, the arguments made 
therein obviously were merely theoretical. However, empirical evi-
dence bears out the theory. Both anecdotal accounts275 and empirical 
research276 suggest that some CEOs still exert control over charitable 
giving—and that, as a result, corporations do support CEOs “pet” 
charities, without regard for bettering the corporation’s image or its 
bottom line. In sum, there is some empirical support for the view that 
corporations that give greater amounts to charity may be doing so for 
the benefit of management. 
                                                                                                                  
 274. Further, states could easily solve the reporting aspect of this problem with regard 
to charitable donations by requiring that corporations report all charitable donations, 
whether they are material or not.  
 275. See Barnard, supra note 244, at 1160-64 (describing five unexceptional examples 
of corporate funds being given to CEO’s “pet charities” that were neither intended to pro-
mote profit-maximization or to bolster the corporation’s public image).  
 276. Sung Hui Kim, The Diversity Double Standard, 89 N.C. L. REV. 945, 981-82 (2011) 
(“[E]mpirical research on corporate philanthropy, though not conclusive, suggests that 
corporate executives have mixed motives, including altruistic ones, when making corporate 
donations.” (emphasis removed)); see also Fisch, supra note 246, at 1097 (arguing that cor-
porate giving is likely “motivated by management self-interest rather than profit maximi-
zation,” because “studies . . . fail to find a conclusive link between charitable giving and 
profitability” (citing James R. Boatsman & Sanjay Gupta, Taxes and Corporate Charity: 
Empirical Evidence from Micro-Level Panel Data, 49 Nat’l Tax J. 193 (1996) (finding, ac-
cording to Fisch, “data supporting the characterization of philanthropy as maximizing 
managers’ utility rather than maximizing profits”))); Galaskiewicz, supra note 246, at 252 
(“[C]ompany contributions [may] be made to elicit the applause and approval of business 
peers and local philanthropic elites.”); Barnard, supra note 244, at 1165 (“CEOs who  
are . . . successful in directing corporate charitable contributions toward organizations 
whose goals are favored among their social and business peers, are perceived by those 
peers as being more successful in business . . .  than other CEOs who are less influential in 
stimulating corporate charitable gifts.” (emphasis removed) (summarizing Galaskiewicz, 
supra note 246)). 
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(3)   A Different Take: Corporate Philanthropy As Corporate  
       Opportunity 
 As described above, corporate law scholars have long suggested 
that corporate philanthropy raises unusual agency cost concerns be-
cause corporate charitable giving is different in nature than ordinary 
business decisions. However, this scholarship tends to characterize 
the problem of corporate philanthropy as akin to self-dealing, in that 
charitable gifts potentially enrich management personally and psy-
chologically (rather than financially), instead of the corporation itself. 
 This account, while true, is incomplete. In addition to being akin 
to (psychic) self-dealing by management, corporate charitable dona-
tions are problematic because they raise the same issues that arise 
when management steals a corporate opportunity, albeit inversely. 
 Traditionally, a corporation’s management cannot engage in the 
same types of activities on its own behalf that it can engage in on the 
corporation’s behalf, because to do so would mean that management 
is competing with the corporation. This type of conduct, known as 
stealing a corporate opportunity, violates the duty of loyalty unless 
management has a defense for doing it.277 
 The theory underlying this rule is that opportunities for the corpo-
ration to profit in its line of business belong to the corporation and 
cannot be stolen by management.278 This generalized prohibition is 
necessary because it is efficient in the same way that a generalized 
fiduciary duty of loyalty is efficient: it renders unnecessary a lengthy 
contract between the corporation and management that prohibits the 
wide range of ingenious ways that management could divert the cor-
poration’s assets—here, business opportunities—to itself.279 
 Under the corporate opportunity doctrine, management is prohib-
ited from stealing opportunities that the law deems to belong to the 
corporation. Thus, the doctrine would prohibit the HOF Inc. CEO 
from opening a competing store of her own, or buying and selling 
fashionable women’s clothing out of her home. In either case, the 
                                                                                                                  
 277. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 84, at 313-16 (describing the corporate opportunity 
doctrine). 
 278. See Victor Brudney & Robert Charles Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportuni-
ties, 94 HARV. L. REV. 997, 998-1000 (1981) (“[A] corporate opportunity is defined to be, as 
against fiduciaries, a corporate asset.”).  
 279. See id. (explaining that prohibiting corporate agents from stealing opportunities 
from the corporation is efficient in the same way that the duty of loyalty is efficient: it re-
quires the agent to obtain all of the emoluments from her position by “overt compensation” 
rather than “covert rewards” and allows the corporation to avoid contracting for “an array 
of prohibitions against the agent diverting to himself the principal’s assets,” thereby “sav-
ing the cost of individually contracting for the agent’s loyalty in a myriad of situations, not 
all of which can be anticipated”).  
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CEO would be stealing potential customers from House of Fashion 
and potential profits from HOF Inc.280 In addition, the CEO probably 
could not start a completely unrelated business on her own—say, an 
ice cream stand—and hire away House of Fashion’s sales associates. 
In that case, the CEO would be stealing the store’s employees. 
 By contrast to these examples, now consider that the CEO of HOF 
Inc. wishes to make a charitable donation of her own money. Assume, 
also, that the CEO had already caused HOF Inc. to make the previ-
ously-described donation to the local theater company. Surely no 
HOF Inc. shareholder would object to the CEO donating to the same 
charity as the corporation also donated! By all outward appearances, 
such a gift simply shows that the CEO has the same public-spirited 
nature as HOF Inc. What’s more, even if a shareholder complained, 
what would be the basis for the complaint? There is no “reverse cor-
porate opportunity” doctrine for charitable donations. 
 Since this is one of the rare instances in which management is 
permitted to do the same act both on its own behalf and on behalf of 
the corporation, the CEO has every reason to use HOF Inc.’s money 
rather than her own in order to support her pet charities—i.e., to use 
the corporate checkbook more than her own to gain the benefits she 
seeks from charitable giving. Thus, the CEO’s ability to engage in the 
exact same act as HOF Inc. increases the potential for pretext. 
 Indeed, since the CEO is permitted to donate both her money and 
HOF Inc.’s money to the charity, she could easily cause HOF Inc. to 
contribute to her favorite charity under the guise of doing what is 
best for the corporation. That being true, this creates an unfortunate 
incentive for the CEO: Why should she use her own money to give to 
her favorite local theater when she can obtain the exact same benefit 
by using HOF Inc.’s money? Why reach into her own pocket when she 
can reach into the corporate treasury instead?281 Or, to take a more 
nuanced view, even if there is some benefit from indicating to the 
community that she is generous with her own money, all things being 
                                                                                                                  
 280. The classic case of this is Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255 (Del. 1939). That case in-
volved Loft, Inc., which sold many products, including syrups and beverages—and was a 
large buyer and seller of Coca-Cola. Guth, a director and officer of Loft, Inc., learned that a 
relatively new company, the predecessor to Pepsi-Cola, had gone bankrupt, and set up a 
side venture to acquire Pepsi-Cola. This ultimately led Loft, Inc. to sue Guth for stealing an 
opportunity that the corporation claimed belonged to it. The Delaware Supreme Court’s 
holding in favor of Loft, Inc. in that case is considered the seminal case of the corporate 
opportunity doctrine. For a detailed account of the case, see Jennifer Ying, Guth v. Loft: 
The Story of Pepsi-Cola and the Corporate Opportunity Doctrine (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1414478. 
 281. Barnard, supra note 244, at 1149 (explaining that corporate executives rarely 
match their corporate contributions with contributions of their own funds (citing Warren 
Buffet example)). 
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the same, why not donate a nominal amount herself and donate a 
large amount from the corporation? 
 In sum, while one way to understand that benefit accruing to 
management from corporate philanthropy is that philanthropy is 
akin to self-dealing, another way to understand the problem of corpo-
rate charitable giving is that it is akin to an inverse corporate oppor-
tunity. This new perspective on charitable donations does a better job 
of capturing the core problem of pretext that arises with such dona-
tions: Corporate managers have a strong incentive to act with (at 
best) mixed motives or (at worst) principally self-serving motives 
when causing the corporation to make a charitable gift because man-
agers can do the same task either for their own benefit or for the cor-
poration’s benefit—and why not, if it is done for the former reason, 
have someone else pay? 
C.   The Law of Corporate Charitable Donations and Critiques Thereof 
1.   Corporations’ Statutory Authority to Make Charitable  
      Donations 
 Currently, all states, by statute, both (1) allow corporations to 
make charitable donations;282 and (2) do little or nothing to constrain 
either the amount of the contribution or the required beneficiaries.283 
Further, most state corporation law statutes do little to “define who 
within the corporation has decisionmaking power over corporate 
charitable contributions.”284 
 State corporation law statutes break down into basically three 
categories,285 which might be described as permissive, very permis-
sive, and extremely permissive. First, many states, including Dela-
ware, provide corporations with “power ‘to make donations for the 
public welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational purposes’ ” 
or similar, with no explicit requirement that the donation benefit the 
corporation.286 Thus, it is not clear in these states whether a charita-
                                                                                                                  
 282. See Balotti & Hanks, supra note 46, at 965; Elhauge, supra note 248, at 768; Nel-
son, supra note 249. 
 283. Balotti & Hanks, supra note 46, at 965 (writing as of 1999); see also id. at 973 
(“[M]odern corporate philanthropy laws allow wide discretion as to both amount and per-
missible beneficiaries and apparently demand little or no managerial accountability or 
demonstrable benefit for the corporation or shareholders.”).  
 284. Id. at 970. 
 285. See id.; accord Kahn, supra note 258, at 602-05; Pearce, supra note 246, at 267-68.  
 286. Balotti & Hanks, supra note 46, at 970-71; see also id. at 970 n.25 (listing states 
with such statutes). These statutes effectively adopt almost the exact language of the Mod-
el Business Corporation Act. See id. at 970 (quoting MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02(13) 
(1998)).  
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ble donation is required to benefit the corporation.287 Second, nearly 
half of the states have a similar statute to the one described immedi-
ately above, and a second statute which “authorizes corporations, us-
ing the most typical language, to ‘make payments or donations or do 
any other act not inconsistent with law that furthers the business 
and affairs of the corporation’ ”—thereby apparently allowing both 
“altruistic” donations and those intended to “result in corporate bene-
fit.”288 Finally, a handful of states, “including California and New 
York, allow corporations to make donations to charities ‘irrespective 
of corporate benefit.’ ”289 None of these statutes place any explicit lim-
it on the amount of money that corporations can give to charity.290 
Hence, “the vast majority of states allow apparently unlimited corpo-
rate contributions to charity, do not demand director accountability 
to shareholders, and do not require board oversight.”291 Thus, “man-
agers may approve contributions as they choose, for any purpose they 
choose, to whatever qualifying charity they decide, and without re-
gard to shareholder interests.”292 
 2.   How Courts Review Corporate Gifts to Charity 
 The only real limitation on charitable donations is that they must 
“be reasonable in amount and be made to a qualifying charitable or-
ganization as determined by the Internal Revenue Code.”293 These 
                                                                                                                  
 287. See id. at 976-78. However, based on their reading of the sparse Delaware case 
law regarding corporate charitable donations, Balotti and Hanks ultimately conclude that 
the “benefit requirement may be alive and well . . . in Delaware.” Id. at 978 (emphasis add-
ed). 
 288. Id. at 971 & n.27 (listing states with such statutes). 
 289. Id. at 971 & n.31 (listing states with such statutes). 
 290. See Kahn, supra note 258, at 603 (“In contrast to the early statutes, the modem 
laws fail to define any quantitative parameters for corporate charitable giving.”); Pearce, 
supra note 246, at 268 (noting that state law “fail[s] to provide unambiguous guidelines for 
donations and contribution limits” for corporate charity). However, IRS regulations prohib-
it corporations from deducting charitable donation in excess of ten percent of their taxable 
income in any given tax year. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(A) (2016). 
 291. Balotti & Hanks, supra note 46, at 972; accord Pearce, supra note 246, at 254 
(“There are no laws that expressly allow or require shareholders to receive disclosures of 
corporate donations or to participate in the decision making process such that they would 
be able to help choose the recipient organizations and the amounts donated.”) (citing Wil-
liam O. Brown, Eric Helland & Janet Kiholm Smith, Corporate Philanthropic Practices, 12 
J. CORP. FIN. 855, 861 (2006)). Nor do IRS regulations require that the board of directors 
approve a charitable donation in order for it to be tax deductible. See 1.06 C CORPORA-
TIONS, CHARITABLE GIVING ¶ 1.06 (2016) (explaining that charitable deductions are allowed 
for any charitable contributions “actually paid within the tax year,” except that corpora-
tions that account on an accrual basis “may elect to deduct any contributions that are author-
ized by its board of directors during the tax year provided . . . that” certain requirements are 
met) (citing I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (2012) (general rule) & (2)(A) (accrual basis exception)).  
 292. See Balotti & Hanks, supra note 46, at 982.  
 293. Id. 
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requirements are derived from two Delaware cases—Theodora Hold-
ing Corp. v. Henderson294 and Kahn v. Sullivan295—which rejected 
shareholders’ challenges to corporate gifts to management’s “pet” 
charities. 
 In Henderson, a shareholder sued to protest a corporation’s dona-
tion of about a half million dollars to a charitable foundation domi-
nated by the corporation’s controller.296 After holding that charitable 
contributions were permitted generally under Delaware law,297 the 
Court of Chancery then held that specific contributions should be up-
held if they are reasonable.298 To evaluate whether the donation at 
issue was reasonable, the trial court looked to the federal income tax 
deduction limit (which, at the time, was five percent of a corpora-
tion’s gross income), and concluded that the donation fell below this 
limit.299 Therefore, the Henderson court upheld the corporation’s do-
nation.300 
 Kahn involved the art collection of the former CEO of Occidental 
Petroleum Corporation (Occidental), Armand Hammer.301 Occidental 
donated upwards of $90 million to build and fund an art museum 
named in Hammer’s honor302 to house the art collection that he do-
nated to the museum upon his death.303 Two Occidental shareholders 
sued, and the case quickly settled. In passing on the settlement 
(which the court described as “meager”304), the Court of Chancery was 
called upon to assess the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the mer-
                                                                                                                  
 294. 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969). 
 295. Kahn v. Sullivan (Hammer II), 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991). 
 296. Henderson, 257 A.2d at 401. The foundation ran a summer camp for under-
privileged boys. Id. at 402. 
 297. See id. at 404-05 (quoting, inter alia, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (2012)). 
 298. See id. at 405. 
 299. See id. The corporation’s gross income for that year was $19 million. Id. The court 
also concluded that any loss of income to the plaintiff was “far out-weighed” by the long-
term benefit of the charitable donation, which helped “provid[e] justification for large pri-
vate holdings.” Id. The court did not consider whether the donation furthered the holding 
company’s business. See id. It is not clear whether this was part of the reasonableness 
analysis or just grandstanding. 
 300. See id. 
 301. Hammer II, 594 A.2d 48, 51 (Del. 1991). 
 302. Id. at 54.  
 303. See id. at 51-52. The lawsuit also involved allegations that Occidental had “com-
mitted too liberally” to support Hammer’s other “personal charities,” as well, including 
multiple foundations named for Hammer. Allan Parachini, Occidental Reaches Tentative 
Pact in Shareholder Suit Over Art Museum, L.A. TIMES (June 15, 1989), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1989-06-15/business/fi-2556_1_art-museum-tentative-settlement-
settlement-agreement [https://perma.cc/5AUD-QWN8]. 
 304. Sullivan v. Hammer (Hammer I), No. 10823, 1990 WL 114223, at *1, *8 (Del. Ch. 
1990).  
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its.305 The court approved the settlement, and upheld the donation, 
for two reasons. First, the court held that the donation was protected 
by the business judgment rule 306  because “the plaintiffs failed to 
prove that any of the directors had a personal financial interest or 
motive for entrenchment in the donation.” 307  Second, the court—
following Henderson—held the amount of the donation was reasona-
ble.308 The Delaware Supreme Court later affirmed the decision.309 
 The upshot of these decisions is that Delaware courts appear to 
have no concern whatsoever about the psychic or personal benefits 
that accrue to directors from a corporation’s charitable donations. 
Although an influential early decision from New Jersey once suggest-
ed that donations to a “pet” charity might not pass muster,310 the 
Delaware cases seem to reject that view out of hand. Henderson did 
so explicitly by describing the language in that prior New Jersey de-
cision as “dicta”;311 Kahn did so implicitly, by approving what has 
been described as a CEO’s “ultimate vanity museum.”312 
 Further, these decisions suggest that, at least in Delaware, there 
is no requirement that charitable donations be intended to benefit 
the corporation. While the Henderson court purportedly engaged in 
some analysis of the charitable donation’s benefit to the shareholder 
who sued, the court made no effort to assess whether the donation 
benefitted the holding corporation that made the donation.313 Second, 
both Kahn courts upheld a massive charitable donation to an unusu-
ally blatant pet charity “despite the absence of any proffered business 
purpose for the donation.”314 
                                                                                                                  
 305. See id. 
 306. Hammer II, 594 A.2d at 48. 
 307. Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 365 (citing Hammer II, 594 A.2d at 60). 
 308. See Hammer I, 1990 WL 114223, at *6; see also Hammer II, 594 A.2d at 61. 
 309. See Hammer II, 594 A.2d at 63. 
 310. See Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 365 n.436 (discussing A.P. Smith Mfg. 
v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953)). 
 311. See id. (citing and discussing Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 
404 (Del. Ch. 1969)). 
 312. See Michael Kimmelman, Disharmony at Armand Hammer Museum, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 15, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/09/arts/disharmony-at-armand-hammer-
museum.html?pagewanted=all; see also Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 365 (“If a 
charity created with the sole purpose of building an entire museum dedicated to housing 
the CEO’s personal art collection is not a pet charity—then what is?” (emphasis removed)). 
 313. See Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 365 n.434. 
 314. Jill E. Fisch, Teaching Corporate Governance Through Shareholder Litigation, 34 
GA. L. REV. 745, 767 (2000). 
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3.   Calls for Judicial Scrutiny and Understanding the Precise  
      Nature of the Problem 
 In light of the differences between regular business decisions, 
which are subjected to tests of the market, and charitable donations, 
which may be “spurred by the fact that management rather than the 
company benefits,” scholars have argued that “corporate law should 
respond by regulating corporate giving.”315 According to commenta-
tors, the statutes that permit corporate philanthropy “fail[] to provide 
meaningful standards to evaluate the legitimacy of these contribu-
tions.”316 As a result, corporate executives have been “permitted to 
pursue personal interests in their philanthropic decisionmaking on 
behalf of the corporation.”317 
 The basic charge that most critics level at corporate philanthropy 
is that it is akin to self-dealing. However, this argument is not a pre-
cise fit because self-dealing requires that the corporation engage in a 
transaction that provides management or its proxy with a direct or 
indirect material, financial benefit; while the benefits of CEOs giving 
to pet charities may be material, they are psychic, not financial.318 At 
the time of the last outpouring of criticism of corporate philanthro-
py—the late 1990s—Delaware corporate law provided no definite 
way of describing a CEO’s decision to promote her own non-financial 
interests over the interests of the corporation. Today, however, there 
is a better way to describe transactions that management engages in 
primarily for its own psychic benefit: bad faith. 319  Unfortunately, 
even if bad faith corporate charitable donations are rampant, this 
does not mean that shareholders will succeed in challenging 
them. Since the business judgment rule presumes that management 
acts in good faith, and a shareholder plaintiff must adduce proof in 
order to overcome that presumption, it will be extremely difficult to 
challenge corporate charitable giving as bad faith.320 
 On top of concerns about what might be described as quasi-self-
dealing, other writers have urged that the existing regime for review-
ing corporate philanthropy is “not [an] effective regulator[]” of most 
                                                                                                                  
 315. Fisch, supra note 246, at 1098. 
 316. Balotti & Hanks, supra note 46, at 972-73.  
 317. Id. at 973.  
 318. See Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 365 n.434. 
 319. See Leahy, A Decade After Disney, supra note 16, at 877-82; Leahy, Corporate 
Political Contributions as Bad Faith, supra note 3, at 507-10.  
 320. See Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, supra note 3, at 502-
05, 523; accord Kesten, supra note 8, at 184 (positing that “shareholders are highly unlike-
ly to succeed in” litigation to challenge a corporate political contribution because “[b]oard-
approved political activity is likely protected by the presumptions of the business judgment 
rule”). 
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corporate charitable donations—and that as a result, charitable giv-
ing often fails to satisfy the “traditional” (but admittedly not univer-
sal) “paradigm” of corporate law, that “the sole purpose of a corpora-
tion is to maximize profit.”321 That is to say, the existing legal frame-
work for corporate giving is “in direct conflict with the doctrine of 
waste and the requirement that directors act in what they reasonably 
believe is the corporation’s best interests,” because so many states 
allow corporations to donate to charity without requiring a corre-
sponding benefit to the corporation.322 
 On this telling, the problem with corporate charitable giving is not 
necessarily a question of quasi-self-dealing, but rather, a problem of 
giving away the corporation’s money for little or no benefit in re-
turn—i.e., waste. Since “altruistic contributions, by definition, pro-
vide no corporate benefit” and such contributions “cannot pass mus-
ter under the waste standard.”323 Yet, the “the doctrine of waste has 
not been applied to corporate philanthropy”—nor should it, these 
critics urge; the problem is simply that “no court has attempted to 
reconcile the absence of a benefit requirement for charitable contri-
butions with the legal doctrines underlying the profit-maximization 
theory.”324 
 Finally, this Article has introduced a new way of criticizing corpo-
rate charitable giving. Charitable donations are akin to inverse cor-
porate opportunities—i.e., activities in which both the corporation 
and an executive can engage—and therefore, raise greater agency 
costs concerns.325 
 Whichever of these criticisms one levels at the current regime for 
reviewing corporate charitable giving, a change in the law is re-
quired. To the extent that the concern is that CEOs’ ability to donate 
to “pet” charities is quasi-self-dealing—now better described as bad 
faith—then shareholders may need a better way to challenge man-
agement’s bad faith. The presumption of the business judgment rule, 
that management acts in good faith, is simply too difficult to over-
come when management acts with mixed motives. The same is true if 
the concern is that management is simply wasting the corporation’s 
money without any benefit to the corporation, or if the concern is that 
charitable donations can conceal management’s intent to benefit it-
self—again, engage in bad faith—because corporate charity is akin to 
inverse corporate opportunities. 
                                                                                                                  
 321. Balotti & Hanks, supra note 46, at 966, 978-80.  
 322. Id. at 980.  
 323. See id. 
 324. See id.  
 325. See supra Part III.D.2. 
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D.   One Proposal for Reform: Apply Intermediate Scrutiny 
 Eighteen years ago, two eminent corporate lawyers, Jim Hanks326 
and the late Frank Balotti,327 echoing the sentiments of earlier writ-
ers (including the arguments detailed above),328 argued that the way 
courts review corporate charity “is in direct conflict” with the “tradi-
tional” paradigm of corporation law, that “the sole purpose of a corpo-
ration is to maximize profit.”329 To eliminate this conflict, Balotti and 
Hanks proposed a new framework for judicial review of corporate 
charitable giving.330 Under that new framework, courts would subject 
different types of charitable donations to different standards of re-
view. One such standard review was an intermediate scrutiny ap-
proach similar to Unocal.331 This subpart summarizes Balotti and 
Hanks’s framework and arguments in favor of it. 
 1.   Three Types of Corporate Contributions 
 Balotti and Hanks began by dividing all corporate charitable do-
nations into three separate categories based on management’s moti-
vation for making the donation in question. 
 First, many charitable contributions, Balotti and Hanks posited, 
are intended by management to have “some demonstrable benefit—
however intangible or difficult to measure—to the corporation.”332 
                                                                                                                  
 326. See Bill Glose, “Brace for Impact:” Venable’s James Hanks Jr. as the Last Passenger 
out of Flight 1549, SUPER LAWYERS (Jan. 2010), https://www.superlawyers.com/maryland/ 
article/brace-for-impact/8030e23f-0bee-4818-9965-dc0a0b29ae6f.html [https://perma.cc/3TSL-
5LGB]; James J. Hanks Jr.:, UNIV. MD., CAREY LAW, https://www.law.umaryland.edu/faculty/ 
profiles/faculty.html?facultynum=1096 (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (James Hanks bio). 
 327. See James J. Hanks, Jr. et al, Foreword: Remembering Frank Balotti, 72 BUS. LAW. 
603 (2017); U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’R, R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/ 
proxyprocess/bio/rfbalotti.pdf [https://perma.cc/X87F-A3ZH] (biography of Frank Balotti on 
SEC website); Bussard and Balotti Named 2013 Delaware Lawyers of the Year, RICHARDS, 
LAYTON & FINGER (Sept. 14, 2012), https://www.rlf.com/5378; Richards, Layton & Finger Tops 
Delaware Listings in Best Lawyers in America 2008, RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER (Oct. 18, 
2007), https://www.rlf.com/5310. 
 328. See Balotti & Hanks, supra note 46, at 966 n.3 (citing, inter alia, David S. Ruder, 
Public Obligations of Private Corporations, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 209 (1965)); cf. Fisch, supra 
note 246, at 1096 (urging that “[t]he judicial deference accorded to such expenditures under 
the business judgment rule may not be appropriate in the context of philanthropic expendi-
tures,” because they present “a possible conflict of interest” in that “the personal prefer-
ences of corporate executives who use their power to choose the recipients of large corpo-
rate grants in order to support preferred causes or reap the social perquisites afforded to 
large donors.”) (citing, inter alia, Barnard, supra note 244, at 1149). 
 329. See Balotti & Hanks, supra note 46, at 978, 980. Although Balotti and Hanks rec-
ognized that competing paradigms exist, they opined that “almost all corporate legal doc-
trines” are based on the traditional paradigm. Id. at 979.  
 330. See id. at 966-67, 992-96. 
 331. See id. at 993 n.173. 
 332. Id. at 968. 
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This first category includes “charitable gifts for general product ad-
vertising purposes or to improve the corporation’s public image, aid 
recruitment efforts, or attract shareholders.”333 
 By contrast, many charitable donations are made without any in-
tent to provide a demonstrable benefit to the corporation.334 Rather, 
such donations are made “only because [they] in some way aggran-
dize[]” either a specific corporate manager or “someone (e.g., a 
spouse) closely associated with the manager.” 335  For example, the 
contribution might be “made to further officers’ own political or ideo-
logical preferences” or “to achieve a higher social status.”336 For this 
second category of charitable donations, Balotti and Hanks described 
the charity that receives the donation as a “pet charity”337 
 This second category of charitable donations, Balotti and Hanks 
explained, includes many contributions that are not publicized, be-
cause they cannot “generate goodwill or increase market share” 
among the public and therefore “cannot be justified as profit-
maximizing actions.”338 Indeed, Balotti and Hanks urged that contri-
butions to a pet charity were akin to “interested” transactions—i.e., 
self-dealing.339 However, today we would describe contributions to a 
pet charity as bad faith.340 
                                                                                                                  
 333. Id. at 967. 
 334. Id. at 968. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. at 982. According to Balotti and Hanks, other contributions that aggrandize 
management (or its associates) include: “contributions made to pet charities of fellow exec-
utives in hopes of reciprocity,” “contributions made as a ‘payment’ for membership on the 
board of directors of nonprofit corporations,” and “contributions to charities of which the 
officers, or relatives or friends of the officers, are insiders.” Id. at 982-83. 
 337. Id. at 968. 
 338. Id. at 967. 
 339. Id. at 982-83.  
 340. Although Balotti and Hanks clearly understood the basic meaning of bad faith, see 
id. at 986 (defining it as acting with “self-serving” motivations), they wrote before the Del-
aware courts clarified that a fiduciary acts in bad faith whenever she puts her personal, 
non-financial interests ahead of the best interest of the corporation. See Leahy, A Decade 
After Disney, supra note 16, at 866-82 (explaining the bad faith doctrine as it developed 
after the famed Disney litigation in the early 2000s). Further, in the past decade, Delaware 
courts have clarified that mere personal aggrandizement, without a material financial gain 
to the fiduciary, is not considered self-dealing. See Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 
366-67. Rather, when a fiduciary favors her own non-financial, personal preferences over 
the corporation’s best interests, she acts in bad faith. See Leahy, A Decade After Disney, 
supra note 16, at 883-84 (contrasting bad faith and self-dealing). Thus, a contribution to a 
“pet” charity is bad faith on the part of management. Cf. Leahy, Corporate Political Contri-
butions as Bad Faith, supra note 3, at 521 (describing a political contribution to a “pet” 
candidate as bad faith). In addition to using an underdeveloped concept of “interested” 
transaction, Balotti and Hanks also conflated “interest” and “independence”—but only for 
sake of simplicity. See Balotti & Hanks, supra note 46, at 984 n.114. For an explanation of 
the difference between “disinterest” and “independence,” see Leahy, A Decade After Disney, 
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 Finally, for some contributions which management causes the 
corporation to make without any intent to demonstrably benefit the 
corporation, there is nonetheless “no personal aggrandizement” in-
tended by management (or any associate of management).341 In this 
third category falls the truly “rare” contributions that serve no one’s 
personal agenda and are essentially “altruistic.”342 
 2.   Two Frameworks Rejected 
 Before proposing their own approach, Balotti and Hanks first con-
sidered and rejected a potentially simple “fix” for the corporate law of 
charitable donations: a “return to the rule requiring a benefit for 
charitable contributions,” which would result in such donations 
“be[ing] evaluated under the same standards as every other corporate 
payment and action.”343 Under such a regime, all “such contributions 
would not be ‘charitable’ at all, but rather business expenses de-
signed to generate revenue.”344 Balotti and Hanks also rejected the 
argument—made by some commentators—that “personal-
aggrandizement contribution[s]” and those made to “pet charit[ies]” 
ought to be prohibited “outright” because it “would unnecessarily de-
prive charities of corporate donations.”345 
 3.   The Proposed Framework: Three Tiers of Review 
 Instead of requiring a benefit for all charitable donations, Balotti 
and Hanks urged that only the first category of contributions—those 
intended to benefit the business—be subject to the traditional stand-
ard for other business decisions: “the business judgment rule.” 346 
Thus, a shareholder could challenge such a contribution only if she 
could “plead facts sufficient to demonstrate why the business judg-
ment rule would not apply.”347 
 By contrast, Balotti and Hanks argued that “personal-
aggrandizement contribution[s]” and those made to “pet charit[ies]” 
should not be reviewed under the business judgment rule.348 Rather, 
“because the ‘ever present specter’ of self-interest glides through the 
                                                                                                                  
supra note 16, at 893-97. A corporate officer or director whose actions are not independent 
has also acted in bad faith. See id. 
 341. Balotti & Hanks, supra note 46, at 968. 
 342. Id. 
 343. Id. at 990.  
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. at 993.  
 346. See id. 
 347. Id.  
 348. Id.  
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boardroom as easily in this instance as when a change of control is 
proposed,”349 Balotti and Hanks proposed that, if a plaintiff “ade-
quately pleads . . . that a gift is made for personal aggrandizement or 
to a pet charity, then the burden should shift to the defendant direc-
tors to demonstrate that the gift resulted in a reasonable benefit to 
the corporation.”350 However, if the directors can show “a reasonable 
corporate benefit resulting from the contribution,” then the business 
judgment rule would apply.351 In short, Balotti and Hicks urged that 
many charitable donations should be subject to Unocal-style inter-
mediate review.352 
 Finally, Balotti and Hanks urged that altruistic contributions 
should not be subject to the business judgment rule “because of the 
absence of one of its elements—that the action must be in the best 
interests of the corporation, which, by definition, an altruistic contri-
bution is not.”353 Instead, Balotti and Hanks proposed, it should be 
required to establish that it “adopted and disclosed to its stockholders 
a board-adopted charitable-giving policy that permits altruistic con-
tributions,” established a “reasonable” budget for such contributions, 
and satisfied both the policy and the budget.354 In short, Balotti and 
Hanks’s protection against simply giving money away is advance 
warning: “If corporations are given the authority to make charitable 
contributions without any demonstrated corporate benefit, share-
holders should at least be put on notice of this possibility.”355 
 4.   Corporate Philanthropy and Defensive Measures Compared 
 While Balotti and Hanks (and others) made a strong case for 
greater judicial scrutiny of management decisions concerning certain 
types of corporate charitable donations, they did not spend much 
time addressing the fit of their proposed solution—intermediate scru-
tiny—with the problem at hand.356 However, further analysis indi-
                                                                                                                  
 349. Id. (footnote omitted) 
 350. Id.  
 351. See id.  
 352. Balotti and Hanks considered, but rejected, subjecting personal-aggrandizement 
type contributions to entire fairness review. See id. Such review was not warranted be-
cause entire fairness is used to evaluate direct financial benefits received by officers and 
directors, but “officers and directors do not receive a direct financial benefit from self-
aggrandizing gifts or ones to pet charities which would implicate entire fairness.” Id.  
 353. Id. at 994.  
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. 
 356. See id. at 993-94 (positing that the benefit to an officer and director from donating 
to a pet charity “is more akin to that reviewed by the intermediate standard” than to tradi-
tional self-dealing). 
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cates that Balotti and Hanks’s plan is an excellent solution to ad-
dress the problems raised by corporate philanthropy. 
 The type of charitable donation that Balotti and Hanks want sub-
ject to greater scrutiny—the “personal aggrandizement” (or “pet char-
ity”) donation357—is essentially a donation that smacks of the poten-
tial for bad faith. Yet the business judgment presumption makes it 
extremely difficult to establish bad faith358—and not just because 
management is presumed to act in good faith. Rather, because any 
benefit to the corporation from charitable donations must (by defini-
tion) be tangential, indirect, and (supposedly) unexpected,359 a share-
holder plaintiff may have no clue as to how and why a particular 
charitable donation supposedly benefits the corporation.360 This dif-
fers dramatically from the typical business transaction—a quid pro 
quo exchange for goods or services—for which the intended benefit to 
the corporation likely will be easier to discern, if not patently obvi-
ous.361 
 As a result, a shareholder plaintiff who wishes to challenge a cor-
porate charitable donation will be in the extremely difficult position 
of disproving a negative—that the donation was not intended to bene-
fit the corporation—without having any explanation from manage-
ment of how the donation was intended to benefit the corporation.362 
This places the shareholder challenging a gift to charity at a distinct 
disadvantage compared to a shareholder challenging an ordinary 
business decision (either as waste or a violation of the duty of care). 
 In light of the inherently indirect and speculative ways in which a 
charitable donation must benefit the corporation (if it benefits the 
                                                                                                                  
 357. See supra text accompanying notes 334-38, 347-56. 
 358. See Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, supra note 3, at 510-23. 
 359. See supra text accompanying notes 244-50. 
 360. For example, there is no corporate law requirement that the CEO of the hypothet-
ical women’s clothing boutique discussed above explain why she believes that donating 
money to the local theater would benefit the corporation’s bottom line, either in the short 
run or the long run. See supra text accompanying notes 265-66.  
 361. Returning to the hypothetical close corporation, HOF Inc. that owns a clothing 
store, House of Fashion, it would be fairly easy for a HOF Inc. shareholder  to figure out 
the business purpose behind each potential hypothetical business transaction. See supra 
text accompanying notes 259-73.  
 362. Although the HOF Inc. shareholder could make a “books and records” request for 
all board meeting minutes at which the contribution was discussed, see, e.g., D.G.C.L.  
§ 220, if the CEO controls the purse strings on philanthropy, it is plausible that the board 
did not discuss the gift and no internal documents exist that address the CEO’s thinking. 
Further, Delaware courts are not kindly disposed to using books and records requests as 
fishing expeditions to unearth evidence of wrongdoing in the first instance. See Stephen A. 
Radin, The New Stage of Corporate Governance Litigation: Section 220 Demands—Reprise, 
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1287, 1316 (2006) (citing, inter alia, White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 557 
(Del. 2001)). 
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corporation at all), it makes perfect sense for a court to apply inter-
mediate scrutiny when evaluating the corporation’s philanthropy. 
Intermediate scrutiny puts management to its proof and forces it to 
make its case to the shareholders.363 Whenever management plausi-
bly could have mixed motives—either in the context of defensive 
measures or in the context of a charitable donation—a shareholder 
plaintiff should not be forced to disprove all possible ways in which 
management’s actions could benefit the corporation. Rather, man-
agement should have the burden of establishing a plausible theory of 
why the charitable donation would benefit the corporation before a 
court will defer to its decision. That is exactly how intermediate scru-
tiny is intended to work. 
E.   Expanding Balotti and Hanks’s Framework to Include Corporate 
Political Contributions 
 When Balotti and Hanks wrote, corporations could not engage in 
political spending other than in a very constrained way—via corpo-
rate PACs.364 Hence, it is not surprising that Balotti and Hanks left 
corporate political spending out of their article. However, in today’s 
post-Citizens United world, corporations may give freely to Super 
PACs.365 As explained previously, this new type of corporate spending 
is analogous to corporate philanthropy because, by definition, both 
involve a corporation simply giving money away without any direct 
or indirect benefit in return.366 
 As a result, corporate Super PAC contributions, like charitable 
donations, present a problem of “mixed motives” and increased agen-
cy costs.367  Management undoubtedly has preferences that do not 
precisely track the corporation’s performance.368 Just as management 
may have a “pet” charity that it favors for its own personal reasons, 
management may have a “pet” candidate that advances its own polit-
ical views. 369  Therefore, like corporate charity, corporate political 
                                                                                                                  
 363. See supra text accompanying notes 233-35.  
 364. See Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, supra note 3, at 481-
84, 544-46. 
 365. See Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 294-96. 
 366. See supra text accompanying notes 251-54. 
 367. See Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Political Speech, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 109, 
137 (1992) (“Managers’ use of corporate funds to invest in speech contrary to investors’ 
interests or beliefs can be regarded as a type of agency cost.”). 
 368. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who De-
cides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 90 (2010) (“Political spending might often have consequences 
that are exogenous to the firm’s performance, and directors’ and executives’ preferences 
with respect to such spending might be influenced by these consequences.”). 
 369. See Kesten, supra note 8, at 177 (“[C]orporate political spending may be a form of 
a managerial consumption good, i.e., managers are using the firm’s resources to further 
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spending poses a greater risk than with normal business decisions 
that management’s interests will diverge from the corporation’s in-
terests. 
 Further, just as with charitable donations, empirical evidence 
supports the view that corporations that engage in political activity 
do so for the benefit of management.370 Therefore, if the Delaware 
courts (or those of any other jurisdiction) were to adopt Balotti and 
Hanks’s proposal for greater judicial review of corporate charitable 
donations, that same review also ought to apply to corporate political 
contributions. 
 If Delaware courts were to apply Balotti and Hanks’s framework 
to corporate political contributions, they would have little problem in 
doing so. Corporate political donations also fit neatly into the three 
categories that Balotti and Hanks described: (1) contributions that 
are intended to benefit the business; (2) personal aggrandizement 
contributions; and (3) altruistic contributions. After the court places 
a contribution into one category or the other—based on, it would 
seem, a preliminary showing by the plaintiff that could be rebutted 
with evidence by the board—then the applicable standard would dif-
fer for each category of contribution. If the court determined that the 
corporate political contribution was intended to benefit the corpora-
tion’s bottom line, it would be subject to business judgment review; if 
the contribution seemed to be intended for personal aggrandizement, 
then it would be subject to intermediate scrutiny; and if the contribu-
                                                                                                                  
their own political preferences rather than the interests of the firm.”); Ribstein, supra note 
367, at 138 (“Managers’ and shareholders’ interests are . . . likely to diverge regarding 
speech. Managers may advocate pet causes that do not relate to the corporation.”); Beb-
chuk & Jackson, supra note 368, at 90 (“There are good reasons to believe . . . that the in-
terests of directors and executives with respect to political spending often diverge from 
those of shareholders. . . . [P]olitical spending decisions may be a product not merely of a 
business judgment regarding the firm’s strategy, but also of the directors’ and executives’ 
own political preferences and beliefs.”); Lucian Bebchuk, Citizens United Impact: Corporate 
Political Speech is Bad for Shareholders, 14 WALL STREET LAW.: SEC. ELECTRONIC AGE 1 
(2010) (“When corporations decide which politicians to support . . . and which political out-
comes to seek . . . such decisions are likely to reflect the preferences and objectives of the 
insiders who manage the companies, ostensibly on shareholders’ behalf. And politicians 
that benefit from corporate spending and access to corporate resources will have an inter-
est in serving the insiders’ preferences and objectives.”); see also Winkler, supra note 7, at 
873 (explaining that, historically, “corporate political corruption was conceptualized as a 
problem of agency costs”). 
 370. See Timothy Werner & John J. Coleman, Citizens United, Independent Expenditures, 
and Agency Costs: Reexamining the Political Economy of State Antitakeover Statutes, 31 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 127, 127 (2014) (concluding that states are “more likely to pass antitakeover stat-
utes that entrench management when firms are allowed to make independent expenditures”); 
Kesten, supra note 8, at 178 (“[M]ost cross-industry studies report negative correlations between 
corporate political activity and shareholder value.”) (citing Michael Hadani, Comments Before 
Committee on Disclosure of Corporate Political Spending: Petition for Rulemaking, SEC File No. 
4-637, at 7-10 (Aug. 3, 2011),  https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/4637-8.pdf)). 
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tion was truly altruistic, it would be allowed so long as the board had 
disclosed to shareholders the possibility of such contributions and the 
corporation had a benefit for altruistic political contributions and this 
contribution fit within that budget. 
IV.   BEYOND THE ANALOGY: CORPORATE POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
ARE MORE PROBLEMATIC THAN CORPORATE CHARITABLE DONATIONS 
 Even if Delaware courts ignore Balotti and Hanks’s exhortation to 
subject corporate charitable donations to intermediate scrutiny, the 
courts nonetheless ought to apply such scrutiny to corporate political 
contributions because they pose more risk of management acting in 
its own self-interest than charitable donations do.371 The crux of the 
difference is pretext: due to the nature of corporate political contribu-
tions, it is far easier for management to lie about its motives when 
causing the corporation to contribute to a Super PAC than when 
causing the corporation to donate to charity. Indeed, it is so easy for 
management to hide the real reason for corporate political contribu-
tions that such contributions arguably raise greater concerns about 
management’s “mixed motives” than even defensive measures—the 
“paradigmatic” case372 for intermediate scrutiny.373 This Part explains 
why. 
A.   Corporate Political Spending Raises Greater Agency Cost  
Concerns Than Corporate Philanthropy 
 Political contributions differ from charitable donations in many 
subtle ways.374 Several of these differences suggest that corporate 
Super PAC contributions raise greater agency cost concerns than 
corporate charitable gifts. First and foremost, elections are about 
candidates, not specific policies; further, even when candidates pur-
port to support specific policies, they do not always keep their prom-
ises. By contrast, charitable organizations typically have a consistent 
policy agenda and can even be contractually required to use a dona-
tion in a specified way.375 Thus, when a corporation donates to chari-
ty, the shareholders have some idea of what the corporation is getting 
for its money—possibly goodwill, but also, the advancement of a spe-
cific charitable mission. When a corporation contributes to a Super 
                                                                                                                  
 371. See infra Part IV.A. 
 372. SARGENT & HONABACH, supra note 23. 
 373. See infra Part IV.B. 
 374. For a somewhat exhaustive list of the ways in which corporate political contribu-
tions differ from charitable donations, see Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 329-37, 
356-61. 
 375. See id. at 333-37. 
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PAC that supports a candidate (or candidates) for office, however, the 
shareholders have literally no idea what specific policy goal that con-
tribution will advance,376 even if management were to share with the 
shareholders its (purported) reason for the contribution. 
                                                                                                                  
 376. Some might describe the view that corporations support politicians in hopes that 
they will enact particular policies as too narrow, insufficiently nuanced, or even naïve. 
Corporations often support candidates on “both sides of the aisle”—i.e., candidates from 
both political parties. This suggests that management’s goal in making a political contribu-
tion is not to support specific legislation or regulatory action, but rather, to make sure that 
the corporation’s lobbyists have “access” to politicians who are elected to office, regardless 
of political viewpoint. See Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 337, 344; Tamara R. Piety, 
Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2583, 2616 n.151 (2008) 
(“[A] desire for influence, not principles, surely explains why so many corporate donors 
regularly contribute to both parties.”); Vicki Kemper & Deborah Lutterbeck, The Country 
Club, COMMON CAUSE MAG., Spring/Summer 1996, at 16, 17-18 (opining that corporations 
often make “large contributions to both political parties to guarantee access, influence and 
agenda-setting power no matter who’s in the White House or which party controls Con-
gress”); see, e.g., Editorial, After Conventions, a Debt to Donors, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/11/opinion/after-conventions-a-debt-to-donors.html? 
action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=opinion-c-col-left-
region&region=opinion-c-col-left-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-left-region (describing how 
corporations sponsor both parties’ national conventions, and paraphrasing lawyers who 
advise corporations on campaign finance laws as saying that “corporate donors will contin-
ue financing both conventions, eager to ensure that they’re covered regardless of which 
party takes the White House in November”). On this view, corporations may simply be 
“satisficers” who are looking for an implicit quid pro quo in that their contributions will 
allow them to “gain a hearing”—i.e., “access to [some] government decision makers” on 
issues that are important to them; thus, they may be “indifferent between candidates” so 
long as none are “openly hostile to their position.” Ronald A. Cass, Money, Power, and Poli-
tics: Governance Models and Campaign Finance Regulation, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 37 
(1998). Further, the issues that are important to a corporation may not fit neatly on an 
ideological spectrum, so (as described above) it may be difficult to find the perfect politician 
to support. 
 Yet, under closer scrutiny this supposedly more nuanced understanding of why cor-
porations contribute to politicians is itself problematic and incomplete. First, even satisfic-
ers would, all things being equal, prefer “to have a representative who is sympathetic to 
their position on issues of importance to them.” Id. Surely it is most logical for manage-
ment to first seek out politicians who have staked out positions favorable to the company, 
or at least whose claimed ideologies and stated political views suggest that they may take 
positions favorable to the company, before finding politicians who are neutral or have ex-
pressed no opinion on issues that are important to the company. Second, the supposedly 
more nuanced understanding may be a relic of a less partisan era. For many issues that 
are important to corporations today—taxation, regulations, etc.—candidates from different 
political parties seem likely to have diverging views. (For example, a conservative Republi-
can who favors lowering the corporate tax rate would be likely to favor other supposedly 
“pro-business” policies, like reducing business regulations. By contrast, a progressive Dem-
ocrat who favors raising taxes on corporations probably would not support reducing gov-
ernment regulation of business.). 
 Moreover, much of the learning about corporations contributing to “both sides of the 
aisle” comes from an era where corporations were prohibited from engaging directly in politics 
by contributing to Super PACs; all they could do was assist with PAC administrative expenses. 
Thus, giving to both parties may have reflected a “if you cannot beat ‘em, join” view. However, in 
the post-Citizens United world, deep pocketed donors (albeit mainly individuals like Sheldon 
Adelson) have given millions of dollars in an attempt to influence election outcome. See Michal 
Addady, Donald Trump Gains the Support of a Former ‘Never Trump’ Billionaire, FORTUNE 
 
1186  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1119 
 
Second, charities to which corporations can make tax-deductible con-
tributions must be intended to benefit a large swath of the general 
public, whereas political organizations like Super PACs can support 
candidates who advance their own, narrow interests.377 As a result, 
politicians can more easily make contributions that benefit them-
selves when pretending to enrich society. 
 Third, contributions to support politicians do not plausibly in-
crease goodwill like corporate donations to charity presumably do.378 
Therefore, a key justification for charitable donations—building gen-
eralized goodwill for the corporation—does not exist for political con-
tributions. Accordingly, the only benefit that may accrue to the cor-
poration comes from any policies that the politician may support (or 
the “access” that politician may provide to the company) if she is 
elected. 
 This subpart describes each of these three differences in detail 
and explains why, as a result of these differences, corporate political 
contributions raise greater agency cost concerns than corporate char-
itable donations.379 
                                                                                                                  
(Sept. 20, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/09/20/donald-trump-donation/ [https://perma.cc/ZPX5-
BV4F]; Theodoric Meyer, How Much Did Sheldon Adelson Really Spend on Campaign 2012?, 
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 20, 2012, 11:47 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-much-did-
sheldon-adelson-really-spend-on-campaign-2012#adelson-correx [https://perma.cc/E6U7-J3GP]. 
To the extent that management of major corporations comes to believe that it can influence 
elections, and adopts the model of influencing outcomes rather than attempting to buy off the 
winner (whoever it is), the old learning will no longer apply. 
 Finally, and most important of all, even if it is true that corporations generally seek 
access rather than specific policy outcomes, the concern that politicians do not keep their 
promises could just as easily apply to the implicit promise to provide access. Politicians 
cannot be held to implicit promises any more than they can be held to explicit ones.  
 377. See Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 357-59. 
 378. See David Rosenberg, Goodwill and the Excesses of Corporate Political Spending, 
11 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 29, 47-48 (2015). 
 379. A fourth difference between donating to a charitable organization and contrib-
uting to a Super PAC that potentially bears upon the question of agency costs is that a 
political candidate, if elected, actually yields state power where a charitable organization’s 
influence over government can only be indirect. See Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 
334-35; accord Kesten, supra note 8, at 182 (“[P]olitical activity is unique: it is the only 
means by which corporations can directly influence the ‘rules of the game’ governing our 
society or oppose changes to the status quo.”). While nonprofit organizations can have size-
able influence over elected officials (e.g., the National Rifle Association), it is “still one step 
removed from office.” Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 334. Further, “charitable or-
ganizations to which donations are tax deductible—section 501(c)(3) organizations—cannot 
lobby broadly for political change, and therefore can only promote societal good in [more 
indirect] ways.” Id. (footnote omitted). Since charities are not state actors, they are not able 
to exert direct, coercive power over the citizenry; as such, contributions to charities do not 
lead to the donee “gaining power over the machinery of the state.” Id. at 359. “As a result, 
the stakes are much higher when a corporation makes a political contribution than when a 
corporation makes a charitable donation” because management “is supporting one candi-
date’s bid to become clothed in the coercive power of the state.”  Id. at 360. This, in turn, 
“magnifies the potential harm that can result from such contributions.” Id. For this addi-
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 1.   Political Contributions Support Candidates, Not Policies 
(a)   With Politicians, Corporations Must Take the Good With  
 the Bad 
 (1)   Politicians Have Views on Many Issues 
 A first, critical difference between donations to charity and spend-
ing on political campaigns is that “candidates for elective office, by 
their very nature, hold a variety of views.”380 Thus, one who contrib-
utes in support of a political candidate could support that candidate 
for any one of a number of reasons—including any of the candidate’s 
positions on the issues. There is no way to know, simply based on the 
fact of the donation, why it was made. 
 As a corollary, since candidates take positions on many different 
issues, except in the case of a highly unusual politician who devotes 
herself to advancing a single issue (e.g., Larry Lessig’s quixotic run 
for President in 2016381) or a politician who runs for a single-issue 
elective office (e.g., dogcatcher or school board), a corporation’s inter-
est and the interests of a politician that it supports undoubtedly “will 
diverge somewhere.”382 (Even in today’s highly partisan environment, 
many politicians do not toe their party’s line on every issue.383) There-
                                                                                                                  
tional reason, the analogy between charitable donations and corporate political contribu-
tions is not perfect, and courts’ deference on the former is not necessarily reason for them 
to defer on the latter. Accord Kesten, supra note 8, at 182 (arguing, for similar reasons, 
against the same analogy). 
 380. Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 333; accord Joseph F. Morrissey, A Con-
tractarian Critique of Citizens United, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 765, 821 (2013) (“[T]he temp-
tation for corporate managers to support the candidates of their choosing and disguise that 
personal support as support that is in the best interests of the corporation runs contrary to 
the fundamental bargain of the shareholder. . . . All management needs to do to justify 
electioneering is simply argue that the political support was in the best interest of the com-
pany. Given the complexity and variety of positions taken by any given politician, it would be 
almost impossible to overcome management’s claim in support of any such transactions.”). 
 381. See David Catanese, Larry Lessig Seeks a Single Issue, Single Year Presidency, 
U.S. NEWS: THE RUN (Sept. 25, 2015, 5:24 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/run-
2016/2015/09/25/larry-lessig-seeks-a-single-issue-single-year-presidency. 
 382. Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 334 (emphasis removed).  
 383. Republican Donald Trump, the President, appeared to be an extreme example of this 
phenomenon during the primary season leading up to the 2016 presidential election. See Alan 
Rappeport & Alicia Parlapiano, Where Trump Breaks with the Republican Party, N.Y. TIMES (May 
11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/05/11/us/politics/where-trump-breaks-with-
the-republican-party.html. However, Trump’s Cabinet picks have been extremely conservative, 
in line with Republican Party orthodoxy, thereby pleasing Republicans. Matthew Cooper, Don-
ald Trump is Building the Most Conservative Presidential Cabinet in U.S. History, 
NEWSWEEK (Dec. 9, 2016, 3:36 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/trump-cabinet-picks-
nominees-conservative-530477 [https://perma.cc/4453-LZVD]; Shane Goldmacher, Trump 
Winning GOP Converts with Cabinet Picks, POLITICO (Dec. 10, 2016, 7:42 AM), 
https://www.politico.eu/article/trump-winning-gop-converts-with-cabinet-picks/ [https://perma.cc/ 
WV9N-SHKY]. Further, in his first months as President, Trump governed as a convention-
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fore, a donor corporation “must, if the candidate is elected, take the 
good with the bad.”384 
 None of the foregoing is likely true with donations to charity, be-
cause charities are founded around a narrow range of goals (e.g., pro-
tecting the environment, opposing abortion rights).385 While a corpo-
ration’s best interests could diverge on particular, narrow issues from 
the specific policies advanced by the charitable organization, the 
range for potential disagreement is more narrow because the range of 
issues on which a charity is focused is more narrow. 
 Of course, in some instances, it may be possible for a large, public-
ly held corporation to find a politician whose views exactly match the 
specific policies that advance the corporate interest. For example, if 
the corporation is looking for a Congressperson to support legislation 
that advances its own interest, the corporation has 535 men and 
women from which to choose. This will not always be the case, of 
course, when looking to support a candidate for the statehouse of a 
particular jurisdiction, such as governor, or the President of the 
United States, however. 
 Further, while the rightward movement of the Republican Party 
in the United States (and perceived or resulting leftward movement 
of the Democratic Party) means that the range of views of politicians 
within one party are narrower than ever, this does not necessarily 
mean that any particular politician’s views will be consistent with 
the corporation’s interests. That is to say, at a time when more and 
more Democrats can be described as leaning liberal, and more and 
                                                                                                                  
al (albeit “incompetent”) conservative. See, e.g., Richard M. Skinner, Trump: A Convention-
al Republican President, but an Incompetent One, BROOKINGS: FIXGOV (May 3, 2017), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2017/05/03/trump-a-conventional-republican-
president-but-an-incompetent-one/ [https://perma.cc/LL2X-4MX5]. So perhaps Trump is 
not that far out of the conservative Republican mainstream, after all. Only time will tell. 
 384. Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 334; accord Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, 
Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 
842-43 (2012) (“[T]he basic problem is that Citizens United permits corporations to make 
expenditures on behalf of candidates, and candidates must take positions on a wide range 
of issues. Thus, if a corporation wishes to support candidate A because she favors a certain 
tax policy, the corporation will also be expending funds in support of all the other positions 
that candidate A favors.” (emphasis removed)).  
 385. See Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 334. Even the rare charity that focuses 
on an unusually broad range of issues will likely focus on fewer issues than a politician, 
because charities do not typically represent specific jurisdictions. For example, the Herit-
age Foundation and the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) focus on a wide 
range of issues from a particular ideological perspective (Heritage is conservative; CBPP is 
liberal). Each organization may therefore take a position on a national issue, such as the 
appropriate budget for the United States military. However, neither charity is likely to 
take a position on a narrow state-specific issue, like the closure of a particular military 
base or the awarding of a specific contract to a defense contractor in, say, Atlanta, Georgia. 
By contrast, a U.S. Senator from Georgia or a Member of Congress from the Atlanta met-
ropolitan area undoubtedly would take a position on the base closure or defense contract.  
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more Republicans can be described as conservative, there is no rea-
son to believe that a corporation’s interests will be solely liberal or 
conservative. This is particularly true when one remembers that poli-
ticians are elected from particular jurisdictions, and serve constitu-
ents who live in a particular locale. Thus, even someone who is ex-
tremely liberal on most issues may stake out some positions that are 
not entirely consistent with that ideology because of interests partic-
ular to his or her home jurisdiction.386 
 By contrast, charitable organizations—especially ones that are 
national in scope—are not beholden to the narrow interests of a par-
ticular jurisdiction. Therefore, such organizations can retain their 
ideological purity on particular issues much easier than politicians 
can. As a result, for example, a gun manufacturer that is looking for 
a charitable organization that strongly opposes gun control legisla-
tion is likely to find it easier to find one that does not make compro-
mises to appease its constituents, as a politician might be forced to 
do. 
 In light of the wide range of issues that politicians face, it is much 
easier for management to lie about why it caused the corporation to 
contribute to a Super PAC that supports a political candidate (or 
candidates) than it is for management to lie about why it caused the 
corporation to donate to a charity. Management could contribute to a 
Super PAC that supports management’s “pet” political candidate 
(e.g., a friend of the CEO) or could support the candidate because of 
management’s own political views on Issue A, and claim to support 
the candidate instead because the candidate’s position on Issue B will 
benefit the corporation. Absent a “smoking gun,” shareholders will 
never know why management supported the candidate. Nor will they 
know whether management really believed in good faith that the 
candidate’s election would serve the corporation’s best interest. 
                                                                                                                  
 386. E.g., Senator Bernie Sanders’ supposedly not-so-liberal position on gun control. See 
Michele Gorman, Why Bernie Sanders’s Gun Record Could Hurt Him in New York, 
NEWSWEEK (Apr. 1, 2016, 4:01 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/hillary-clinton-criticizes-
bernie-sanders-gun-record-new-york-443096 [https://perma.cc/6B2R-UVUK]. Or Deborah 
Wasserman-Schultz’s support for limiting liability of payday lenders. See Nolan D. McCaskill, 
Nonprofit Group Targets Wasserman Schultz Over Payday Lenders, POLITICO (Mar. 9, 2016, 
7:47 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/03/debbie-wasserman-schultz-payday-lenders-
220527 [https://perma.cc/VHM4-HQB7]. Or Joe Biden’s support of legislation making bank-
ruptcy protection harder to benefit credit card companies headquartered in Delaware. See 
Bob Cesca, Joe Biden’s Greatest Betrayal: The One Senate Vote that Makes It Hard to  
Support a Biden Run, SALON (Oct. 21, 2015, 6:58 AM), http://www.salon.com/2015/10/21/ 
joe_bidens_greatest_betrayal_the_one_senate_vote_that_makes_it_hard_to_support_a_biden
_run/ [https://perma.cc/H6F5-27Y2]. 
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 2.   The Problem of “Dark Money” 
 The problem that candidates have views on many issues is further 
complicated by the way corporations donate to Super PACs. Corpora-
tions (like other donors) often engage in independent expenditures 
indirectly, by donating to social welfare organizations that funnel 
that money to Super PACs (or Super PACs that support multiple 
candidates), in an attempt to disguise their political spending.387 If 
one assumes that management acts with undying fealty to the corpo-
ration’s best interests, then funneling money through an additional 
layer could benefit the corporation by covering its tracks and poten-
tially avoiding negative media attention. (Looking back, Target Corp. 
surely wishes that it contributed to a nonprofit organization rather 
than directly to MN Forward.388) 
 However, contributing via unaccountable “dark money” organiza-
tions means that the contributor may have “no idea who else is giving 
[to the same political organization], and whether their interests are 
in competition.”389 As a result, a corporation may donate to a social 
welfare organization expecting the organization to support candi-
dates who promote a particular policy agenda, but end up having no 
control over which candidates who promote that agenda end up re-
ceiving the contributions. This could lead the corporation to unwit-
tingly support candidates whose policy agendas do far more harm 
than good to the corporation’s interests. 
 Unfortunately for shareholders, this ostensible uncertainty about 
where “dark money” contributions end up also can shield unfaithful 
managers who cause the corporation to spend money to promote their 
own personal views, rather than the corporation’s best interest. Alt-
hough it is certainly possible that corporate managers write massive 
checks from the corporate treasury to social welfare organizations 
without knowing anything about where that money will end up, sav-
vy managers probably can avoid that trap. While a formal contractu-
al agreement would be illegal, management could informally (and 
orally) insist that the corporation’s money must go to support partic-
ular candidates, or else no more money will be forthcoming. To the 
extent that corporate managers use such tactics, contributing to a 
                                                                                                                  
 387. See Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, supra note 3, at 482 n.6. 
 388. See infra Part IV.A.1(3). 
 389. See Kathleen M. Donovan-Maher & Steven L. Groopman, Why Dark Money is Bad 
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social welfare organization increases management’s ability to obfus-
cate its motives for the corporation’s political spending. 
 3.   Some Real-World Examples 
 Some real examples will help illustrate why contributing in sup-
port of a politician who has views on many different issues greatly 
increases the chance of management pretext. 
 (a)   Target’s Contribution to MN Forward 
 Target Corp.’s 2010 contribution to Super PAC MN Forward is a 
perfect example of how giving to a Super PAC rather than a charity 
helps to obscure the intent behind a contribution.390 MN Forward 
used Target Corp.’s donation to support conservative Republican 
Minnesota gubernatorial candidate Tom Emmer, who opposed mar-
riage equality. 391  After making the contribution, Target Corp. en-
dured a media firestorm after gay rights activists harshly criticized 
the contribution and called for a nationwide boycott of the company’s 
retail stores.392 
 Yet, even assuming that that Super PAC supported only Emmer 
(in fact, it supported several candidates 393 ), Emmer himself had 
staked out views on a wide range of policies in the 2010 election, in-
cluding traditional conservative views on job promotion. Then, in re-
sponse to the activists’ criticism, Target Corp.’s CEO, Greg Steinha-
fel, claimed that the company had contributed to MN Forward be-
cause the Super PAC supported candidates whose favored policies 
would promote job growth in Minnesota, not because of any social 
policies favored by candidate Emmer.394 
 By all outward appearances, Steinhafel’s explanation made per-
fect sense, since MN Forward’s website focused entirely on issues 
that (at least according to Republicans) are closely related to job cre-
ation— “tax reform,” “spending reform,” and “education reform.”395 
Further, although it was not widely reported in the media, not only 
did MN Forward purport to take no position whatsoever on social is-
                                                                                                                  
 390. For an extended discussion of this contribution, see Leahy, A Closer Look, supra 
note 2, at 314-19. 
 391. See id. at 314-15. 
 392. See id. at 315; Meena Hartenstein, Target Boycotted for Donating $150,000 to MN 
Right-wing Republican Tom Emmer’s Campaign for Governor, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug 3, 
2010), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/target-boycotted-donating-150-000-mn-
right-wing-republican-tom-emmer-campaign-governor-article-1.200635.  
 393. See Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 326. 
 394. See id. 
 395. See id. at 325. 
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sues like gay marriage, it actually supported at least one Democrat 
who subsequently cast multiple votes in support of gay marriage.396 
Hence, Target Corp.’s claim that it supported MN Forward (and, in 
turn, Emmer) due to his position on job growth—not because of his 
position on marriage equality—was entirely plausible.397 This is par-
ticularly true since Target Corp. had previously supported gay rights 
by, for example, supporting a gay pride parade.398 
 Yet, it is also possible that CEO Steinhafel was lying, and Target 
Corp.’s management in fact supported MN Forward (and Emmer) in 
order to oppose gay marriage in Minnesota. If Emmer had been elect-
ed, Target Corp.’s management surely knew that he would bring both 
his proposed policies on job growth and his views on gay marriage 
into the governor’s office with him. Accordingly, it is conceivable that 
Target Corp.’s (secretly-disloyal) management lied about supporting 
Emmer for reasons that were palatable to the company’s sharehold-
ers (and customers), but planned to celebrate (in secret) if Emmer 
won because what it claimed was “the good” (Emmer’s job growth pol-
icies) was in fact a smokescreen for its real reasons for supporting 
Emmer (his stance on gay marriage). But this is complete and utter 
speculation. Absent some magical truth serum or access to a smoking 
gun like CEO Steinhafel’s secret diary, it is impossible to know pre-
                                                                                                                  
 396. See id. at 326 (describing Democrat Jim Metzen). However, MN Forward did not an-
nounce that it supported these candidates until after the media firestorm occurred. See Tom 
Scheck, Target Apologizes for Donation to MN Forward, MPR NEWS (Aug. 5, 2010), 
http://www.mprnews.org/story/2010/08/05/target-apology-donation [https://perma.cc/5V7S-
RG29] (noting that MN Forward announced that it was “backing six candidates for the Minne-
sota Legislature—three Republicans and three Democrats who voted in support of the priorities 
of the business community in the past” after the controversy about Target Corp. supporting MN 
Forward arose); see also MN Forward Announces Support for Bipartisan Group of State Legisla-
tive Candidates, MN FORWARD (Aug. 5, 2010), https://web.archive.org/web/20100817003906/ 
http://www.mnforward.com/blog/2010/08/05/mn-forward-announces-support-for-bipartisan-
group-of-state-legislative-candidates/ (MN Forward announcement).  
 It is therefore possible that MN Forward added Democrats—and candidates who sup-
ported gay marriage, in particular—in order to take some heat off Target. However, this seems 
unlikely, since MN Forward already had Target Corp.’s money, and since neither MN Forward 
nor Target Corp. apparently highlighted any of its other candidates’ positions on gay marriage 
at the time (although MN Forward did go out of its way to state that it had always planned to 
support both Democrats and Republicans who were pro business). Moreover, MN Forward 
claimed to support both pro-business Democrat and Republican candidates (for state Legisla-
ture) all along—it just ran ads for Emmer first. See Jason Hoppin, Target CEO Fends Off Gay 
Backlash Over PAC Cash, TWINCITIES.COM (July 27, 2010), http://www.twincities.com/ 
2010/07/27/target-ceo-fends-off-gay-backlash-over-pac-cash/ [https://perma.cc/TZC4-3TNF].  
 397. If this is true, then the donation clearly backfired, because the negative publicity 
that resulted would be particularly rueful to the corporation’s shareholders if management 
had no intent to oppose marriage equality.  
 398. See Scheck, supra note 396. Further, after the 2010 debacle Target moved rapidly 
in the opposite direction to actually promote same-sex marriage. See Leahy, A Closer Look, 
supra note 2, at 320. 
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cisely why Target Corp.’s management decided to support Tom Em-
mer in 2010. 
 This potential for management pretext would have been far less 
great if Target Corp. had skipped the contribution to MN Forward 
and instead donated to a charity to advance its stated goals. If Target 
Corp. had “donated to three different single-issue charitable organi-
zations that focused on promoting” the three stated goals of MN For-
ward (“tax reform,” “spending reform,” and “education reform”), there 
would have been little doubt about the intent of Target Corp.’s man-
agement.399 With such nonprofit organizations, you get what you pay 
for, more or less. 
 (b)   The Additional Complication of Dark Money 
 When Target Corp. donated to MN Forward, the company’s 
shareholders at least knew what politician the company was support-
ing. Although MN Forward ultimately supported other politicians in 
the 2010 election,400 at the time Target Corp. contributed to MN For-
ward, the Super PAC’s main focus was to run television ads for Tom 
Emmer.401 
 However, if Target Corp. had donated to a social welfare organiza-
tion rather than directly to MN Forward, the shareholders’ inability 
to know the mind of its management would have been greatly exac-
erbated. The management of corporations who contribute to “dark 
money” organizations—social welfare organizations that support par-
ticular policies—do not necessarily know to which Super PACs, sup-
porting which candidates, the corporation’s money will be funneled. 
This can lead to some instances where donations to a social welfare 
organization actually seems to harm the corporation’s interest. 
 For example, in 2010, a trade association whose members include 
manufacturers of contraceptive devices like Merck and Johnson & 
Johnson gave a total of $4.8 million to two nonprofits, the American 
Action Network and the American Future Fund, purportedly for the 
purposes of “promot[ing] limited government.”402 However, both non-
profits reportedly funded Super PACs that helped elect politicians to 
office who ultimately “voted to eliminate funding for access to contra-
ceptives through programs like Title X and Planned Parenthood.”403 
Presumably, this reduction of government funding for programs in-
tended to assist in the purchase of contraceptives reduced purchases 
                                                                                                                  
 399. See Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 334. 
 400. See supra note 396 and accompanying text.  
 401. See Hoppin, supra note 396. 
 402. See Donovan-Maher & Groopman, supra note 389. 
 403. See id. 
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of such contraceptives, thereby harming the manufacturers’ bottom 
lines in these ways. Further, it is unclear whether the candidates 
helped enact policies that helped the contraceptive manufacturers’ 
bottom lines in other ways (such as by lowering their taxes or elimi-
nating “burdensome” government regulations).404 
 Contributing to a trade association, which in turn contributes to a 
nonprofit organization, which in turn contributes to a candidate who 
supports policies that harm the corporation, would seem to be an ex-
ample of corporations “taking the good with the bad”—or perhaps, 
simply being unlucky. However, since there is no way for sharehold-
ers to know whether management’s stated reasons for contributing to 
the trade association (and the trade organization’s reason for con-
tributing to the nonprofit) are true, it is possible that each contribu-
tion to the trade organization (and the nonprofit) was not intended to 
promote limited government in the first place. Rather, management 
and the trade association could have conspired to funnel the corpora-
tion’s money to the nonprofit in order to advance management’s own, 
personal political agenda. If so, this clearly would be a bad faith polit-
ical contribution.405 However, absent a smoking gun that revealed 
management’s intent, it would be impossible for a shareholder to 
prove management’s bad faith.406 
 In sum, whether Target Corp.’s contribution to MN Forward ei-
ther was pretextual or backfired badly, at least shareholders had the 
critical information—what candidate was being supported—
necessary to evaluate the various pros and cons of where the corpora-
tion’s money was going. When corporations funnel corporate political 
contributions through social welfare organizations, it becomes even 
more tricky for shareholders to know whether management is being 
truthful about its reasons for spending the company’s money on polit-
ical contributions. 
 (c)   Politicians Cannot Be Held to Their Promises 
 Another problem arises when a corporation contributes to a Super 
PAC that supports a particular politician: regardless of what the poli-
tician says when running for office, the corporation cannot know for 
sure what policies that politician will support while in office. It goes 
                                                                                                                  
 404. To take another example, Google, Inc. was once a member of the American Legis-
lative Exchange Council (ALEC). Yet, “while Google was devoting significant resources 
toward developing green energy technologies, its ALEC membership dues were helping 
campaigns seeking to gut renewable energy standards.” Id. 
 405. See Leahy, A Decade After Disney, supra note 16, at 877-82; Leahy, Corporate 
Political Contributions as Bad Faith, supra note 3, at 507-10.  
 406. Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, supra note 3, at 520-23 
(discussing similar hypothetical examples). 
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without saying that “politicians do not always keep their promis-
es”407—and there is little that the corporation can do about it, except 
refuse to give (or give to the politician’s opponent) the next time 
around. There is no legal way for the corporation to mandate that a 
politician it supports keep her promises; trying to do so by contract 
would render the contribution a “quid pro quo . . . [i.e.] an illegal 
bribe.”408 Thus, a politician could renege on her promise to advance a 
specific policy goal, or even change her position 180-degrees, after 
receiving the corporation’s political contribution. 
 By contrast, a charitable organization is unlikely to abandon its 
stated positions. First, charitable organizations have none of the in-
centives that politicians have to change their tune once they are 
elected to office. Second, if a charity were to collect money for a par-
ticular charitable purpose and repurpose that money for other pur-
poses, it could potentially lose its nonprofit status and its manage-
ment could perhaps be charged with fraud. 
 Most important of all, a corporate donor can specify by contract 
what the charity must do with its gift and, so long as the restriction 
remains charitable in nature (i.e., it requires that the money be spent 
on a particular program or project, rather than to benefit a particular 
individual), not only is such an agreement enforceable, the corpora-
tion will not lose its tax deduction if the specified purpose does not 
result in a recognizable benefit to the corporation.409 
 For example, a corporation that donates money to an art museum 
that collects both Rocco and Baroque artwork could require that the 
money be spent on Baroque art, or even a particular Baroque paint-
                                                                                                                  
 407. Id. at 548. Indeed, in extraordinary cases, politicians may break their campaign 
promises even before they take office. See, e.g., Michele Gorman, Donald Trump’s  
Campaign Promises: Keeping Score, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 29, 2016, 1:02 PM), 
http://www.newsweek.com/keeping-score-donald-trump-campaign-promises-526391 (conclud-
ing that President Donald Trump had backed off several of his campaign promises within 
one month of being elected). 
 408. Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 311 (citing, inter alia, 18 U.S.C. § 201 
(2012)). 
 409. See Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, supra note 3, at 548; 
accord Christine W. Hubbard, Draft Charitable Gifts that Protect Donor Intent and Tax 
Savings, 42 EST. PLAN. 26, 31, 2015 WL 3879809, 7-8 (2015) (“A donor may earmark a con-
tribution to charity for a particular use without jeopardizing the charitable deduction pro-
vided the restriction does not prevent the charity from freely using the transferred assets 
or, at a minimum, the income therefrom, in furtherance of its charitable purposes. If the 
gift is earmarked for a noncharitable purpose, or even a charitable purpose that is outside 
of the donee organization’s charitable purposes, the gift is not deductible.” (footnote omit-
ted)); Zachary S. Kester, Are Tax Deductions Allowed for Restricted Donations?, CHARITA-
BLE ALLIES, http://charitableallies.org/news/tax-deductions-restricted/ [https://perma.cc/ 
XY3J-NWZP] (“Certain restrictions do not destroy the ‘complete’ nature—and therefore 
deductibility—of a gift. Generally acceptable restrictions include the right of a donor  
to . . . direct that the donation be used for a specific program . . . .” (emphasis removed)).  
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ing that the museum was planning to obtain—and, the corporation 
would receive no “substantial benefit” in return, so the gift would be 
tax deductible.410 Or a corporate donor to a nonprofit hospital that is 
looking to build a new wing could require that the donation be spent 
to build that wing—and, again, since the corporation would not re-
ceive a “substantial benefit,” in the eyes of the IRS, the corporation 
would not lose its tax deduction. What’s more, the corporation could 
even require that the art museum or hospital name a wing of the 
building after the corporation—or its CEO—and the corporation 
would not lose its tax deduction, because the IRS does not view nam-
ing rights as a “substantial benefit.”411 
 4.   Charity Is Supposed to Be Altruistic; Politics Can Be Selfish 
 A second difference between charitable donations and political 
contributions relates to the purpose of the donation. Charities are 
“supposed to be altruistic ventures”—indeed, “ ‘charity’ essentially 
means ‘to help others.’ ”412 Thus, at least in theory, no tax-deductible 
charitable organization can exist solely for the purpose of advancing 
one’s own interests to the exclusion of the best interests of the gen-
eral public.413 Further, “[a]lthough one could create a charity that ad-
vances one’s own interests along with the interests of others in need, 
the point of the charity must nonetheless be to help the public, not 
just its founder and/or her family.”414 For example, a man with diabe-
tes cannot create a 501(c)(3) tax exempt charity to pay his own medi-
cal expenses, but he could create an organization that funds medical 
research on diabetes, or provides public education about diabetes, or 
even an organization that helps all diabetes patients with certain 
medical expenses. 
 Political parties are completely different. “There is nothing unto-
ward about founding a political party solely to serve the interests of 
its founders and/or its core members.”415 For example, a group of 
workers could form a party called the “Labor Party,” the main goal of 
which is to serve their own interests to the detriment of management 
                                                                                                                  
 410. See Hubbard, supra note 409, at 7-8 (quoting Treas. Reg. 1.170A-1(e)) (providing 
analogous examples: “The contribution of land to a city to be used as a public park, when 
the city intends to use the land for such purpose at the time of the gift. The creation of an 
endowment fund for a particular university department. The donation of funds for the con-
struction of a building sought to be built by an exempt organization.”). 
 411. See Drennan, supra note 272, at 54. 
 412. See Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 357. 
 413. See id. 
 414. See id. (footnote omitted). 
 415. See id. at 358. 
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and owners.416 Or a group of farmers could create a “Farmer’s Party” 
to advance their interests to the detriment of consumers and/or ur-
ban dwellers. Indeed, the group that is benefitted could be drawn as 
narrowly as the group’s founders desire: for example, there is nothing 
illegal about a political organization solely devoted to advance the 
interests of foul-mouthed, orange-skinned male billionaires living in 
Midtown Manhattan.417 
 Of course, serious political organizations will rarely be tailored 
narrowly to only benefit the interests of a few founding members. 
Further, political parties “often attempt to justify their policies by 
urging that they are best for society as a whole.”418 Yet, it is critical to 
realize that doing so is “not required by law or logic.”419 Hence, “while 
there is no doubt that many candidates for office claim that their 
goals are quasi-charitable in nature, there is no legal requirement 
that a political party act charitably.”420 Accordingly, while the federal 
tax code’s limitation on the permissible charitable purposes ostensi-
bly serves as somewhat of a bulwark against management causing 
the corporation to make charitable donations to further its own self-
interest, there is no such limitation on corporate political contribu-
tions. Rather, since “political contributions are by their nature in-
tended and allowed to be less altruistic than charitable donations,” it 
is “at least plausible that the typical political contribution is motivat-
ed less by altruism”—and more by management’s own self-interested 
desire to grab intangible benefits—“than the typical charitable dona-
tion.”421 
 For these reasons, corporate political contributions again raise 
greater agency cost concerns than corporate philanthropy. While it is 
possible for a corporation’s management to cause the corporation to 
donate money to a charity that benefits management along with oth-
er members of the general public (perhaps even a narrow slice there-
of), it is not possible for management to sponsor charitable gifts that 
blatantly serve only management’s narrow personal interests. For 
example, although a corporation’s CEO could cause the corporation to 
donate to her favorite opera company, presumably that opera compa-
                                                                                                                  
 416. See id. 
 417. All kidding aside, the issue of political parties serving particular constituencies’ 
interests is not a hypothetical one. Republicans have long criticized the Democratic Party 
for supposedly focusing too much on serving the interests of minority groups, such as Afri-
can Americans. More recently, in the 2016 election, Democrats criticized President Donald 
Trump for focusing on the interests of whites to the detriment of minorities. 
 418. See Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 359. 
 419. See id. 
 420. See id. (emphasis removed). 
 421. See id. at 361. 
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ny’s performances will be open to members of the public (or at least 
those who can afford to buy a ticket). Or, if the CEO causes the cor-
poration to donate to her alma mater, where her daughter attends 
college, presumably that donation will benefit that school’s other cur-
rent students, as well. By contrast, when a corporation’s CEO causes 
the corporation to contribute money to a Super PAC, the candidate(s) 
supported by the Super PAC could be from a party that is narrowly 
drawn to protect the CEO’s interest or a narrow class of people simi-
larly situated to the CEO. Or the Super PAC itself could support only 
candidates, from whatever party, who focus narrowly on legislation 
that benefits the CEO either directly or indirectly.422 For example, if 
the CEO is a millionaire, the CEO could cause the corporation to do-
nate to a candidate who proposes to lower taxes on millionaires—
even if none of the corporation’s other shareholders are million-
aires.423 
 Yet, since the politician in question or party in question will ulti-
mately take a large number of policy positions, the CEO could claim 
that the corporation is supporting the politician or party in question 
due to her position on other issues. Again, the wide range of policy 
positions that a politician takes makes the situation ripe for man-
agement pretext. 
 5.   Political Contributions Are Unlikely to Foster Goodwill 
 A third key difference between charitable donations and political 
contributions involves the oft-cited benefit of corporate philanthropy: 
promoting goodwill. Even assuming that both political contributions 
and charitable donations are disclosed (which is unlikely424), it is 
simply not plausible that giving to a Super PAC promotes goodwill in 
the way that giving to charity does.425  
 Today, corporate philanthropy in general seems to enjoy wide-
spread public support,426 so corporations can, in theory, bask in the 
                                                                                                                  
 422. See id. at 353-63. Recent studies bear this out. See, e.g., Werner & Coleman, supra 
note 370 (finding a correlation between allowing corporations to make independent expend-
itures and state anti-takeover legislation). 
 423. Such a contribution might arguably constitute self-dealing, however. See Leahy, A 
Closer Look, supra note 2, at 362-63. 
 424. See Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, supra note 3, at 482-83 n.6.  
 425. See Rosenberg, supra note 378, at 47-48; accord Nelson II, supra note 249, at 162; 
Jonathan Romiti, supra note 37, at 770-71 n.221. But see Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 
2, at 313-21 (rebutting the argument that corporate political contributions do not inherent-
ly promote goodwill, and concluding that the lesson of Target Corp.’s 2010 donation to MN 
Forward is the importance of getting it right by not contributing to a wildly unpopular or 
divisive candidate).  
 426. Corporate philanthropy is widely assumed to increase public goodwill towards the 
corporation—i.e., the “halo effect.” See supra notes 243, 248 and accompanying text. This 
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“halo” effect without worrying too much about what specific charities 
to support. Although some ostensibly charitable organizations that 
engage in political activism may be unpopular with certain consum-
ers (e.g., the Sierra Club Education Foundation is probably unpopu-
lar with climate-change deniers), corporations have a wide range of 
uncontroversial charities from which to choose if they wish to appeal 
broadly to the general public. For example, few consumers would ob-
ject to donations to educational institutions or to institutions that 
promote the arts or public health. Moreover, those who support a 
particular charity (e.g., a medical school) seem unlikely to be peeved 
by a donation to a different type of charity (e.g., a public theater) or 
even a “competing” charity (e.g., another medical school).427 
 By contrast to corporate philanthropy, corporate political spending 
is highly divisive. While charities can be non-partisan and therefore 
enjoy broad support, Super PACs usually are not.428 Moreover, unlike 
many charitable endeavors, partisan politics under our two-party 
system is a zero-sum game.429 Thus, “money given to Republicans is 
not simply unavailable to Democrats,” as with money that is given to 
one charity rather than another; “it is money that . . . will . . . ad-
vance an agenda that is squarely at odds with the Democrats’ agen-
da.”430 As a result, Democrats “can be expected not just to disagree, 
but to disagree vehemently with—and feel that their political goals 
are negated by” a corporate contribution to a Republican candidate 
(and vice versa).431 Therefore, a disclosed donation to a Super PAC 
that supports political candidates is probably more likely to raise 
public ire than promote public goodwill—especially if the candidate is 
unpopular within her own party. 
 This is particularly true “where there is no obvious business pur-
pose for” the political contribution, because “it will have an immedi-
ate taint of disloyalty” to the public.432 In addition, since political 
spending is more plausibly self-interested than charitable giving, the 
former is more likely to cause the citizenry to believe that the corpo-
                                                                                                                  
Author is not currently aware of any hard evidence, such as survey data, which proves that 
the “halo effect” exists, though. Further, there are possible downsides to corporate charity. 
For example, dissenters fear increased corporate influence over public charities. See Mark 
Rosenman, When Charities Act as a Shill for Corporate Interests, the Public Good Suffers, 
CHRONICLE PHILANTHROPY (Apr. 28, 2015),  https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Opinion-
When-Charities-Act-as/229711. 
 427. See Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 332 n.269, 333 n.270. 
 428. See Rosenberg, supra note 378, at 47-48. 
 429. See Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 332-33. 
 430. Id. 
 431. See Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, supra note 3, at 534 
(emphasis removed). 
 432. See Rosenberg, supra note 378, at 47-48. 
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ration is trying to gain an advantage from government—i.e., “the 
perception of a quid pro quo.”433 
 As a result, corporations must tread lightly—and “get it right” by 
picking a popular candidate434—if they plan to disclose their political 
spending. Further, to avoid any potential for controversy, corpora-
tions may feel greater urgency to keep their political contributions 
private. Thus, the main benefit that a corporation may expect to gain 
from charitable giving is largely unavailable when giving to a Super 
PAC (or to a charity for which the main purpose is to funnel money to 
a particular Super PAC). This only increases the likelihood that a 
corporate political contribution will be made to serve management’s 
interests rather than the corporation’s interests. 
B.   Corporate Political Contributions and Defensive  
Measures Compared 
 In addition to being a better candidate for intermediate scrutiny 
than charitable contributions, corporate political contributions also 
stack up favorably against the “paradigmatic” case for intermediate 
scrutiny435—defensive measures. This subpart compares a decision by 
management (1) to cause the corporation to contribute to a Super 
PAC and (2) to employ defensive measures, and concludes that both 
decisions pose an “omnipresent specter” of a management conflict of 
interest—albeit for slightly different reasons. 
1.   Corporate Political Contributions Raise an Inherently Strong 
      Risk of a Management Conflict of Interest 
 Whenever management decides to undertake defensive measures 
to avoid a hostile takeover, there is an “omnipresent specter that a 
board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those 
of the corporation and its shareholders.”436 This concern arises due to: 
(1) a structural conflict between management’s personal interests 
and the shareholders’ financial interests;437  and (2) management’s 
ease of lying successfully about its motivations.438 
 The structural conflict is that a hostile tender offer typically pre-
sents a binary choice between management’s personal interest in 
keeping their jobs and its duty to look out for the shareholders; if 
                                                                                                                  
 433. Id. (emphasis removed). 
 434. Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 321. 
 435. SARGENT & HONABACH, supra note 23. 
 436. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). 
 437. See supra Parts II.D.1-2. 
 438. See supra Part II.D.3. 
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management refuses to employ defensive measures and allows 
shareholders to accept a hostile tender offer, the managers undoubt-
edly will lose their seats on the board (and the officers will lose their 
day jobs).439 Management can easily lie about its motivations because 
its information advantage over the shareholders allows it to easily 
fake a plausible “policy” reason for opposing a hostile takeover.440 
 Corporate political contributions do not pose the same structural 
conflict, but they pose a much greater risk of management pretext 
than defensive measures do. 
 (a)   No Inherent Conflict . . . 
 Corporate political contributions do not pose a binary, either/or 
conflict between management’s financial interests and the corpora-
tion’s financial interests. Nor do political contributions necessarily 
pose an inescapable conflict between management’s personal, politi-
cal views and the corporation’s best interests. There is simply no rea-
son to believe that, when management decides whether to make a 
corporate political contribution, it must choose between two compet-
ing and inconsistent choices—either promote their own best interests 
or the corporation’s best interests. Indeed, it seems plausible that 
management’s preferred candidates for elective office could, in many 
instances, also serve the corporation’s best interests.441 For example, 
a Republican candidate for office who promises to lower taxes on 
wealthy American “job creators” may also promise to eliminate the 
regulatory burden on certain corporations or lower the corporate tax 
rate. Contributing to such a candidate would be a “win-win” situation 
for a rich CEO, the corporation, and its shareholders (assuming that 
they are focused, above all else, on profit-maximization442). 
 Yet, properly described, defensive measures also do not involve an 
inherent conflict for management (as defined in this Article to include 
both inside and outside directors). Delaware law does not deem inde-
pendent outside directors to have a financial interest in a corporate 
transaction simply because making that decision could result in them 
losing their board seats.443 While incumbent directors stand to lose 
the “power, prestige, and perquisites that accompany board member-
                                                                                                                  
 439. See text accompanying notes 204-11. 
 440. See text accompanying notes 221-27. 
 441. This is not necessarily true, however. At least one recent study suggests that 
states where firms are allowed to make independent expenditures are “more likely to pass 
antitakeover statutes that entrench management.” Werner & Coleman, supra note 370. 
 442. Of course, it is possible that in many cases shareholders would prefer that a cor-
poration resist maximizing corporate profits in order to promote other political goals. See 
Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, supra note 3, at 526-36. 
 443. See text accompanying notes 213-16. 
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ship,”444 the law deems these to be personal interests, not material 
financial ones.445 Thus, the only directors for whom the law deems to 
have an inescapable financial conflict of interest in the decision 
whether to cause the corporation to take defensive measures to avert 
a takeover are inside directors (e.g., the corporation’s highly-paid CEO) 
who stand to lose their lucrative day jobs.446 As previously explained, 
independent outside directors face only an “inherently . . . strong risk” 
of a conflict of interest when deciding whether to implement defensive 
measures.447 Therefore, Unocal’s “omnipresent specter” really refers 
to directors’ personal interests, not their financial ones. 
 So, does management face an “inherently strong risk” of a conflict 
of interest when deciding whether to cause the corporation to con-
tribute to a Super PAC? Arguably yes—but not for exactly the same 
reasons that management faces such a risk when deciding whether to 
engage in defensive measures to avoid a hostile takeover. 
 To understand why, let us take a brief detour into the mind of a 
corporate director who is deciding whether to undertake an action 
that she has already determined is not in the corporation’s best in-
terests—for example, to steal money from the corporation by moving 
it from the corporation’s bank account to her own. Presumably, a di-
rector who is deciding whether to steal will consider several things 
(among others): (1) whether stealing is morally and/or legally wrong; 
(2) how badly she wants or needs the money; and (3) whether she will 
get caught and be (a) sanctioned; and/or (b) shamed. While hopefully 
the first consideration will dominate and determine the director’s ul-
timate decision, corporate law does not assume that fiduciaries will 
always be governed by morals and the law; derivative lawsuits exist 
to punish directors who fail to take the morally and legally required 
action. If we assume that the director is immoral and willing to act 
illegally, then considerations two and three together will determine 
whether she ultimately decides to steal from the corporation. All oth-
er things being equal, a greater need or desire for the money should 
make it more likely she will steal from the corporation, whereas a 
higher likelihood she will be caught and sanctioned should make it 
more likely that she will not steal from the corporation. Thus, if an 
immoral director’s need/desire for the money were graphed on the x-
axis and her perceived likelihood of being caught were graphed on 
the y-axis, the chart might look like this, in which the chance of the 
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 447. See id. 
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director stealing goes up based on either a greater desire/need for 
money or a reduced chance of being caught: 
 
 That is to say, even an immoral director who desperately wants or 
needs money will be less likely to steal when the chances of being 
caught are too high—and even a director who has little want or need 
for the money will be more likely to steal when the chances of being 
caught are incredibly low. 
 Returning to the two types of management decisions at issue here, 
the decision whether to engage in defensive measures presents a sit-
uation where management’s need or desire to steal from the corpora-
tion (i.e., place its interests ahead of the corporation’s) may be some-
what high, because management stands to lose its “power, perks, and 
prestige” if it does its job. Further, management’s chances of being 
caught are somewhat low, because management can easily pretend 
that it is engaging in defensive measures to advance a plausible cor-
porate policy. 
 By contrast, the decision whether to cause the corporation to make 
a political contribution does not mean that management’s desire or 
need to steal from the corporation is high (i.e., management is not 
desperate to put its own interests ahead of the corporation’s inter-
ests) because there is no reason to believe that doing good by the cor-
poration will cause any harm to management’s own interests. Yet, 
that said, management might nonetheless have the same incentive to 
steal from (i.e., be disloyal to) the corporation as in the case of defen-
sive measures if management faced a lower likelihood of being 
caught as compared to when management decides whether to under-
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take defensive measures. This is where pretext comes into play: The 
easier it is for management to make up a plausible lie about its mo-
tives for causing the corporation to make a political contribution, the 
less likely it is that management will be caught. 
 (b)   . . . But Far Greater Potential for Pretext 
 Although both the decision to undertake defensive measures and 
the decision to make the corporation contribute to a Super PAC raise 
the possibility for pretext, the potential for pretext is far greater with 
a political contribution. With defensive measures, everyone involved 
should know that the directors—and management, in particular—
stand to lose their jobs if a hostile takeover succeeds. Therefore, 
management’s possible conflict of interest—although inherent—is no 
secret. If a shareholder suspects that management is lying about why 
it opposes a hostile takeover bid, there is little doubt about the un-
derlying reason for the lie: it is all about entrenchment (or, perhaps 
for outside directors, a desire to entrench their colleagues, the in-
cumbent CEO and/or other officers). 
 The opposite is true of corporate political contributions. Since the 
possibility of pretext arises because politicians hold many different 
views, a shareholder who suspects that management is lying about 
why it caused the corporation to contribute to a Super PAC does not 
start off with an obvious alternative. Rather, since politicians hold a 
variety of views, absent a “smoking gun”—such as management’s 
own prior political contributions or public statements—the share-
holder might literally have no clue as to management’s true motives. 
 For an example, let us return to HOF Inc. that owns a women’s 
clothing boutique, House of Fashion. Now assume that the HOF Inc. 
CEO has caused the corporation to donate to the Republican candi-
date for governor of the state where House of Fashion is located. 
There is no legal requirement that HOF Inc. disclose to its share-
holders why it made the contribution. As a result, a shareholder who 
suspects that the contribution was intended to further the CEO’s own 
personal political views rather than the corporation’s best interest 
has nothing to work with. Absent a “smoking gun”—for example, if 
both the Republican candidate for governor and the CEO were out-
spoken opponents of abortion—the shareholder will have little chance 
of figuring out the CEO’s true motives. Further, even if we assume 
that the CEO informs the shareholders that the contribution was 
made for some plausible reason—for example, she believes that the 
candidate will support policies that “improve the state’s business cli-
mate”—there is almost no way for the shareholder to disprove this 
assertion, unless the candidate’s views are so patently hostile to 
business (which would be unlikely with a Republican candidate) that 
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the statement is implausible on its face. This potential for pretext is 
increased because, as with corporate philanthropy, there is no prohi-
bition on the CEO contributing to a Super PAC personally and with 
the corporation’s money. 
 As a result, although management’s interests do not squarely and 
inescapably conflict with the corporation’s best interests when caus-
ing the corporation to make a political contribution, there is nonethe-
less every reason to believe that management will look after its own 
interests rather than the corporation’s interests because it is just so 
easy to do so. Just as with corporate philanthropy—where corporate 
managers are known to give generously with the corporation’s money 
rather than with their own—it borders on irrational for a corporate 
CEO to contribute her own funds to a Super PAC to support her “pet” 
political candidate when she can use the corporation’s funds to sup-
port the same candidate without any repercussions. 
 In sum, due to the strong potential for pretext, management’s de-
cision to cause the corporation to contribute to a Super PAC support-
ing a political candidate arguably raises the same mixed motives 
problem as the decision to engage in defensive measures. 
2.   A Response to Arguments that Political Contributions Do Not  
     Raise Unusual Agency Cost Concerns 
 Despite the unusual nature of corporate political contributions, 
the late Professor Larry Ribstein argued that management’s decision 
to cause the corporation to make such a contribution raises no great-
er agency cost concerns than ordinary business decisions do.448 
These subparts respond to Ribstein’s arguments. 
(a)   Takeover Markets Are Inadequate Regulators of Political  
       Spending 
 Ribstein argued that derivative suits are unnecessary because 
markets will discipline firms that engage in poorly chosen political 
contributions. According to Ribstein, a corporation that “waste[s] 
money on speech that does not help [its] bottom line” will be less prof-
                                                                                                                  
 448. Others have asserted as much without much supporting argument. See, e.g., John 
Persinger, Note, Opening the Floodgates?: Corporate Governance and Corporate Political 
Activity After Citizens United, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 327, 356-57 
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cal Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1105 
(2002) (“There is nothing special about the agency problem associated with managerial 
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itable than peer corporations—and “will have to pay more for capi-
tal.”449 Here, Ribstein presumably meant that, even if management 
did not disclose the specifics of its wasteful political spending, that 
spending would nonetheless result in the corporation being less prof-
itable than its competitors, leading stockholders to dump the stock 
and causing the stock price to tumble. 
 Of course, a drop in the corporation’s stock price will not neces-
sarily discipline managers who have no fear of taking “soft” benefits 
from the corporation; presumably they will find other ways of over-
compensating themselves to make up for the losses to their portfolios. 
Rather, at bottom, this argument seems to refer to the takeover mar-
kets: if managers waste the corporation’s capital on projects that 
have little prospect of benefitting the corporation’s bottom line, and 
the corporation’s stock price drops so that it becomes undervalued 
(either as a going concern or considering its asset value), this will at-
tract hostile bidders who will seek to replace management.450 
 There are two problems with this argument. Initially, it ignores 
the possibility of rent-seeking: If management could cause the corpo-
ration to support politicians who propose to enact laws to make hos-
tile takeovers more difficult or that make defending against such 
takeovers easier. 451  Ironically, this could allow corporate manage-
ment to avert the need to employ defensive measures—and therefore, 
to avoid facing the scrutiny of Unocal—by using the legislative pro-
cess to circumvent the Chancery Court. 
 Further, this “trust the takeover markets” argument ignores that 
corporate political contributions are just one way that management 
may take “soft” benefits from the corporation. There are many ways, 
besides contributing to “pet” political candidates (and “pet” charities), 
that management can spend the corporation’s money to benefit itself 
rather than the shareholders. For example, the board of directors can 
lavish perks on the CEO beyond those that are typical for, or pay her 
a salary that is higher than CEOs of, similar companies. Yet, the 
                                                                                                                  
 449. Larry E. Ribstein, The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 GA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 1019, 1034 (2011) (citing Target Corp.’s donation to MN Forward). 
 450. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a 
Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) (ex-
plaining how markets for corporate control can discipline management); Geoffery Manne, 
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965). 
 451. See Kesten, supra note 8, at 177 (“[M]anagers might use corporate resources to 
[promote] changes in corporate . . . law that redound to their benefit at the expense of other 
corporate constituencies.”); Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 368, at 91 (“One area in which 
directors and executives may be particularly likely to have views divergent from those of 
shareholders involves rules concerning corporate governance and shareholder rights.”). See 
generally Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111 
(1987). For a brief explanation of rent-seeking, see Kesten, supra note 8, at 210-18. 
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takeover markets act with regard to the whole, not aggregate, not 
based on one type of soft benefit or the other. That is to say, the cor-
poration’s decrease in profitability and resulting stock price tumble 
would reflect the sum total of all “soft” benefits that management 
takes for itself rather than spending on net present value positive 
projects. Therefore, a corporation that pays its CEO at the market 
rate and provides her with the market rate of perquisites will have 
more leeway to engage in “pet” political contributions. 
 This is not a problem if we assume that shareholders only care 
about the corporate bottom line. If that is true, shareholders will 
have no preference between different types of “soft” benefits to man-
agement; rather, shareholders will care only about the overall 
amount of such benefits. 
 Yet, this narrow view of shareholders as one-dimensional wealth-
maximizers is anything but true.452 Shareholders may hold political 
positions and, in light of the zero-sum nature of politics and today’s 
hyper-partisan atmosphere, shareholders may care about their poli-
tics as much as their profits (or more).453 As a result, shareholders 
may object more strongly to the “soft” benefit of allowing manage-
ment to further its own political views at the corporation’s expense 
than other soft benefits, such as lavish perquisites. In short, the 
market-based approach denies shareholders the ability to obtain re-
dress for small-dollar instances of management bad faith about 
which they might feel strongly. Shareholder derivative suits, by con-
trast, allow shareholders to pick and choose. 
 (b)   Boards Are Unlikely to Rein in CEO Political Spending 
 Ribstein also argued that, even if markets do not perfectly  
discipline most agency costs, they are well-suited for regulating  
“the . . . type of agency costs inherent in corporate speech that inter-
feres with shareholders’ expression” because such agency costs are 
“more susceptible to market discipline than agent conduct general-
ly.”454 This is because, according to Ribstein, while “corporate agents 
might misbehave when they stand to earn monetary benefits at the 
firm’s expense”—e.g., “lucrative compensation packages”—they are 
                                                                                                                  
 452. See Kesten, supra note 8, at 184 (“[S]hareholders are not homogenously wealth 
maximizers.” (citing Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the 
Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071, 2118 (2010)). 
 453. See Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, supra note 3, at 526-48 
(so arguing at length); accord Kesten, supra note 8, at 181 (“Corporate political activity is 
especially likely to implicate other aspects of [shareholders’] utility functions. Indeed, 
shareholders may find these expressive harms . . . much more burdensome than any asso-
ciated financial losses.”). 
 454. Ribstein, supra note 449, at 1034. 
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less likely to misbehave (and therefore, more susceptible to market 
discipline) when engaged in “mildly self-interested conduct” because 
they are “unlikely to risk board dismissal for potentially embarrass-
ing or costly political speech whose potential benefits are long-range 
and speculative.”455 By this, Ribstein apparently meant that the cor-
poration’s outside director-dominated board might remove the CEO 
for causing the corporation to engage in wasteful political spending 
that promotes the CEO’s own personal views. 
 But Ribstein had it exactly backwards. Corporate political contri-
butions, like charitable donations, are less susceptible to scrutiny 
than ordinary business decisions. Due to the “long-range and specu-
lative” nature of any benefits that flow from corporate philanthropy, 
it is more difficult to evaluate whether such decisions benefit the cor-
poration than it is to evaluate ordinary business decisions that in-
volve a transaction for goods or services.456 Thus, not only is it more 
difficult for shareholders to challenge such decisions in court (as de-
scribed above457), it is also more difficult for a board of independent 
directors to conclude that the CEO has wasted the corporation’s 
money. 
 At bottom, Ribstein’s argument seems premised on the assump-
tion that CEOs will be loathe to cause the corporation to make Super 
PAC contributions for fear that they will be unable to prove to the 
board that the contributions bolstered the corporation’s bottom line. 
But this is probably not an accurate depiction of reality, for two rea-
sons. First, there is simply no reason to believe that the boardroom 
reverses the business judgment presumption. It seems unlikely that 
directors who have “hired” the CEO (or who have been recruited to 
serve on the board by the existing CEO) will demand that the CEO 
prove that the corporation’s political (and charitable) spending bene-
fits the corporation, or else be subject to discipline. It seems far more 
likely that the board will trust the CEO and indulge her explanation 
of why and how the corporation’s political (and charitable) spending 
may benefit the corporation in the long run, so long as that explana-
tion is plausible. 
 Second, corporate political contributions are generally a miniscule 
percentage of a corporation’s overall expenditures, particularly for 
public corporations. Such contributions are therefore unlikely to be 
significant enough to garner board scrutiny unless they go completely 
awry. Here, the example Ribstein cites—Target Corp.’s donation to 
MN Forward—is the exception that proves this rule. While a board 
                                                                                                                  
 455. Id. (emphasis added). 
 456. See supra Part III.B. 
 457. See supra Part III.B. 
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obviously will second-guess the CEO’s decision to contribute to a Su-
per PAC if, in retrospect, the contribution leads to horrible publicity 
and widespread boycotts of the company’s stores, in the absence of 
such a debacle, there is no reason to believe that the board will care 
one whit. 
 The foregoing analysis is not mere speculation. Rather, it is sup-
ported by “[a] growing academic literature [that] has found that, with 
the exception of firms dependent on government contracts or operat-
ing in heavily regulated industries, corporate political spending does 
not result in greater economic returns for the firm” and in fact may 
harm the firm.458  This research suggests that “corporate political ac-
tivity is . . . associated with higher levels of senior executive inde-
pendence”459—i.e., agency costs. Thus, corporate election spending 
may be less about investment on behalf of the firm and more of a 
benefit to “senior managers seeking to advance their partisan com-
mitments.”460 
V.   INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY FOR CORPORATE POLITICAL  
CONTRIBUTIONS 
 So far, this Article has argued that courts should subject man-
agement’s decision to cause the corporation to contribute to a Super 
PAC to intermediate scrutiny, rather than the business judgment 
rule. If the Delaware courts were to accept that argument, what 
should that intermediate scrutiny look like and what would its effects 
be? This Part addresses both questions. 
                                                                                                                  
 458. Richard Briffault, The Uncertain Future of the Corporate Contribution Ban, 49 
VAL. U. L. REV. 397, 426 (2015) (citing, inter alia, John C. Coates IV, Corporate Politics, 
Governance, and Value Before and After Citizens United, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 657, 
659, 668-90 (2012) (concluding that corporate political activity “correlates positively with 
measures of managerial agency costs—greater use by CEOs of corporate jets,” that “politi-
cally active firms making large capital expenditures have significantly lower value than 
inactive firms making similarly sized capital expenditures,” and that “the value of political-
ly active firms diverged downward relative to inactive firms after the unexpected decision 
in Citizens United, even as political expenditures in already active firms increased”—all of 
which is inconsistent with “a simple theory in which [corporate political activity] generally 
serves the interests of shareholders”)); Rajesh K. Aggarwal et al., Corporate Political Dona-
tions: Investment or Agency?, 14 BUS. & POL. 1, 1 (2012) (finding that, after controlling for 
certain aspects of corporate governance, campaign donations are associated with lower 
returns); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The 
Tension Between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. 
REV. 335, 390 n.221 (2015) (interpreting Coates as “doubt[ing] whether corporate political 
spending is good for stockholders . . . because his results indicate that increased political 
spending was negatively correlated with firm profitability in all sectors except one: indus-
tries that are heavily subject to government regulation.”). 
 459. Briffault, supra note 458, at 426. 
 460. Id. 
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A.   The Proposed Test: In Brief 
 By analogy to Unocal, when evaluating a decision to make a cor-
porate political contribution, a court should require that manage-
ment establish that (1) it believed in good faith, and had reasonable 
grounds to believe, that the contribution would directly advance a 
specific policy outcome that serves a specific corporate interest, ra-
ther than some general political viewpoint; and (2) the contribution 
was reasonable, both as a method of addressing the specific corporate 
interest and in its amount. Only if management could prove that the 
political contribution satisfied both prongs would its decision be pro-
tected by the business judgment rule. 
 Now let us delve a little deeper into the test by describing its ap-
plication in greater detail. 
B.   The Proposed Test: Detailed Application 
 1.   Prong One in Greater Detail 
 As with Unocal, the first prong of this test requires that the board 
state its rationale for acting, and requires that the board identify a 
corporate interest advanced by the political contribution. However, 
unlike the Unocal test, which has been criticized as accepting as gos-
pel basically anything that management wants as a valid corporate 
policy,461 the proposed test requires that the court actually scrutinize 
management’s stated corporate policy for potential pretext in two 
ways. 
 First, the contribution must be in support of a specific policy out-
come. Thus, management could not justify a political contribution 
with mere content-free political sloganeering. For example, manage-
ment could not make a contribution to Donald Trump based on his 
slogan that he would “make American great again,” and could not 
make a contribution to Bernie Sanders based on his claim to promote 
“a future to believe in.” Nor could management justify the contribu-
tion by referring to general issue areas without adding any specific 
content to those issues. Hence, a contribution could not be justified 
on the grounds that the candidate will “advance conservative values,” 
“bring needed toughness to our foreign affairs,” “fix the economy,” or 
“bring a new era of responsibility to Washington.” More specificity 
would be required. For example, management could state that the 
candidate in question proposes to “cut the corporate tax rate,” or “re-
duce crime and homelessness in the downtown area,” “lower the min-
imum wage” or “increase spending on post-secondary education.” 
                                                                                                                  
 461. See Siegel, Problems & Promise, supra note 29, at 86-88. 
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(The test would not require that either the candidate or the corpora-
tion have spelled out in detail his exact proposal for advancing the 
particular policy outcome, however.) If management is not able to 
identify a specific policy outcome that its campaign contribution ad-
vances, management would fail to satisfy its burden under interme-
diate scrutiny. 
 Second, the policy outcome advanced by the contribution would 
have to directly serve a specific corporate interest, rather than a gen-
eral political point of view. Thus, management would be required to 
explain why the policy outcome that it supported was in the best in-
terest of the corporation, rather than in the best interest of the locali-
ty, state, or nation, generally.462 For example, if management were to 
posit that it supported the candidate who proposes to “implement a 
flat income tax,” or “raise taxes on the top 1 percent of Americans 
and increase funding for social welfare programs” both of those would 
pass muster as specific policy outcomes that the corporation could 
wish to advance. However, in either case, management would also 
have to explain why the particular change in the tax structure that 
its candidate favors will directly benefit the corporation in a specific 
way, rather than simply benefitting society as a whole. Thus, man-
agement could not simply assert that a flat tax would “simplify the 
tax code and reduce the burden on millions of Americans,” nor could 
management simply assert that the raising taxes on the top 1 percent 
while spending more money on social programs “would reduce income 
inequality in America.” Rather, in both instances, management 
would be required to explain why its desired tax policy could actually 
advance the corporation’s own, narrow interests. For example, man-
agement of a corporation that makes yachts could urge that imple-
menting a flat tax would “lower taxes on wealthy Americans, thereby 
freeing up money to spend on more of our yachts, thereby benefitting 
our bottom line.” Or management of a corporation that designs and 
sells mass-market knock-off designer clothing could posit that “reduc-
ing income inequality would put more cash in the pockets of the 
working Americans, who will have more money to buy our mass-
market clothing, thereby increasing our firm’s profits.” 
 Importantly, however, management would be required to explain 
how its campaign contribution directly—rather than indirectly—
benefits specific corporate interests. If management were able justify 
contributions based on an indirect effect on corporate interests, then 
                                                                                                                  
 462. This seems only fair, since corporations do not have political views. To the extent 
that management has any place causing the corporation to make a political contribution, it 
is to advance the business of the corporation. 
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the test would have no teeth (as many have urged that Unocal, post-
Unitrin, has none). 
 Thus, management could not contribute to a Super PAC that sup-
ported a Republican candidate, in support of the policy objective of 
“electing a pro-business candidate as governor,” on the theory that 
“Republicans are perceived as pro-business, so having a Republican 
in office will result in greater business confidence that the admin-
istration will have a low-tax agenda, thereby spurring business to 
expand and promoting job growth.” Nor could management contrib-
ute in support of a Democrat candidate for President, in support of 
the policy objective of “electing a less hawkish candidate as Presi-
dent,” on the theory that “our allies trust that a Democrat president 
will work to build coalitions more than a Republican, so having a 
Democrat in office will result in less friction with our international 
trading partners, which will result in better markets for our products 
abroad.” In either instance, even if the objective of electing a particu-
lar type of person were deemed to be a specific policy objective—
which is doubtful—the policy objective only advances the specific cor-
porate interest in an indirect way. While these are perfectly legiti-
mate views for Republican and Democrat donors (respectively) to 
hold, they are not legitimate positions for corporations to hold due to 
the agency costs and the strong possibility of management pretext. 
(The requirement that management’s specific policy objective directly 
support a specific corporate interest would also be relevant in prong 
two, because a court will be able to assess whether a more direct 
method exists.) 
 Therefore, to advance to prong two, management must not only 
posit a specific policy outcome and a specific corporate interest, it also 
must explain why the former directly supports the latter. If neither 
the policy income nor the corporate interest are plausible or specific 
enough for the court, or if the court deems that the link between the 
two is not plausible, management will fail to satisfy its burden of 
proof. 
 Finally, before moving on to prong two, a word about good faith. In 
most cases, it will be more difficult to establish that management’s 
policy views are reasonable than to show that management holds 
them in good faith. This is because shareholder plaintiffs typically 
will not have access to damning evidence about management’s in-
nermost thoughts—and because frankly, few corporate executives (at 
least the leaders of large corporations) are outspoken about their po-
litical views. However, to the extent that the shareholder has evi-
dence concerning management’s actual political views, in the public 
record or otherwise, a shareholder might be able to contest manage-
ment’s assertion that it holds, in good faith, the policy outcome it 
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purportedly desired to advance. As we will see, this is an important 
protection against management pretext. 
 2.   Prong Two in Greater Detail 
 If management is able to proffer a specific policy that advances a 
specific corporate interest, the next step is for management to con-
vince the court that its decision to contribute to a Super PAC that 
supports this particular politician is reasonable, both in terms of 
method and amount. This test, while by no means onerous, is not 
simply rational basis review; management must do more than simply 
show that its decision to advance the specific policy was not irration-
al. Instead, management would be required to show that a reasona-
ble person might choose its course of action over other plausible 
courses of action.463 
 When assessing the reasonableness of management’s decision to 
make the contribution, a critical issue for the court will be whether, 
in light of the aforementioned differences between political contribu-
tions and charitable donations, a reasonable director acting in the 
corporation’s best interest would have instead donated to a charitable 
organization.464 Thus, the court should consider whether the money 
would be better spent on a nonprofit organization that advances that 
particular policy issue. In this way, the proposed test also tweaks 
Unocal, which—as modified in Unitrin—deferentially asks only 
whether the board’s action fell “within a range of reasonableness.”465 
 In determining whether the corporation’s money would be better 
spent on charitable donations, a court might consider the “binary, 
winner-take-all nature of elections” 466 —which means that money 
spent for a candidate who loses might arguably be wasted, whereas 
money spent on a charitable organization will not be. Further, the 
court might consider “the fact that political spending is akin to an 
                                                                                                                  
 463. Compare In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 598 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
(Strine, V.C.) (“One of the benefits of this approach is that it mandates that the court look 
closely at the motivations of the board. In adopting a reasonableness, rather than rationality, 
standard . . . Unocal implicitly acknowledge[s] that there is a predicate question that must be 
answered that is not typically at issue in a case governed by the business judgment rule.”).  
 464. Here, to some extent, the court will be exercising its own business judgment. That 
is perfectly appropriate in the context of intermediate scrutiny. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldo-
nado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) (developing the intermediate scrutiny test, the second prong 
of which requires a court to exercise its own business judgment). 
 465. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1388 (Del. 1995) (“The ratio 
decidendi for the ‘range of reasonableness’ standard is a need of the board of directors for 
latitude in discharging its fiduciary duties to the corporation . . . . The concomitant re-
quirement is for judicial restraint.”). 
 466. Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, supra note 3, at 548. 
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arms race”467—which means that greater and greater dollar amounts 
funneled to candidates in expensive elections may result in lower re-
turns to scale because the result (election of either candidate) will be 
the same if less money were spent on either side. 
 In addition, while contributing directly to governmental actors 
may place the corporation’s dollars closer to the locus of power than 
contributing to a nonprofit organization, there are several downsides 
about contributing to politicians rather than organizations that the 
corporation would be required to consider. First, since “elections are 
about people, not specific policy goals,”468 the corporation will have to 
take the good with the bad when electing a politician; to the extent 
that the politician in question holds policy positions that oppose the 
corporation’s best interest, the court should consider whether the 
downside is worth the upside. Second, the court should consider “the 
truism that politicians do not always keep their promises”469; thus, 
while a politician could renege on her promise to advance a specific 
policy goal, a charitable organization is unlikely to abandon its stated 
positions. Indeed, a charitable organization could be required by con-
tract to spend funds donated to advancing specific policy goals.470 
 Finally, management would be required to prove to the court that 
the political contribution was reasonable in amount. For a large mul-
tinational corporation, this probably will be no difficult feat, since 
large corporations tend to spend only a tiny amount of their entire 
budget on giving away money. However, in assessing whether the 
amount is reasonable, the court should again consider whether cor-
porate funds would be best spent on political contribution or by a 
charitable donation. 
 First, the court ought to consider the overall cost of the political 
contribution, keeping in mind that the corporation will not receive a 
tax deduction for it. By contrast, a donation to a charitable organiza-
tion that works towards the same policy goals would receive a tax 
deduction, so the same amount of money could go farther. Although 
some organizations that engage in direct policy advocacy (e.g., the 
Sierra Club) are not tax exempt because they do lobbying, often such 
organizations have an educational or litigation-advocacy arm (e.g., 
Earthjustice or the Sierra Club Education Fund) that advances the 
organization’s goals without direct lobbying and allows for a tax de-
duction. Moreover, even if it were reasonable to place the corpora-
tion’s funds closer to the halls of power, it might be reasonable—
                                                                                                                  
 467. Id. 
 468. Id. 
 469. Id. 
 470. Id. 
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particularly in light of the binary, winner-take-all nature of electoral 
politics—to contribute that money to an organization that lobbies, 
rather than to a Super PAC that focuses on electoral politics. 
* * * * * 
 In sum, if courts were to employ the intermediate standard de-
scribed above when reviewing corporate political contributions, man-
agement’s latitude to make political contributions would be some-
what restricted but not eviscerated. While the test should eliminate 
many egregious political contributions that obviously support man-
agers’ own personal political views without any plausible argument 
that they serve the best interest of the corporation,471 management 
may, in many instances, be able to satisfy the test by providing a de-
tailed and plausible explanation for why the contribution benefits the 
corporation.472 That said, adoption of the test might cause manage-
ment, in some instances, to decide to donate to an advocacy organiza-
tion or a nonprofit rather than to a Super PAC that supports a candi-
date for elective office. 
 Ultimately, if courts apply intermediate scrutiny when reviewing 
corporate political contributions, it may become more difficult for 
management to cause a corporation to donate to Super PACs that 
support specific candidates for public office. However, management 
would retain wide discretion to donate to ballot initiatives that di-
                                                                                                                  
 471. See Kwak, supra note 3, at 283 (arguing that applying intermediate scrutiny to 
corporate political contributions “would help ensure that corporations’ political spending is 
more closely focused on initiatives that have a good chance of promoting shareholder value 
and make it harder for executives to direct contributions based on their personal financial 
interests or ideological preferences”).  
 472. If intermediate scrutiny were applied, management might “either scale back  
their . . . political spending or subject it to considerably more scrutiny . . . to ensure that 
each contribution . . . show[ed] a plausible likelihood of delivering a net benefit to the cor-
poration.” Kwak, supra note 3, at 283. This, in turn, “would help align political activities with 
the interests of shareholders rather than the personal preferences of directors and officers.” Id. 
 Alternatively, the board might “choose to submit political contributions for share-
holder approval.” Id. This would be a good idea, indeed. Cf. Leahy, Corporate Political Con-
tributions as Bad Faith, supra note 3, at 554-57 (urging that management could avoid 
shareholder challenges to corporate political contributions by obtaining advance approval 
of shareholders). Or, if management refuses to submit political contributions for share-
holder approval, shareholders could take the matter into their own hands and unilaterally 
insist upon a role. See Kesten, supra note 8, at 228-36 (arguing that corporate political 
activity could and should be governed by shareholder-enacted bylaws). Either way, this 
might result in more shareholder involvement in corporate political contributions—just as 
the Supreme Court has envisioned. See Kwak, supra note 3, at 283-84 (“By requiring cor-
porations to . . . substantiate the merits of their political activities, it would also make it 
possible for shareholders to come to an informed judgment about the . . . value of those 
activities. This would help make the Supreme Court’s assumption in Bellotti—that ‘share-
holders may decide . . . whether their corporation should engage in debate on public issues’ 
—a reality.” (footnote omitted)). 
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rectly relate to the corporation’s business—and even to some Super 
PACs directed to particular issues that support political candidates. 
C.   The Proposed Test in Action 
 In order to demonstrate the effect of applying intermediate scruti-
ny to corporate political contributions, let us now apply it to two real-
life corporate political contributions that were widely reported in the 
national media: Target Corp.’s 2010 contribution to MN Forward and 
News Corp.’s 2010 contribution to the Republican Governor’s Associ-
ation. 
 1.   Target Corp.’s Donation to MN Forward 
 The basic facts of this contribution have been detailed elsewhere473 
and above.474 Basically, Target Corp. contributed to a Super PAC, MN 
Forward, that supported (among other candidates) the Republican 
candidate for governor of Minnesota, Tom Emmer. Target Corp. faced 
a large backlash among gay rights advocates because of the contribu-
tion, due to Emmer’s vocal opposition to gay marriage. However, 
Target Corp. did not purport to make the contribution due to Em-
mer’s (or any other politician’s) stance on gay rights or any other so-
cial issue.475 Rather, Target’s CEO steadfastly claimed throughout 
the debacle that the company’s contribution to MN Forward was in-
tended “to support economic growth and job creation . . . [and] a 
business climate conducive to growth.”476 
 Supporting “economic growth and job creation” in Minnesota is 
not a particularly specific policy outcome, but nor is it a general polit-
ical slogan. Yet, although Target Corp. did not provide more specific 
details about the specific policy outcomes that it believed were im-
portant to “job growth,” MN Forward’s own public pronouncements 
provided a great deal more information. 
 MN Forward was not a single-candidate Super PAC, focused on 
supporting Tom Emmer, and all of the issues that he supported;477 
rather, MN Forward claimed to focus on “creating jobs and economic 
                                                                                                                  
 473. Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 313-26, 338-41. 
 474. See supra text accompanying notes 390-98. 
 475. Leahy, A Closer Look, supra note 2, at 326. 
 476. See id. (quoting letter from Target CEO to its employees). 
 477. Indeed, MN Forward later supported candidates, including Democrats, who sup-
ported gay marriage. See id.; see also supra note 396. Further, at the time it made the do-
nation, Target Corp.—which previously had been known for its moderate image, see id.— 
admitted that it did not agree with all of the policies advanced by the candidates that it 
supported. See Martiga Lohn, Target CEO Defends Minn. GOP Contributions, 
NBCNEWS.COM (July 27, 2010), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/38434618/ns/business-retail/t/ 
target-ceo-defends-minn-gop-contributions/ [https://perma.cc/PZ5S-ZC62]. 
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opportunity.”478 To that end, MN Forward claimed to support three 
policy goals: “tax reform,” “spending reform,” and “ensuring our chil-
dren receive a world-class education.”479 More specifically, MN For-
ward advocated lowering Minnesota’s corporate tax rate; reducing 
government spending; and implementing some fairly specific educa-
tional proposals.480 
 Although Target Corp. did not go into much detail in explaining 
its support for MN Forward—because it did not have to—it easily 
could have done so, if necessary, if faced with a lawsuit in which the 
court applied intermediate scrutiny. On the face of MN Forward’s 
clear focus on jobs, Target Corp. could have proffered the following 
explanation: “We contributed to MN Forward (which in turn support-
ed Mike Emmer for governor) to promote job growth in Minnesota by, 
among other things, lowering the corporate tax rate. Lowering taxes 
on businesses would allow them to expand and thereby create more 
jobs.” (Target would not have to explain its particular preference for 
how to lower the corporate tax rate.) By doing this, Target would 
have easily satisfied the first requirement of prong one of intermedi-
ate scrutiny, identifying a specific policy outcome: inter alia, lowering 
Minnesota’s corporate tax rate. 
 Although Target did not make an effort to do so, it also easily 
could have satisfied the second part of prong one, identifying a specif-
ic corporate interest that would be advanced by the specific policy 
outcome its candidate favored. Target Corp. could have asserted that 
“We supported MN Forward’s goal of lowering the corporate tax rate 
because it will help reduce unemployment in Minnesota. More jobs in 
Minnesota means more money in the pockets of Minnesotans—and 
therefore, more money to spend on the fine products sold at Target 
Corp.’s retail stores.” 
 Next, to satisfy prong two, Target Corp.’s management would be 
required to establish that its contribution to MN Forward was rea-
sonable, both (1) as a method of addressing the specific corporate in-
terest of lowering the corporate tax rate and promoting job growth; 
and (2) in the amount donated. To do this, Target Corp.’s manage-
ment would have to establish that it is reasonable to conclude that 
supporting MN Forward would lead to Target’s Corp.’s desired goal of 
lowering the corporate tax rate, spurring job growth, and lowering 
unemployment in Minnesota; and that a reasonable person in its po-
sition might choose to contribute to MN Forward rather than to some 
                                                                                                                  
 478. Issues, MN FORWARD, https://web.archive.org/web/20100802161503/ 
http://www.mnforward.com/issues (last visited Dec. 13, 2016). 
 479. Id.  
 480. Id. 
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other nonprofit organization that supports those same goals, address-
ing the concerns raised above. 
 The first aspect of this analysis is not difficult. Lowering the cor-
porate tax rate is not a well-refuted policy fantasy (such as say, the 
Laffer Curve) of the farthest of far-right wing Republicans. Rather, it 
is a policy position taken by many middle-of-the-road Republicans 
and Democrats.481 Thus, whatever one feels personally about lower-
ing the corporate tax rate and whether it would stimulate job growth, 
a reasonable person might plausibly take that view. 
 The harder question is whether Target Corp. was reasonable in 
donating to MN Forward rather than a nonprofit organization. There 
is no shortage of nonprofit organizations—both tax-exempt and non-
tax-exempt—that promote reducing the corporate tax rate either as 
their primary or as a secondary goal.482 However, there appears to be 
no such organization (from what this Author could find) that focuses 
on lowering taxes in Minnesota. Further, since state policy outcome 
could only be addressed by legislation (not, say, by litigation), it 
seems that placing the money closer to the locus of power is reasona-
ble. What’s more, since achieving such a legislative goal probably 
would have required lobbying, it is not clear that contributing to an 
educational organization in order to receive the tax deduction would 
have been as effective. Finally, for a large, national corporation like 
Target Corp., for which the cost of goods sold was about $54 billion in 
2015,483 the amount of the MN Forward contribution—$150,000—is 
literally like a single drop in eleven buckets of water.484 Moreover, 
that amount is likely to have had more power because dollars go far-
                                                                                                                  
 481. See William Greider, Democrats and Republicans are Quietly Planning a Corporate 
Giveaway—to the Tune of $400 Billion, NATION (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.thenation.com/ 
article/democrats-and-republicans-are-quietly-planning-a-corporate-giveaway-to-the-tune-of-
400-billion/ [https://perma.cc/FFR3-WJSV] (discussing plans in Congress to lower tax rates 
so that companies that have “parked” their profits abroad will bring them to the United 
States); Jim Puzzanghera, Big Differences Divide Democrats, GOP on Overhauling U.S. 
Tax Code, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2015, 4:55 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-tax-
reform-20150418-story.html [https://perma.cc/J7S4-LGQQ] (“There’s broad agreement the 
U.S. corporate tax rate, which at 35% is the highest among industrialized nations, needs to 
be lowered . . . .”). 
 482. For example, the Tax Foundation, which purports to be “the nation’s lead-
ing independent tax policy research organization,” see About Us, TAX FOUND., 
http://taxfoundation.org/about-us, has advocated for lowering the corporate tax rate, 
see, e.g., Andrew Lundeen, A Cut in the Corporate Tax Rate Would Provide a Signifi-
cant Boost to the Economy, TAX FOUND (Feb. 19, 2015), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/cut-
corporate-tax-rate-would-provide-significant-boost-economy [https://perma.cc/9PTL-C2GK]. 
 483. See Target Corp., MKT. WATCH, http://www.marketwatch.com/investing/stock/tgt/ 
financials (last visited Dec. 13, 2016). $150,000 is approximately 1/333,333 of $50 billion. 
 484. See How Much is a Drop in the Bucket?, COCKEYED.COM, http://www.cockeyed.com/ 
science/drop_in_bucket/drop_in_the_bucket.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (concluding 
that a standard three-gallon bucket holds about 30,000 drops of water).  
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ther in a governor’s election in a small, Midwestern state than, say, a 
highly-contested United States Senate race on the East or West 
Coasts.485 
 Ultimately, since we do not know what Target Corp. would have 
argued in support of its contribution, we cannot be sure whether its 
decision to contribute to MN Forward rather than to a nonprofit or-
ganization was a reasonable means of advancing its policy goal. But 
there seems to be a decent argument in support of the contribution. 
At a minimum, Target Corp.’s management surely could have met its 
burden under the first prong of intermediate scrutiny to proffer a 
specific policy outcome (lowering the corporate tax rate in Minnesota) 
that directly advanced (by lowering unemployment in Minnesota) a 
specific corporate interest (promoting sales at its retail stores). Fur-
ther, Target Corp.’s management probably could have shown that its 
donation to MN Forward was a reasonable approach to achieving its 
stated policy goal. Thus, with a little good lawyering, Target Corp.’s 
much maligned political contribution would have passed muster un-
der intermediate scrutiny. 
2.   News Corp.’s Contribution to the Republican Governor’s  
     Association 
 Next, let us analyze another notorious corporate political contribu-
tion, News Corp.’s contribution to the Republican Governor’s Associa-
tion (RGA) in 2010.486 The RGA is a section 527 political organization, 
which means that its primary purpose is political activity.487 News 
Corp.’s only official announcement about the contribution was that it 
was made because of the RGA’s “ ‘pro-business’ agenda” and because 
it supported “ ‘pro-business’ candidates.”488 
 Like Target Corp.’s initial statement about its contribution to MN 
Forward (which was slightly more specific in that it stressed the cre-
ation of jobs in addition to economic growth), “ ‘pro-business’ agenda” 
                                                                                                                  
 485. See Dayton Bested Rival in Lower-Spending Governor’s Race, CBS MINN. (Feb.  
3, 2015, 9:31 AM), http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2015/02/03/dayton-bested-rival-in-lower-
pending-governors-race/ [https://perma.cc/55DN-TXRU] (candidates and outside groups 
spent about $9 million combined in 2010 Minnesota gubernatorial race); Center for Re-
sponsive Politics, Most Expensive Races, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/ 
overview/topraces.php?cycle=2010&display=allcands [https://perma.cc/6QXM-MMU6] (list-
ing the top six most expensive U.S. Senate races in 2010, all of which were on the East or 
West Coast, and all of which involved total spending of greater than $40 million). 
 486. For an extended discussion, see Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad 
Faith, supra note 3, at 510-14. 
 487. See Donald B. Tobin, The Internal Revenue Service and a Crisis of Confidence: A 
New Regulatory Approach for a New Era, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 429, 448 (2014) (explaining that 
“section 527 organizations must be primarily engaged in campaign activity”).  
 488. Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, supra note 3, at 511. 
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is not a specific policy outcome—not even close. However, unfortu-
nately, the RGA’s agenda, like that of a politician (and unlike that of 
MN Forward), is so multifarious that the gift does not, on its face, 
suggest a specific policy outcome. The RGA’s “primary mission is to 
help elect Republicans to governorships throughout the nation”489—
which is not a specific policy outcome, since Republican governors 
can and do support a vast range of specific policy outcomes. 
 The RGA’s website also states that the organization also 
“provid[es Republican] governors with the resources to help them 
govern effectively,”490 but the website provides no additional infor-
mation about what materials it provides to governors. The website 
purports to contain a link to “RGA research,” but the linked page 
simply contains attack videos on various Democratic governors;491 
further, the RGA’s own description of what its research director does 
(when hiring a new one in 2014), suggests that the “research” in 
question is simply “opposition” type research, digging up dirt on 
Democratic governors.492 What’s more, the RGA has a separate policy 
research association, the Republican Governors Public Policy Com-
mittee (RGPPC), a 501(c)(4) nonprofit “social welfare” organization—
which by law is not allowed to focus primarily on political activi-
ty493—the primary focus of which “is to generate and monitor con-
servative policy impacting states.”494 Hence, it seems that the RGA is 
simply a partisan organization, devoted to electing Republican gover-
nors, and any research the RGA provides to Republican governors is 
for that purpose, not general policy education (unlike the non-
partisan National Governors’ Association).495 
 Therefore, while News Corp. might, in theory, have been able to 
provide a more specific policy outcome that it sought to support by 
contributing to the RGA, it did not, and none is evident on the face of 
the contribution. This stands in stark contrast to Target’s donation to 
                                                                                                                  
 489. About, REPUBLICAN GOVERNORS ASS’N, http://www.rga.org/homepage/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/KF98-DW6S]. 
 490. Id. 
 491. Research, REPUBLICAN GOVERNORS ASS’N, https://web.archive.org/web/20160825221924/ 
http://www.rga.org/homepage/category/research/ (last visitied Dec. 13, 2016). 
 492. RGA Names Kevin Wright Research Director, REPUBLICAN GOVERNORS ASS’N 
(Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.rga.org/homepage/rga-names-kevin-wright-research-director/ 
[https://perma.cc/UJE6-66J2]. 
 493. Tobin, supra note 487, at 443-44 (501(c)(4) social welfare organizations “are al-
lowed to intervene in political campaigns but the primary purpose of these organizations 
may not be political campaign activity and must be consistent with their exempt status.”).  
 494. Republican Governors Association, BALLOTOPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/ 
Republican_Governors_Association [https://perma.cc/KEA8-YQNK]. 
 495. See FAQ, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, http://www.nga.org/cms/home/about/faq.html 
[https://perma.cc/NNS2-WYGW]. 
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a more narrowly-focused Super PAC. Hence, without more infor-
mation, this contribution would seem to fail the first prong of inter-
mediate scrutiny for failure to state a specific policy outcome it sup-
ports. 
 Yet, let us assume that a shareholder of News Corp. sued man-
agement about the RGA contribution and, as a result, News Corp. 
provided more detailed information about the purpose of its contribu-
tion. Let us assume that News Corp. made the contribution for the 
same reason that Target Corp. did, to lower unemployment—albeit 
on a national scale. Even assuming that News Corp. could posit a 
specific corporate interest that was furthered by this specific policy 
outcome—say, more jobs for the middle class means more money to 
spend on movies made by 21st Century Fox (which, at the time, was 
a subsidiary of News Corp.)—the RGA contribution would nonethe-
less probably fail to pass muster for two reasons. 
 First, the first prong of the intermediate scrutiny above requires 
good faith, and there is strong reason to believe that News Corp.’s 
official statement about why the contribution was made was not 
true—i.e., made in bad faith. This is because News Corp.’s outspoken 
CEO, Rupert Murdoch, provided his own, personal explanation for 
the RGA contribution in a candid moment with the press—making 
this contribution one of the few instances in which the public ob-
tained an inside look into management’s actual mindset for making a 
contribution. As was widely reported, Murdoch informed a reporter 
from Politico, when asked whether the contribution to a Republican 
suggested that Fox News—owned by News Corp.—was biased to-
wards Republicans, Murdoch posited that he gave the contribution to 
the RGA to benefit his close friend John Kasich, a former commenta-
tor on Fox News,496 who was running for Governor of Ohio.497 
 Thus, a plaintiff would have an admission from News Corp.’s own 
CEO to rebut the company’s showing on prong one that it made the 
contribution to support a particular policy position. Lying about the 
purpose for its actions is a classic example of bad faith.498 
 Second, even if a court rejected Murdoch’s explanation of the pur-
pose behind the RGA contribution,499 the contribution probably would 
fail to satisfy the second prong of intermediate scrutiny because 
                                                                                                                  
 496. Jessica Taylor, 5 Things You Should Know About John Kasich, NPR (July 21, 
2015, 8:41 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/07/20/424834838/5-things-
you-should-know-about-john-kasich. 
 497. Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, supra note 3, at 511. 
 498. Leahy, A Decade After Disney, supra note 16, at 864-65. 
 499. It is possible that Murdoch was lying to the press, and the contribution did indi-
cate Murdoch’s political leanings—which are well known to be strongly Republican. See 
Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, supra note 3, at 511. 
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News Corp. likely could not show that contributing to the RGA was a 
reasonable means of achieving the policy outcome of lowering unem-
ployment. There were thirty-seven gubernatorial elections in 2010, 
and the RGA presumably provided some support to many different 
Republican candidates for governor. Absent a secret agreement be-
tween News Corp. and the RGA that News Corp.’s funds would be 
spent in favor of a particular candidate (say, Kasich), or on adver-
tisements focused on a particular audience or topic (i.e., candidates 
that support particular reforms to reduce unemployment), there is no 
certainty that the money would be spent to advance News Corp.’s 
goal. 
 In addition, although the Republican party has become more con-
servative—and therefore, more cohesive—in its ideology in recent 
years, there is simply no plausible way that News Corp. could show 
that it was reasonable to believe that its money would be directed 
towards lowering unemployment rather than to support one of the 
hundreds of other priorities supported by the thirty-seven Republi-
cans who ran for governor in 2010. The point about taking the good 
with the bad in candidates is even more true when donating to an 
organization that supports multiple candidates whose only common 
thread is sharing the same political party. Some Republican candi-
dates for governor may have made lowering unemployment the focus 
of their campaign and, upon winning, a primary goal of their admin-
istration—but other Republican candidates for governor may have 
focused on other issues.500 When contributing to an organization like 
the RGA (or the Democratic Governors’ Association), or to any state 
or national party, there is simply no way to know where the cash is 
going. 
 Therefore, News Corp.’s contribution to the RGA probably would 
not have satisfied intermediate scrutiny and earned the protection of 
the business judgment rule. 
* * * * * 
 Based on these two examples, the application of intermediate 
scrutiny to corporate political contributions might seem to have little 
effect. Despite the black eye that it gave Target Corp., the company’s 
contribution to MN Forward in support of Mike Emmer probably 
would have passed muster under intermediate scrutiny because MN 
Forward supported a narrow range of candidates and clearly stated 
its agenda in narrow and specific terms. Further, the News Corp. 
contribution to the RGA in support of John Kasich failed to pass 
                                                                                                                  
 500. This would be true regardless of what policy outcome News Corp.’s contribution 
was intended to advance.  
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muster in part because of the CEO’s ill-advised explanation for the 
contribution; had Murdoch been more circumspect, and had the News 
Corp. board spent more time crafting a coherent justification for the 
contribution, it might have passed muster. 
 Yet, the point of applying intermediate scrutiny is not to defeat 
management’s ability to cause a corporation to make political contri-
butions. Rather, the goal is to reduce the potential for bad faith polit-
ical contributions by requiring management to make a reasonable 
argument that any political contribution promotes the corporation’s 
bottom line and by making management think twice about the value 
of making a political contribution rather than a charitable donation 
that supports the same policy goals. Therefore, even if it does not end 
up eliminating many corporate political contributions, it could serve 
the goal of lowering agency costs and providing shareholders with 
more information about management’s rationale for making political 
contributions. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 Today, courts apply the business judgment rule to a management 
decision to cause the corporation to contribute to a Super PAC that 
supports a candidate for elective office. But tomorrow, they should 
consider applying a heightened standard like intermediate scrutiny. 
This Article has explained why and how to make that change. 
 This not to say that the case for intermediate scrutiny is open and 
shut. The same objections that scholars level against derivative liti-
gation generally could be (and have been, briefly)501 martialed against 
applying intermediate scrutiny in a new context, that of corporate 
political contributions. Derivative litigation is a blunt tool, and it 
may be less efficient to address common agency cost concerns by liti-
gation than by more orderly corporate governance processes.502 Yet, 
the threat of derivative litigation can incentivize management to 
make changes that it otherwise would not make; if the ultimate goal 
is for management to submit corporate political contributions for 
shareholder approval, imposing intermediate scrutiny on manage-
ment might make that goal a reality.503 
                                                                                                                  
 501. See Kesten, supra note 8, at 185 (arguing that making it easier for shareholder 
plaintiffs to succeed in challenging corporate political activity by reviewing such activity 
under the intermediate scrutiny rather than the business judgment rule “could lead to a 
flood of litigation” that “would likely dwarf any concomitant reduction in agency costs.”). 
 502. See id. at 184-85 (arguing that shareholders should exercise control over corporate 
political contributions by voting rather than by litigating because the former requires ma-
jority approval whereas the latter can be brought by any shareholder with standing). 
 503. See supra note 472. 
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 Either way, reviewing corporate political contribution under Un-
ocal’s “enhanced business judgment rule” would bring reality into 
line with the United States Supreme Court’s assertion in Citizens 
United that shareholders can avoid contributions “through the proce-
dures of corporate democracy.”504 These procedures do not work if 
management never has to explain itself and can easily lie about its 
motivations—which is necessarily true if courts subject political con-
tributions to the business judgment rule. However, if courts apply the 
Unocal test, management will be required, at a minimum, to offer a 
reasonable explanation of why a political contribution benefits the 
corporation. This is a small price for management to pay for the awe-
some power of the purse unleashed by Citizens United. 
                                                                                                                  
 504. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361-62 (2010) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)). 
